KCL report on Pak missile program
KCL, as is well-known, is a premier, globally renowned institution serving as one of the world’s leading multi-disciplinary research universities, and is considered as an authoritative source of academic research, which is globally valued
Western institutions’ hue and cry over Pakistan’s nuclear program and strategic assets comes in no dearth, but the recent report of King’s College London (KCL) – titled “Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Industries” – is the first of its kind, as it attempts to hit hard on Pakistan’s missile program, along with overall nuclear program, in such detail.
KCL, as is well-known, is a premier, globally renowned institution serving as one of the world’s leading multi-disciplinary research universities, and is considered as an authoritative source of academic research, which is globally valued. The report, launched by KCL’s Project Alpha, came just hours before the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group’s consultative meeting (November 10) and informal plenary session (November 11) in Vienna for deliberations on the membership of non-NPT countries; India and Pakistan.
Pakistan has faced allegations repeatedly that being a non-NPT state it has proliferated nuclear technology to other countries, and also proliferated technology inwards to make its own bomb. Notably, the same argument is not applied to India, which is also a non-NPT state but is generally presented as having a ‘responsible’ record at the proliferation front. It was on the back of such a ‘record’ that India was granted a highly controversial waiver in 2008 from NSG, allowing it to have nuclear trade with cartel’s countries. Similarly when in May 2016 both India and Pakistan applied for the NSG membership, India received a welcoming response with the support by the US, while Pakistan is consequently fighting its case on the criterion based approach. Thanks to some strong opposition to ‘pick and choose’ type of approach – from within NSG spearheaded by China – the US and other India-backers have so far not been able to have their way. Seen in this backdrop, the timing of the launch of the report becomes very significant. Targeted, indeed.
Coming to the allegations and concerns raised in the report, as far as self-sufficiency is concerned, there is no industry in the world which can be termed wholly self-sufficient in producing all the equipment it needs. Many countries prefer to buy a products/material instead of producing the same, even after having an ability to produce, because production may be a costly affair, as compared to buying it.
The technology that Pakistan is accused of importing with dual-use has a wide number of potential applications in the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weapon production and other strategic applications, as well as having efficacy in civil industries. The technology which the report claimed as a dual use like electronics, cutting tools and laser cutting machines, furnaces, grinding machines, solid propellant, binding compounds, they are used in various industrial contexts, including in aircraft and automotive part production. Therefore, massive import of these products could not be considered that it is used in the production of strategic assets. Pakistan does not have the capability or infrastructure to produce every product indigenously, therefore the country relies on the import of machineries and other items.
Pakistan has presented a strong case for its bid to enter into the group on the basis of its strong commitment to the international objectives of the nuclear non-proliferation and robust command and control systems of its civilian nuclear program
Trade with China! The two countries have a broad spectrum of bilateral trade. One cannot claim that Pakistan is purchasing any technology specifically for the growth of its strategic program. Yes, Pakistan is in an agreement with China for civil nuclear program. The cooperation agreement that was signed on 15 September 1986 in Beijing, which was prior to China’s signing the NPT and entry into the NSG, providing for a broad framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation.
As far as the accusations regarding Pakistan’s supplies of nuclear technology to North Korea are concerned, the report states that “Despite allegations in the Indian press that Pakistani entities have supplied goods to North Korea’s nuclear programme in violation of UN Security Council sanctions, no evidence was found in the course of this study to suggest that Pakistan is involved in onward proliferation to the DPRK or elsewhere. However, several of Pakistan’s strategic entities participate in an export”. Pakistan has limited trade relations with the North Korea and fully abides with UN sanctions.
Another report of the same Project Alpha published in August this year titled“Examining allegations that Pakistan diverted Chinese-origin goods to the DPRK Proliferation Case Study Series” by Dr Stephan Blancke termed the claims by Indian ‘analysts’ as “intriguing but unverifiable” and “exaggerated”. It says: “There is little authoritative evidence on the public record hinting at any ongoing missile connections between Pakistan and the DPRK”.
It would not be wrong to assume that this report from such as well-known institution seems to be aiming – at this crucial moment – to impact negatively on Pakistan’s entry into the cartel by influencing the opinions of policy-makers and opinion-makers in the different capitals vis-à-vis Pakistan’s membership of NSG. While a decision is to be made by the Group’s members with consensus, which seems hard to achieve at the moment, such reports may give an edge to the Indian bid – image wise, precisely – as Pakistan has been insisting on uniform and transparent criteria for non-NPT states, while India is insisting for a ‘merit-based’ approach.
Pakistan has presented a strong case for its bid to enter into the group on the basis of its strong commitment to the international objectives of the nuclear non-proliferation and robust command and control systems of its civilian nuclear program. It is well known to the world that Pakistan has instituted an elaborate export control regime, legislative framework and comprehensive regulatory and administrative measures. Its export control lists are in harmony with those of the NSG, Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. Islamabad’s official position is that Pakistan’s desire to participate in the NSG stands on solid grounds of technical experience, capability and well-established commitment to nuclear safety.
But this report, as mentioned above, could give an advantage to India and questions could be raised on the Pakistan’s commitment to export control regime and its opposition to the “exclusive membership” of the NSG for India.