Fencing in failure

Pacifying the Pak-Afghan border

Arguably, fencing can only help when districts on both sides of the Durand line are cleaned from insurgents.

 

For a long time, the cross border insurgency along the Durand Line has been a matter of concern for Pakistan as well as other regional states, including Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been a theatre of many wars including the one which was launched by a global alliance after the 9/11 terrorist in the US. The spill over effects of the war have had adverse impact on Pakistan’s internal security, for Washington’s military might that pushed insurgents out of Afghanistan, forced thousands of jihadists into Pakistan.

It has been long argued that the main reason that insurgents were able to find sanctuaries in Pakistan after the US’s military operation in Afghanistan was due to Pakistan’s own policy of sustaining connections with different non-state actors in order to avoid another phase of abrupt US withdrawal from Kabul that took place during the early 1990s. While part of it is true that some groups were deliberately given space inside Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas along the Durand Line, it’s preposterous to argue that majority of militant groups that slipped into Pakistan did so under the country’s watch.

Pakistan on its part has been trying to establish the state’s writ in the country’s tribal areas for two years; majority of the districts in federally administrated tribal areas (FATA) have been cleaned of militants. Moreover, the long awaited FATA reforms process is seemingly moving ahead with some seriousness reflecting on all policy making circles in Pakistan. In effect, the FATA reforms process has more security connotations than political: the military in Pakistan understands that for the region to remain stable, it’s essential that any security efforts should follow political and constitutional reforms in the region.

Moreover, an even more ambitious plan to stabilise the region is being planned through the fencing of the border with Afghanistan. For some time, Pakistan on its part, has called for the fencing of Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, arguing that the ultimate solution to the cross border infiltration can come through this process. While the fencing of the entire mountainous terrain is likely to prove costly for Pakistan, the planned partial fencing of sensitive areas is not likely to prove effective in terms of thwarting cross border infiltration unless a bilateral – one that includes Afghanistan’s full support – or perhaps a regional effort is devised to ensure stability in areas along the frontier.

The lawless and mountainous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan that occupies space more than 2,000 km cannot be secured fully regardless of the much debated military might of Pakistan. This is what has been frustrating Pakistan for some time, particularly since the country launched a military operation in tribal areas.

Arguably, fencing can only help when districts on both sides of the Durand Line are cleared of insurgents. In this regard, while Pakistan has made strides, Afghanistan continues to play the blame game: Kabul, a few days ago, made a statement that Afghanistan will never recognise the Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the context of Kabul’s border dispute with Pakistan, the government in Afghanistan is not likely to support Pakistan’s fencing, for Kabul’s acceptance of Islamabad’s fencing effort would imply the Afghan government’s final acceptance of the border.

With such an apologetic attitude, the government in Afghanistan has been trying to hide its own weakness in the face of growing terror machine in the country. Last week, reports emerged claiming that the Afghan Taliban control at least 34 states in Afghanistan with majority of militants taking shelters in districts surrounding Pakistan’s tribal regions. While Pakistan may have some connections with the Afghan Taliban, it’s fictitious to argue that Islamabad is interested in keeping its border regions volatile, for it helps the country’s policy of “strategic depth,” largely associating with Islamabad’s sub-state level influence in Afghanistan. Rather, on the other hand, it is more in Islamabad’s interest to make sure that stability returns along the Durand line, for the recent economic investments which Pakistan is eyeing in different forms cannot become sustainable unless security returns to Pakistan’s border regions with Afghanistan.

All in all, Pakistan is no longer beneficiary of any major conflict or troubles inside Afghanistan; rather Islamabad stands to lose as much as Kabul from growing instability in the neighbouring state. Earlier in the week, a bomb explosion in Parachinar, which is in close proximity to Afghanistan, killed at least 22 people. It’s likely that the suicide bomber crossed into Pakistan from its sanctuary in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan cannot continue to blame Pakistan for its own failures which have not allowed the return of peace in the country. On the regional level, a numbers of peace plans are under way: Russia and China are the two major countries which are interested in seeing an end to the Afghan insurgency, for Moscow’s own border with the Central Asian states poses a military challenge to the country if militancy develops there while Beijing’s plans of regional economic integration also demand peace in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s efforts to fence the border with Afghanistan reflect sincerity on Islamabad’s part. However, regional states with interest in the Afghan peace process need to push Afghanistan into accepting the fact that unless the country welcomes Islamabad’s efforts, which are in the interest of both countries, fencing wouldn’t be much help in containing militancy.

Unilateral efforts aimed at effective border control through fencing cannot achieve much needed peace along the Durand Line.