What is wrong with Pakistan’s foreign policy?

A lot. Clearly.

With Iran, Pakistan has openly undermined the former’s interests by supporting Salafi radical groups, particularly in Afghanistan. In 1998, the Afghan Taliban, supported and recognised by Pakistan, killed Iranian diplomats in Mazar Sharif which further deepened distrust between the neighbours.  

States revise their foreign polices according to their domestic needs and external pressures. Consistently changing global security, political and diplomatic needs force states into making certain periodic changes in their foreign policies to adapt to new emerging realties in order to safeguard their national interests.

In state’s working, there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. Historically, in Pakistan’s context, these interests have remained poorly defined: Pakistani leadership’s securitisation of its foreign policy due to some vague and imaginary military threats, particularly from India, has prevented the country’s decision makers from taking any rational policy decisions while isolating it regionally.

The process of securitisation of Pakistan’s foreign policy began right after the partition. While India joined the USSR’s security camp, Pakistan was offered an alliance by the US. During the Cold War, India’s leadership foresaw the gains and strategic value of the Non-aligned movement.  Pakistan, on the other hand, by remaining in America’s alliance, not only continued its securitisation patterns – by and large against India – but also managed to alienate other regional countries in its neighbourhood.

Pakistan’s relations with Iran, Afghanistan and Bangladesh have never been cordial largely because of Islamabad’s one dimensional security oriented policy formation. Historically, in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policy makers have never attempted to deal with the state; rather, Pakistani policy makers have always tried to deal with Kabul on sub-state level, by funding and supporting non-state actors to contain regional security challenges. With Iran, Pakistan has openly undermined the former’s interests by supporting Salafi radical groups, particularly in Afghanistan. In 1998, the Afghan Taliban, supported and recognised by Pakistan, killed Iranian diplomats in Mazar Sharif which further deepened distrust between the neighbours.

Even domestically, to support the abovementioned securitisation foreign policy preferences, the managers of Pakistan’s foreign policy have cultivated Islamist proxies at home. Extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and others, for a long time have been operating with the state patronage. In a different vein but a similar context, Pakistan’s historic closeness towards KSA has always been counted at the expanse of Iran. Hence, Pakistan’s inability to strike balance in its foreign policy towards Iran and KSA has not just cost it internally in the form of sectarian wars but has also contributed towards its growing isolation which has emerged recently.

Pakistan is slowly loosing the remaining ground or regional support base due to continued reluctance from abandoning its policy of securitising its bourders which inevitably declare regional countries as enemies. A month ago, India, Afghanistan and Iran signed a trilateral trade agreement, excluding Pakistan from newly emerging highly lucrative regional economic partnership. Afghanistan’s President, Ashraf Ghani’s initial reapproachment towards Pakistan met with same fate of denial which his predecessor faced: Pakistan has refused to give up on groups targeting Kabul’s interests. The death of Mullah Mansour in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province was an indication that how the Taliban leadership remains operational in Afghanistan from Pakistan. Besides, in Islamabad, there is no urgency to expel or uproot the Quetta Shurra, the Afghan Taliban’s decision making body which is believed to be based in Pakistan.

While Pakistan’s leadership in its policy making has not come out of its obsession with India, New Dehli’s diversification of its foreign policy in the last one decade has brought remarkable diplomatic, economic and security gains for the country. Despite all noted differences, India’s growing economic closeness with global powers such as the US, China and KSA is a patent sign of a growing regional power. Riyadh, which Pakistan considers its closest ally, is deepening security and commercial ties with India. Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, was awarded the state’s highest civilian award by King Salman.

Apparently, even the Kingdom’s oil based rental economy has begun to undergo an internal and external transformation where Riyadh’s new leadership has been making new economic alliances while breaking new grounds in diplomatic arenas. Riyadh’s deputy crown prince, Mohammad Bin Salman has recently, in a marathon trip – with a short stopover in Pakistan – visited China and Japan, one of the Kingdom’s largest oil buyers in Asia region.

Pakistan’s growing economic dependence on just one country – China – will not serve the country’s interests in the long run: rather than diversifying its economic, diplomatic and security relations, Pakistan is preparing to fall into a novel dependency mood with all of its outdated old policies intact.

One of the core rationales for Pakistan’s approach to look at its foreign policy from a security tilted lens is largely because of the question of who runs the country’s foreign policy: the military’s control and preference to deal with all diplomatic challenges from a security perspective has brought down Pakistan foreign relations on its knees. Pakistan’s civilian government’s efforts to grant Indian the status of Most Favoured Nation (MSF) in order to deepen bilateral trade relations was vetoed by the military on multiple occasions.

The country’s economic transformation is not even a back burner issue: on policy level, the managers of Pakistan’s foreign policy have attempted to compete with India in all spheres ranging from diplomatic to arms race. But the fact remains that Pakistan being a small country with limited resources, cannot complete with a much larger neighbour whose resources and diplomatic outreach is far more than Pakistan. For instance, Pakistan’s arms race with India has hurt the former’s economy more than the latter.

In many areas, India and USA’s growing economic and military interdependence is likely to come at Pakistan’s expanse. In this regard, Pakistan needs to regain its lost diplomatic space in Washington as it cannot only depend on China whose economic and security interests, like any expanding global power, sit beyond Pakistan.

Pakistan’s overall approach to define its foreign policy from a security perspective has clearly resulted in its regional isolation. Unless Pakistan diversity its foreign policy, one suited to meet the country’s economic, diplomatic and security interests on equal footing, Islamabad’s isolation is likely to deepen.