Blame game over terror

Still not doing the right thing

Not only do militant groups still retain the capacity to carry out attacks all across the country but they appear to have organised again, perhaps by taking advantage of the loopholes that are widespread in the government’s counter-terrorism policy formation

A string of suicide bombings across Pakistan has once again put the country’s counter terrorism efforts on the radar.

The recent terrorist attacks which have taken place in all provinces of the country appear to have been coordinated among various militant outfits. The attack that took place in Lahore was carried out by a Pakistani Taliban’s splinter group, the Jamaat–ul–Ahrar (JA), which is responsible for one of the deadliest attacks in the country that have taken place in recent years. The attack that took place at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sindh was claimed by the Islamic State (ISIS) which is known to have developed close relations with different sectarian militant groups in the country including JA. The other two attacks were reported from the areas which are in close proximity to the Afghan border.

As of now, two things have become clear: first, not only do militant groups still retain the capacity to carry out attacks all across the country but they appear to have organised again, perhaps by taking advantage of the loopholes that are widespread in the government’s counter-terrorism policy formation. Second, the leadership in Pakistan continues to blame Afghanistan for attacks that are taking deep inside the country which means that Islamabad is still not willing to recognise that part of the problem in this regard has more to do with how we define and in process act against our domestic terrorists and the environment that enables them.

The frustration in Pakistan about Kabul’s inability to act against groups that are based in Afghanistan is partially true. However, the dilemma in this regard is far deeper than blame game: while Kabul has for decades accused Pakistan of harboring its enemies in the form of the Afghan Taliban leadership and other groups, Pakistan has made similar accusations concerning the sanctuaries of Pakistan’s Taliban in Afghanistan. It appears that both countries’ unwillingness to work together has only strengthened militant networks operating on both sides of the Durand Line. “Ironically, Afghanistan has become for the TTP the same kind of safe haven as the FATA and Quetta used to be for al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban,” says Christophe Jaffrelot, the author ofThe Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience.

While Pakistan can blame Afghanistan for its inaction against some of the groups that the former wants the later to act against, the policy makers in Pakistan cannot continue to remain indifferent to some of the strategic issues which are important in the areas of counterterrorism and counter radicalisation.

For instance, when it comes to Pakistan’s policy against domestic extremism, a clear confusion prevails. While the tactical and operational aspects are also important in order to prevent and foil militant attacks, going into the roots of militancy problem is essential when it comes to a sustainable counter terrorism response. The government in Pakistan has not been able to tackle or in fact even touch the fundamental reasons that attract militancy and inspire radicalisation in the country. Majority of these fundamental aspects are part of the theoretical domain of the National Action Plan (NAP). However, when it comes to an operational response to these domains, the action has been nonexistent.

Punjab and Sindh’s hate breathing factories continue to churn out intolerance and bigotry while the state remains engaged in blame game with neighbours. Sectarian outfits such as the ISIS – and others – continue to make inroads in the country’s militant infrastructure

To date, no sincere effort has been made by the government to regulate the religious seminaries which were among one of the prime promises of NAP. The differentiation between good militant and bad militant continues to exist: the interior minister of Pakistan, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, is known to have said that sectarian organisations cannot be equated with militant groups despite the fact that both have shed blood of innocent people in the country. The curriculum of hate that is being taught in schools and madrassas remains intact. Additionally, on the tactical side, there appears no coordination among the intelligence gathering community: even if the militants who struck Punjab and Sindh travelled from Afghanistan, shouldn’t it be considered a failure of the country’s intelligence community, for they were unable to restrain or detail them at any level?

Punjab and Sindh’s hate breathing factories continue to churn out intolerance and bigotry while the state remains engaged in blame game with neighbours. Sectarian outfits such as the ISIS – and others – continue to make inroads in the country’s militant infrastructure while the government remains adamant on differentiating between militant networks and sectarian networks. As I have argued elsewhere: “Number of sectarian groups which have not been targeted in recent military operations offer a perfect recipe for the implementation of the ISIS’s brutal ideology.”

The prevailing anger and frustration over the recent killings will soon die down like all previous incidents until the next attack happens. Unless Pakistan deals with strategic gaps that should be part of our counter violent extremism and counter radicalisation efforts, such attacks will continue to take place.