The coffers full and the people happy
Legitimacy as a means of governance has evolved radically over time. The advent of democracy has provided the people with the power to confer legitimacy where once birth right was enough. Under a democratic system the delivery of government services and power are means for extracting legitimacy from the people. Why Turkey’s Erdogan was able to overcome the army’s coup was a consequence of him having earned a legitimacy to rule from the people. What is the source of Erdogan’s legitimacy that has allowed him to put down the Turkish army’s recent coup attempt? And in case of such an attempt unfolding in Pakistan, has the democratic project garnered enough legitimacy to overcome any such attempts?
Amongst sources of legitimacy, economic growth stands out as one of the most effective means for a government to earn legitimacy. Why the Turkish government was able to stave off a coup was a consequence of legitimacy derived from sustained prosperity and despite an economic downturn, faith harboured by the people of Turkey regarding their leaders’ ability to deliver. A quick analysis of Turkey’s economic performance confirms this assertion. Not only has the economy grown at a rapid pace under Erdogan but there has been a measure of unprecedented economic stability.
In the decade preceding the AKP’s rise to power, Turkey’s GDP grew at an average of 3.3%. While economic growth under Erdogan’s AKP, barring the first year in office to take into account policy lags, grew at an average of 4.7%. During this time period GDP per capita grew consistently from USD 4,595 in 2003 to 9,130 as of 2015.
Focusing solely on the pace of economic growth detracts from a key factor in the underlying growth story, that of stability. Turkey’s GDP per capita swung wildly throughout much of the decade preceding the AKP. In 1993 the country had a GDP per capita of USD 3,172. By 2001, GDP per Capita had actually fallen to USD 3,053 after having peaked earlier in 1998 at USD 4,389. Compare this with only one instance of negative growth rate under the AKP, a residual economic shock from the 2008 financial crisis.
Turkey’s growth story provides the AKP with a potent narrative from whence to derive its legitimacy from. Moreover the contrasts between the economic narratives of preceding governments and the AKP make choices that much clearer for voters.
Democrats in Pakistan do not have the same pedigree of legitimacy. Talk of economic growth in Pakistan is often synonymous with military administration. From the generation that lived through the industrialisation and green revolution of the Ayub administration on through to the generation that experienced an economic boom under the Musharraf regime, the historical narrative of economic prosperity is owned firmly by the military administrations.
From previous generations, the view of prosperity is entirely shaded by the Ayub era. Economic growth during the Ayub administration topped 6% on average. Sans the tumultuous year of 1971 average growth topped 7%. In contrast, Mr. Bhutto’s democracy, besotted by political and economic troubles including a spate of unfavourable weather conditions and a global economic slowdown, was unable to maintain the same rapid pace of economic growth. During Mr. Bhutto’s tenure Pakistan grew at relatively mediocre 4.1%.
Similarly during the Zia regime Pakistan grew at an average annual rate of 6.8%. This was in clear contrast to the performance of succeeding democratic government which were unable to go far beyond 4% during the 11 odd years that democracy lasted in Pakistan.
Musharraf’s regime fared the worst amongst military dictatorships, posting an average growth rate of 4.5% over the regime’s 9 year tenure. However, between 2003 and 2006, economic growth topped 6%, creating a perception that Pakistan was on track and finally poised to achieving substantial economic gains. A presumption that slowly gave way as terrorism took a swift, brutal toll on the economy. While Musharraf is remembered for blundering his way through the latter half of his rule, he is also remembered for the heady optimism that was experienced during his tenure.
Whether these bouts of growth under military regimes have simply been the result of western economic aid or of actual systematic improvements in the economy is entirely debateable. While the quality is debatable, the perception of military administrations being better economic governors – not so much. Pakistan’s periods of democracy have been marred with political instability and consequent economic malaise, followed by periods of relative prosperity under martial administrations. Such clear contrasts that are easy to observe, experience and understand do not make for compelling arguments in favour of democracy.
Come around full circle and consider a coup unfolding in Pakistan. Given the historical narrative of each system of governance, would a coup be met by a conscious ambivalence or would Pakistanis actively oppose a coup attempt. Given the relatively less esteemed perception of the democratic system in Pakistan, how much legitimacy does the system have in the eyes of the people?
Erdogan can build a 1,150 room palace for roughly USD 600 with a monthly electricity outlay estimated at USD 200,000, take a hit in his popularity and still urge his supporters to come out on to the streets and consequently defeat a military coup. Would ruling incumbents in Pakistan be able to pull that off?