Pak-US relation heads south

Just as Islamabad warms up to Moscow

Frost has been quite visibly setting in into the Pak-US relationship for quite a while now. The highest point post Nine-Eleven was just that – the time that immediately followed the attack. Pakistan became the ‘front-line state’ and ‘major non-nato ally’, etc, and quickly came the Paris Club rescheduling and IMF sweeteners. The ’98 ‘upset’ (Pakistan’s nuclear tests) was conveniently forgotten, to say the least. But then, just as quickly, came Pakistan’s ‘duplicity’, its ‘good and bad Taliban’ and, always, the need for it to ‘do more’.

The next high-point was at the time of the QCG. Not only did the ‘do more’ disappear, but there was much optimism in Washington; that having made promises to four parties, Pakistan would definitely deliver. But the Mullah Omar disappointment, among others, proved one too many. Ghani tossed Pakistan out of the Quadrilateral, and the ‘do more’ returned with more quantifiable effect. The Americans walked back on the F16s, blocked CSF payments, and Congress is debating whether to keep Pakistan’s aid flowing or, in the extreme case, declare it a sponsor of terrorism.

There’s been much warmth with Russia in the meantime. Plans have been finalised for the first ever joint military exercise and, after the helicopter deals, there’s even talk of buying Russian advanced aircraft. While the tilt towards Moscow is a welcome foreign policy realignment, and defence ties should be improved – especially if Islamabad can afford those advanced fighters – but one deal should not be in place of another. Clearly the bumps on the road to Washington played a role in the turn to Moscow, but Pakistan must not forget that it is in its interest at the moment to be among the United States’ good friends. Congress, too, was reminded by ‘experts’ that cutting off aid, or doing more, will only push Pakistan further against the wall. When amendments didn’t deter the bomb, and neither carrot nor stick delivered the Taliban, the option of further isolation is a gamble at best. Therefore, it is in the interest of both Pakistan and America to find areas of convergence so a thaw, of sorts, can be forced. And, without a doubt, America will require Pakistan to move first, and it will have to do with the war in Afghanistan