The warrior that kept India at bay
As the submarine age dawned at the beginning of the twentieth century the strange new vessels aroused mixed feelings amongst navies. Some quickly saw the edge they could give, while others dismissed them as dangerous, impractical, and underhand. Somewhat fittingly, Pakistan’s first submarine came not from its former imperial overlord, Britain, but the new global super power, the US. In fact Pakistan’s first documented request for a submarine was actually in 1947, again not from Britain (which seemed constantly reluctant to provide Pakistan with submarine capability), but the US. The strategic parity that submarines could deliver against a larger opponent was therefore well understood by Pakistan’s naval planners. However, it would be nearly two decades before these hopes were realised when the ex-USN Tench Class Ghazi (ex-Diablo), was transferred on a four year lease in 1963.
The Tench Class submarines were heavily armed (ten torpedo tubes with 28 torpedoes) and had a 16,000 nautical mile range, but only ten were ready in time to see any wartime service. Diablo was unlucky, arriving for her first patrol just as the war ended. Though brand new however, technology had already advanced. Captured German U-Boat technology, specifically from the Type-XXI, ensured future submarines would be optimised for sustained underwater endurance and speed with a more hydrodynamic hull, larger battery capacity, and a snorkel. Submarines were no longer boats that essentially submerged to carry out attacks, and deadlier than ever. The Allies consequently developed new designs with this technology, but also converted existing submarines. The US developed the Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program (GUPPY), which it applied to some of the Tench Class submarines. However, it was expensive, and the more affordable, less capable alternative ‘Fleet Snorkel’ upgrade was also developed featuring air conditioning, ESM equipment, streamlined sail, snorkel, and upgraded sonar. This conversion was made to Diablo shortly before her transfer to Pakistan, and she was commissioned on June 1, 1964.
Being the dreadnoughts of the age, and Ghazi’s arrival as the first submarine in the region, was an unpleasant surprise for India that possessed a far larger and more capable navy generally equipped with more modern warships. Her pride was the ex-British Majestic Class carrier Vikrant (ex-Hercules) with which India could project power and dominance around the Indian Ocean region. Ghazi, who in wartime could be lurking anywhere ready to strike, was a serious threat to this capability. Ghazi’s initial officers had also been fully trained in America and brought with them the wealth of US experience and operational culture gained in WWII and since, to establish the seeds of Pakistan’s submarine service. Subsequent training came from Pakistan’s fraternal ally Turkey, which also operated Tench Class submarine (and would later to refit Ghazi using spares from its own stocks), that over the following years rendered every possible service to help train Pakistan’s submariners.
Ghazi had hardly been in service a year before the fighting in Kashmir. In wartime Ghazi was tasked with lurking off Bombay to attack the heavy units of India’s fleet if they left Bombay. This was partly something Operation Somnath, a naval bombardment of the radar station near the Indian coastal town of Dwarka, was hoped could provoke.
Ghazi sailed from Karachi on September 2 under the command of Commander (later Admiral and naval chief) Karamat Rahman Niazi, with Lieutenant Commander (later Vice Admiral) Ahmad Tasnim as his XO (who commanded Hangor in 1971). They were some of Pakistan’s most capable submariners, and Ghazi was in position off Bombay by September 5, but it was quiet. Only after Operation Somnath did she detected 4-5 enemy escorts (destroyers/frigates), but these were ignored as orders gave preference to heavy units. On September 11 Ghazi detected intensive aerial anti-submarine patrols with one Alize aircraft even flying over her as she snorkelled, but she remained undetected. Misfortune struck Ghazi shortly after however, as her ESM equipment failed forcing her to return to Karachi. Luckily this was rectified and she was back on patrol on September 15. At 0850 on the morning of September 22 her sonar detected contacts while patrolling off Bombay giving rise to the hope that this was a target. Though Ghazi trailed this contact and tried to close in on it for the rest of the morning and into the afternoon it eventually slipped away leaving Ghazi in its wake.
Ghazi returned to her patrol track and resumed her vigil. At 1815 her sonar picked up a strong signal indicating a number of ships were approaching and five minutes later a mast was sighted through the periscope, but it was speedily drawing to the right and Ghazi had no chance of catching up. At 1840 however the target suddenly turned towards Ghazi. The range was 14,000 yards, but chance of interception more favourable, so Ghazi altered course to intercept. Sounding ‘Action Stations’ Ghazi began her attack run at 1846. The range gradually closed to 8,400 yards. The target altered course once more, and Ghazi altered to follow, all the while the range still closing. Ghazi altered course for the last time at 1911 to bring her into position to fire her torpedoes. The radar was briefly used to get a final accurate range check and firing solution quickly calculated. The target could now be identified through the attack periscope as an air warfare frigate. At 1912, and still using the periscope to ensure accuracy, a spread of four torpedoes was fired in quick succession. On firing the last torpedo Ghazi immediately dived deep to avoid any possible retaliation. After a minute and thirty seconds the sound of a torpedo impact was heard, followed five seconds by another. At approximately 1917 two patterns of Squid anti-submarine mortars was heard being fired, followed five minutes later by another. Diving deeper, Ghazi altered course and made her way out of the area. Nearly two hours later she rose to periscope depth and used her radar to scan for surface vessels, but all was clear and she began to snorkel to recharge her batteries. Not having gone through the GUPPY upgrade now worked in her favour as she still had the older bow optimised for long distance surface running. Surmising it would be some time before any expected retaliation in force, Ghazi therefore surfaced at 0145 in the early hours of September 23 and increased speed to 19 knots. Diving at 0324 to avoid an approaching aircraft, she surfaced again at 0335 and remained running on the surface till 0545 when she dived due to another aircraft. At 0615 she commenced snorkelling again, sending an attack signal to Karachi at 0730, before surfacing again. She arrived back at base later that day.
India has never acknowledged any warship loss or damage from 1965. Nevertheless, Ghazi’s crew were adamant they scored two hits, but exactly which ship Ghazi hit is unknown. India had three Type-41 Leopard/Brahmaputra Class air warfare frigates in service in 1965, Brahmaputra, Beas, and Betwa. Though not sunk, a damaged frigate could have been repaired away from public eye as India had plenty of capacity, even in Bombay where the Indians claimed ten warships were undergoing refit during the war. Ghazi had fired WWII-era unguided contact torpedoes that detonated upon impact. This may be the reason the frigate survived. Much of the force of the blast on such torpedoes is lost by being vented into the air, whereas magnetic warhead torpedoes detonate under their target, potentially breaking a ship in two. If Ghazi’s torpedoes struck the frigate close together, if it was fully closed up for action, and there were no secondary explosions from munitions, it could have remained afloat, especially so if the impacts were close the target’s prow. This would avoid damaging the Squid and rear 4.5 inch magazines, engineering/machinery and command spaces, and forward 4.5 inch turret and magazine. It could also explain how the frigate was able to fire her Squid in retaliation. The Type-41 was especially notable for being ill-equipped for anti-submarine operations, and India had more capable Type-14 Blackwood and Type-12 Whitby Class frigates for anti-submarine operations. However, unless there was another warship in the vicinity the target frigate must have fired the Squids. This was a fixed manually loaded three-barrel anti-submarine mortar that projected three bombs in a triangular pattern out to 250 metres. Type-41 frigates featured a single Squid fitted at the stern and fired over the length of the ship. The ship had to therefore be directed towards the submarine and almost on top of it to be effective. The Squids Ghazi heard being fired were likely fired as a scare tactic, but she was never in danger, and this is likely the first wartime attack by submarine since WWII.
That Ghazi was able to make such an attack and escape successfully was a testament of the skill and daring of Pakistan’s submariners, something those of today strive to match.
