Turkey and US: common grounds and boundaries

A ‘complicated’ relationship

As the Syrian armed conflict has entered its sixth year, two players—the US and Turkey—on opposition side succeeded to put themselves in the spotlights on various occasions. Turkey is involved in the Syrian conflict since its early beginning as the supplier and hosting country for various rebel factions that strongly oppose Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The US gradually increased its involvement in Syria from delivering non-lethal aid to rebel groups to an extended and continuous weapon supply. Their involvement in the conflict added an extra flavour to their mutual relationship.

The Syrian conflict meant a common ground for the two countries, as both see the removal of Assad’s rule as an inevitable and necessary goal to achieving peace and bringing justice in the war-torn country.

Though the conflict brought the two together, it also caused some considerable strain on their relationship. In particular, the north of Syria and the Kurdish minority that mainly lives there drove a wedge between the two. Turkey views the Syrian-based Kurdish militia YPG as the extension of the Kurdish separatist PKK movement—an insurgent group based in Turkey’s south-east which has regularly committed attacks against Turkey during the last three decades. The US, on the other hand, sees the Syrian Kurds as a valuable and reliable partner on the ground in its battle against the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS or ISIL or Daesh).

Taking both sides of the story in consideration, some sensible questions do emerge. Is their common objective in Syria strong enough to establish a stable partnership in Syria? Or did the Kurdish question create an unbridgeable gap between the two?  An in-depth look into Syria is needed to understand this notion, starting with a new chapter in Turkey’s involvement in Syria.

On August 24, 2016, Turkey added a whole new dimension to its involvement in Syria, one that threw them deeper into the Syrian conflict. With the help of Turkey’s Special Forces and the Turkish Air Force, a wide range of rebel groups crossed the border and commenced a military incursion into Northern Syria, the so-called ‘Euphrates Shield’ offensive. Turkey mainly presented Euphrates Shield as a military action to oust IS out of its remaining territory in the area, refuting any past claims that it didn’t do enough to counter the terrorist organisation. However, there was no doubt the offensive was intended to prevent the Kurdish-led YPG and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from linking up their territories in the area.

At a closer look, Turkey’s Euphrates Shield operation can’t exactly be called a smooth ride. After an initial successful incursion into the Syrian border city of Jarabulus, Turkish assisted rebel groups encountered stiff resistance from Islamic State militants near the strategic city of al-Bab. These difficulties urged Turkey into throwing in more support for the rebel groups in order to achieve further success. It was only after several failed attempts, and after the Syrian Arab Army approached from the south, the city and its surroundings became fully captured and consolidated. Besides targeting IS, Euphrates Shield forces also launched several assaults in an attempt to take over villages from YPG near Afrin canton and from SDF west of Manbij. The clashes achieved little success, only resulting in a takeover of a marginal share of SDF-held territory in the west of Manbij.

In contrast to what is generally thought, Turkey’s seemingly aggressive behaviour towards the SDF is only one side of the story. At the same time, a remarkable shift happened in US perception of Turkey’s actions. However, largely unnoticed it did play a significant role. In the course of a couple of days, the US gradually changed its stance towards the YPG and SDF in relation to Euphrates Shield. In the early days of the offensive, former US vice-president Joe Biden publicly warned YPG forces they would lose US support if they failed to go back east across the Euphrates river. This stance quickly faded away when Euphrates Shield operations went further on. After a relative silence of a couple of days, US officials went back confirming their commitment to the Syrian Democratic Forces and urged Turkey to stop their attacks on the west of Manbij, while little changed with the SDF. This strange twist in US policy caused frustration with Turkish officials, as they had a feeling that the US, at first, stood by their side by not opposing the incursion in Syria. The sudden change, though, did not affect Turkey in any way as it simply continued targeting the SDF. Turkey’s stubbornness prompted the US to take surprising and remarkable measures.

In a strange joint-venture with Russia and the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), US troops entered SDF territory and positioned no less than 500 soldiers on the front sector facing Euphrates Shield. The US military officials stated that it was a “deliberate action to reassure coalition members and partner forces, deter aggression and keep the focus on defeating ISIS.” It meant a blow to Turkey’s aspirations to further expand in the area, as it took any reasonable possibility away to further advance towards Manbij without risking considerable damage. Moreover, as the SAA further advanced against IS in the area, they succeeded in reaching SDF-held Manbij territory. This meant an indirect connection—more symbolic than practical—between Manbij and Afrin canton through regime-held Aleppo province.

On March 29, Prime Minister Yildirim declared that the Euphrates Shield operations had successfully ended, despite the failure to take over Manbij, an original goal of the campaign, and an indirect connection between YPG and SDF. Although he left the possibility open that more cross-border campaigns would be forthcoming, referring to potential future operations against Kurdish troops or in rebel-held Idlib province.

Already during the final clashes of Euphrates Shield Turkey showed an increasing interest in participating in any offensive to free the city of Raqqa—the de facto IS capital—from Islamic State control. With Syrian Democratic Forces already launching the 4th phase of their Euphrates Wrath campaign to isolate and capture Raqqa, Turkey felt it had little time to convince US of the necessity to include Turkey and its supported rebel factions in the offensive.

The US, on the contrary, has little interest in accepting Turkey’s request for assistance in the offensive, a decision that could severely jeopardise ongoing and further collaboration with the majority Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. The US sees the SDF as a valuable partner in the fight against IS, as they have proven to be robust and efficient on multiple occasions; the US favours increasing Arab presence in the SDF rather than including an external force like Turkey and its aligned rebel forces into the offensive. Turkey feared this response and did little to convince the US, on the contrary. Turkey shot in its own foot by declaring no terror group can be destroyed by using another terror group, referring to the YPG presence in the Syrian Democratic Forces.  Even if US was considering a Turkish participation, the statement made an incorporation of the country into the Raqqa offensive permanently impossible for the US.

Considering its rhetoric and actions, Turkey is trying hard to establish itself as a regional power in the Middle East. To a certain extent, the country succeeded in doing that, as it was able to increase its influence in Syria by supporting rebel groups and launching military operations. But often Turkey hits the borders of its geopolitical and military aspirations. When the country acts in a way that is in direct conflict with US interests, the chances are great that it will literally and figuratively hit boundaries. The country has to take into account that it can’t play the game at the same level like global powers such as US and Russia do. Turkey neither has the geopolitical leverage nor the military means to overcome that. Erdogan experienced at various moments that he only can operate when actions fit within the framework US had already established in Syria.

On the other hand, US still behaves as a sort of a patron to Turkey, which has historically grown throughout the years. However, the US does not have the ability to completely leash Turkey and let it walk the way it wants. Since Russia’s uptick in geopolitical aspirations, there’s an increasing fear that a harsher stance on Turkey could drive the country straight into the arms of Russia, which would then welcomingly present itself as an alternate patron to Turkey.

How the relationship between Erdogan’s Turkey and the US will evolve further depends on future events that could strongly influence it. US president Donald Trump congratulated Erdogan on his victory in the constitutional referendum, an attempt to reassure Turkey they are still a US partner, and not let Turkey walk too far away. Will this approach turn out favourable is something that remains to be seen. Reports are emerging Turkey is already thinking ahead and preparing a new incursion into Syria on SDF held Tal Abyad, with or without US’ consent. For now, it seems Turkey has accepted its boundaries; however, it will not hesitate to push them.