Pakistan Today

‘India’s nuclear programme be brought under IAEA safeguards’

Members of the media, wearing protective suits and masks, walk after receiving a briefing from Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) employees (in blue) in front of storage tanks for radioactive water at TEPCO's tsunami-crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Okuma town, Fukushima prefecture, Japan in this February 10, 2016 file photo. The robots sent in to find highly radioactive fuel at Fukushima's nuclear reactors have "died"; a subterranean "ice wall" around the crippled plant meant to stop groundwater from becoming contaminated has yet to be finished. And authorities still don't how to dispose of highly radioactive water stored in an ever mounting number of tanks around the site. REUTERS/Toru Hanai/Files

 

Pakistan would like to see the commencement of negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with existing stocks explicitly included in the negotiating mandate and India’s entire civilian nuclear programme be brought under IAEA safeguards.

This was stated by Foreign Office Disarmament Director General Kamran Akhtar, while speaking at a round table discussion on ‘The FMCT Debate in the CD and Pakistan’s Perspective’ at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) here on Monday.

Kamran Akhtar said, ‘It was incumbent on us to stand up for our own interest. We want an assurance that India’s whole three stage nuclear power programme would be under safeguards. Till the time we get these assurances, we will not agree to FMCT’. Assurances have not been given so far, he added.

The discussion was organized in view of the upcoming deliberations at the CD on its programme of work and other important engagements including the FMCT expert preparatory group meeting.

The Pakistani position has been that negotiating a treaty that only bans future production of fissile material without taking into account the existing stockpiles would freeze the existing asymmetries. This would put Pakistan at a permanent disadvantage and undermine its security interests.

The discriminatory waivers given to India and the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreements Delhi has signed with number of countries added to Pakistan’s security worries.

Eight of Indian reactors, its fast breeder programme, and approximately five tons of reactor grade plutonium are not under IAEA safeguards. It is feared that the reactors that are not under safeguards may be clandestinely used for plutonium production and the existing stockpiles may be diverted to military programme at a subsequent stage.

Akhtar said, “Pakistan should not be asked to agree to something that is not in its strategic interest”. “We have to consider possible actions by India that could undermine credibility of our nuclear deterrence,” he maintained.

Dr Mansoor Ahmed, a post doctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, observed that Pakistan was not engaged in a classic cold war type arms race but was striving for maintaining the credibility of its deterrent. This quest, he noted, is a dynamic process in response to destabilizing technological, doctrinal and force posture developments in India.

“It’s striving for balance, not parity with India,” he asserted and reminded that India was pursuing the fastest growing fissile material expansion and conventional and strategic force modernization outside the NPT states, besides moving in the direction of a first strike option coupled with a review of their No-First Use policy.

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