Comprehensive and deficient at the same time
The report of the Justice Faez Isa-led commission enquiring into the August 8 Quetta massacre is largely being hailed. This is for three reasons; it is detailed to unbelievable extent, it is forthcoming in identifying reasons and fixing responsibilities, and it is a break with the past when reports of such commissions were either not made public or they were found vague in its findings.
This report, in fact, is a break with the past in all these respects. It has gone into every detail related to the incident and has tried not to leave any aspect untouched. It has pinpointed administrative failures before and after this incident as well as other such incidents that have been perpetrated on this nation under the umbrella of religious terrorism. And it has held responsible the Ministry of Interior, particularly the Interior Minister, for all these failures.
In its effort to look into the matter ‘from all the relevant aspects of the multidimensional tragedy’, the commission has apparently gone too far and has tried to address the entire terrorism phenomenon that has plagued this country for the past about 15 years. Good enough, as it may mark the start of a debate on an issue that most try of us to avoid for different reasons. And which the state apparatus has been averse to so far.
Ironically, this is what has made the commission report deficient despite its being declared comprehensive. It has led the commission to extend its scope of work to areas which apparently fall outside the its mandate. Yes, of course, Quetta incident can’t be separated from the overall terrorism issue. But then the buck can’t and won’t stop with the Interior Minister.
Whatever the report has discussed is mostly right and the shortcomings and failures pinpointed can’t be denied. The problem, however, is that though it has taken up administrative issues it has shied away to discuss the roles and responsibilities of all the relevant parties. At the receiving end is mostly the civilian side. And though it has tried to point to policies, it has done so without assigning responsibility.
If terrorism issue had to be taken up and found a way out of, it was necessary to start from the time when Jihadist ideology was adopted as state’s official policy. It was also necessary to fix the responsibility of the continuation of those policies since 1980 despite the material and human losses those policies have inflicted on the country.
When it comes to discussing internal and external policies that Pakistan has been pursued, it is impossible to do it without discussing the practical decision-making process in the country and the role of the military establishment in it. The commission has stopped short to stepping into that territory.
The commission has discussed the meeting of Interior Minister with the leader of a proscribed organization – pointing to the ‘complicity’ between political leadership and extremist outfits – but then it hasn’t gone to dissect whether these groups came into being as a result of this ‘coalition’ or these groups were strengthened by some persistence state policies to the extent which necessitated this coalition in order for politicians to survive. Whether politicians’ acceptance of these terror groups is the cause or the effect? Again who formulated those policies, is the obvious question which the commission didn’t deliberate upon.
Failure of the civilian government in formulating new policies and its administrative failures in combating terrorism can’t be defended. Not strengthening NACTA and non-implementation of NAP or National Internal Security Policy, etc are also areas where government lagged far behind when compared to the military side performance. Weak civil/political institutions can be listed as one of the reasons. But that is not all. During all this period when NAP was devised the most obvious impression that one got was its being very low on the government’s priority list. Billions and billions for mega projects but peanuts for the establishment or strengthening of counter-terrorism institutions/departments. However, it will be wrong to throw all the blame for this situation at Ch Nisar’s door.
As far as addressing the terrorism phenomenon in toto is concerned, it wasn’t possible for a single-member commission to do so in just 54 days; hence, the lacking in many respects. But it has done one good thing; it has opened a debate which the relevant quarters, civil society, think tanks, academia and media must carry forward. The best thing would be that when the legal process is completed in the Supreme Court, law-makers should bring it to the parliament and start a meaningful debate on. This whole terrorism and extremism thing is not something that can be explained and suggested solutions to by a single individual or just one institution, no matter how respectable and sacred it is.
This fact becomes clearer while going through those portions of the report (Points 14.3 to 14.12, discussed on pp. 43-47) where the commission laments ‘lack’ of counter-narrative to terrorists’ ideology and tries to devise one of its own. With all due respect to the court, this portion seems so innocent, irrelevant and out of place, to say the least and to refrain from using words that can be termed disrespectful to the SC.
First, no single individual can determine counter-narrative for a nation – especially when he is not empowered to do that. Second, state’s narratives and counter-narratives can’t be separated from the country’s overall ideological bend. Third, the counter-narrative that has suggested by the learned judge is almost the same which the state is already propagating, albeit if it does not exist in an officially written form. But that has already failed because it is nothing more than a variation of the prevailing narrative that is responsible for the current waves of terrorism, extremism and sectarianism.
Devising an effective counter-narrative to terrorists’ ideology, in effect, means devising counter-narrative to religious extremism. That is so gigantic a task that can’t be done by the government alone, let alone a judicial commission. That may require giving a new ideological orientation to the country. In other words, that will require separation of religion and politics.
And that is something for which no one is ready whether it is a politician, a bureaucrat, a general, a media person or a judge. Or even if some of them realize its need, they are afraid of the unfavorable reaction of the man on the street whom the state has handed over to clerics long ago. And that cleric is giving him a narrative – supported by all the organs of the state and media – which is more in consonance with ‘extremists’ ideology’ than the one proposed by Justice Faez Isa.
This will be really naive to hold Interior Minister responsible for all this. Or to think that the country will change once Ch Nisar will resigned.
