The chief is gone, long live the chief
Now that the guessing game is over, let’s have a quick look at the period when General Raheel Sharif was at the helm. And what good and bad we accumulated in his time?
There is no need to repeat and praise the Herculean tasks that were unbelievably accomplished by Pakistan Army under his command in the shape of Zarb-e-Azb and Karachi operations. However, confining Gen Raheel Sharif’s achievements to these two actions, no matter how gigantic these appear, will tantamount to undermining his true role.
His critical contribution started when he was assigned the duties of Inspector General, Training and Evaluation before his appointment as Chief of Army Staff. He was part and parcel of the inner transformation that the army went through before it took the outer shape of directly taking on the terrorists. Even if not the ‘paradigm shift’ which it was initially believed to be, Gen Raheel Sharif is certainly one of those Generals who caused a ‘change of heart’ inside the military regarding the internal threat that posed itself in the shape of terrorism perpetrated in the name of religion. He is believed to be one among the main architects of the ‘new military doctrine’ which not only declared the internal enemy as enemy number one but which also recognised this internal terrorism as ‘existential threat’ to Pakistan.
Gen Kayani started giving hints about the changing policy as early as 2012 when he said on the eve of Independence Day that, ‘the war against terrorism and extremism is the entire nation’s war’. And then he continued to talk about it time and again. But it was Gen Raheel Sharif who not only provided it a theoretical shape as Inspector General, Training and Evaluation – when he brought changes in curriculum and focussed on counter-insurgency training of personnel – but who also implemented and demonstrated it practically as Chief of Army Staff – when he launched the biggest operation against religious terrorism.
Gen Raheel also presided over the change of policy regarding some old friendships between the military establishment and political actors. The biggest example is that of MQM which helped in restoring peace and bringing an end to mafia-style politics in Karachi, the county’s largest city and its financial hub.
It goes to the credit of Gen Raheel Sharif that he managed the military side satisfactorily well though the results may not be to the entire satisfaction of the General himself. As they say there is always room for improvement so is the case with the military initiatives that he undertook. A lot is to be done before the menace of terrorism and extremism is completely wiped out. Such is the case with Karachi and Balochistan – where much more is needed to be done still.
It’s true but the problems everywhere had become multifaceted and complex to the extent that it would have been unrealistic to assume that everything could be corrected by one institution in the tenure of just one army chief. Law and order and counter-terrorism, being ongoing processes, will have to be carried on by the civilian and military sides alike for a long time. More so, these are not problems which can be solved through military means alone. Nor can the military in Pakistan be totally detached from politics as most of the things that it does or does not do have a political dimension.
And that’s where Gen Raheel Sharif’s tenure left much to be desired.
Political instability and military’s conduct here have a lot to do with each other. Unfortunately, the outgoing chief’s tenure was largely marked by strained civil-military relations and its resultant instability that it brought in its wake.
Its problems with Nawaz Sharif government started with disagreements between the two sides on three issues; a) Pervez Musharraf, b) terrorism, (operation or talks?), and c) ties with India.
Musharraf’s issue brought the civilian and military leadership on collision course. While this tension was continuing, Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri unleashed their forces on Nawaz Sharif. After that the PML (N) government went into a spiral of instability from which it still has not fully recovered. Many related this episode to the civil-military tensions that were going on behind the scene. It is no secret that fingers were pointed at the then DG, ISI.
It is also alleged that Nawaz Shairf’s pro-India postures were not liked by the military establishment and resulted in strained tension between the two.
Disagreement on how to deal with Taliban is also a matter of record now. And though the military’s stance and Gen Raheel’s decision to take on the terrorists militarily has ultimately proved correct, it is a common knowledge that the civilian leadership was not taken into confidence – nor its final approval was sought – before the start of the operation.
The tug of war between the two sides continued to get an upper hand in policy making in core internal and external affairs during these past three years which resulted in the civilian side completely overwhelmed by the military establishment; further marginalising of the already weak political/civilian institutions.
The civil-military struggle for political dominance was nothing new, nor can it be blamed or thrown on Gen Raheel Sharif’s door. This is something historical that is going on for a long time and in which no party seems to have an inclination to budge. However, the charisma of Gen Raheel aggravated the situation for civilians which made them surrender before the army whatever it wanted. For this, politicians are to be blamed equally as they didn’t demonstrate higher leadership qualities and political wisdom nor any of the political leaders over the entire spectrum came near to the tremendous personal traits or impeachable character that Gen Raheel was endowed with.
However, the resultant exaggerated military say in foreign affairs, particularly with relation to India, Afghanistan and the USA, brought in not-so-good results and the country’s overall anti-terror policies have resulted in a bad international image and isolation. On the corruption front, the talk didn’t go farther than ‘nexus between terrorism and corruption’ which was largely used to harass and nab only (undesirable) politicians; khakis, whether serving or retired, were never included among the likely targets, except for occasional circulating some names for public consumption through fabricated media hype.
The charm offensive, that marked the tenure of Gen Raheel Sharif – and helped by his popular charisma – brought laurels to the military at the expense of political development. It temporarily stunted the growth of democracy and its related political institutions.
But there are limits to everything, particularly to popularity and aggrandisement of power by an individual or institution. And then, there are historical curves. It is obvious that Gen Raheel is leaving behind a shining legacy that will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. So will be the good fortune and unparalleled political clout that he helped create and maintain for his institution.
He was really unmatched. Few, if any, among his successors will be able to meet the standards he has set for them. As a soldier he has achieved something in his lifetime, which many fail to achieve by laying down their lives.
Kudos, General. Kudos. You can smile now!