Can we avoid failure?
Let’s assume the government fed ‘fabricated news story’ to the press and that it has blundered; not by raising issues in a closed-door high level huddle but by passing on exaggerated information to a newsman and making it public.
So, what should be done now?
Historically speaking, whoever fell afoul of the military in this country was punished and punished severely. Z A Bhutto dared to make the generals appear subordinate to the civilian prime minister and he paid the price through his neck. Benazir and Nawaz Sharif’s stories of standing up to the powerful establishment and facing the music two times each are so recent that they don’t need to be repeated.
The dilemma, however, is how to make Nawaz Sharif pay the price this time. Create a situation so that he announces fresh elections? Form a sort of national government comprising of technocrats? Or impose direct military rule – but with a difference from past such rules – to do away with the corrupt, incompetent and traitor political lot?
Yes. These are the three available options but each fraught with its own pitfalls. For example, if fresh elections are held, which party is more likely to win it? It will either be Nawaz Sharif again, in a little compromised situation, or Imran Khan or Asif Ali Zardari cobbling up an unperfected mosaic of different political parties to form a shaky government. Frankly, which one of them is acceptable to the army? May be, no one. So?
A government of the technocrats will require legal cover which will be difficult to acquire as the ones who will manage the formation of such government won’t be in the power seat themselves. This judiciary will be almost impossible to manipulate from the sidelines.
There are also some serious speed bumps on the road to direct military rule: one is the realisation within the army that martial laws have never helped the military or the state; second, there is no favorable economic and political situation in which army will be able to deliver better; third, is the general international environment in which martial laws have gone out of fashion, except at the cost of becoming a pariah in the comity of nations; and fourth is the issue which the civilian side has picked to lock horns with the military. Dislodging Nawaz Sharif government over an issue that has greater internationals connotations – when put in the larger ‘war against terror’ context – will result in greater isolation than what we are concerned aboutcurrently. It will harm the army and its image even more.
Then what can be the possible outcome of the current impasse? And what is really the problem behind this tug of war between the civilian government and the military establishment?
While it is difficult to predict at the moment what can be the final shape of things, it is easy to say that it will be difficult for the army to forget or forgive the collective bruise that has been caused to it as an institution through the ‘feeding’ of that story to the press presumably by the Nawaz Sharif government (‘someone in the NS government’ is no more the right phrase). It is easy to explain what is the real problem – or the bone of contention – between the two sides.
This bone of contention is not new. It is there since 1956 (or 1958, if you insist). And it is the struggle for predominance between the two in the power structure of the state. Our teacher and respected political scientist, Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi says, “The critical appraisal of the political role of the Pakistan Military by Pakistani and foreign writers and analysts has identified at least seven reasons for the expansion of its role.” Those long-term reasons can’t be done away with overnight, hence, there will be a prolonged predominant position of the army vis-à-vis the civilians. But there must be a serious effort from both the sides to address some of the short-term issues and to adjust to new emerging realities.
The ‘distrust’ of the military and the civilians of each other is all about an upper hand in the governance structure. No matter whatever name anyone gives to it, it is control over core policy issues which both the parties at the moment are struggling for.
Military, over the years, has not only tasted the power and liked it but also has given a certain direction to the country’s foreign and security policies backed by corresponding narrative built after lots of efforts. One reason for ‘distrust’ towards the civilian political leadership in the military mind is that they look at everything from the security prism and want the civilians to do exactly what they think is right. They have also achieved a certain degree of ‘independence’ in their decisions in certain areas.
The civilians may not have any objection if those policies didn’t have effects elsewhere. Unfortunately that isn’t the case with matter of statecraft. If you adopt a certain policy in security sphere, it is bound to cast its shadow in economic and political spheres. And that is when the situation becomes unbearable for the civilian side. They not only have to pay its political and financial price internally and externally but also have to shoulder all the blame for its bad repercussions.
This situation doesn’t fall in the ‘normal’ category as far as political theory, history of nation-state and its basics are concerned. So, it becomes the responsibility of both the sides to re-asses their approach and adjust to the changing situation in which the military has to take a back seat in ultimate decision-making process despite its increasing role in foreign policy making and enhanced importance of its input in the national policy-making worldwide.
If on the one side, it is imperative for the military to shun its attitude of looking down upon the civilians as untrustworthy lesser beings and to come out of the paradigm of security policy guiding the country’s foreign and other vital policies, it is incumbent upon the civilian side to do away with the politics of patronage based on dynasties and families. If they are interested in having their due place in the political system they have to stop whining about military snatching their powers and rather change their corrupt ways and concentrating on improving governance.
There are other ways to change the status quo but those will be painful and harmful for the military, the politicians, the people and, above all, the country.
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18/10/2016