Diplomatic dire straights

Needed, foreign minister or foreign policy?

 Pakistan seems to be in the eye of the storm once again. Like always. And this time it seems like the situation is mostly of its own making. Like always.

The debate that is raging inside the country – and outside – is about the failure of its foreign policy; the challenging geostrategic situation in its neighborhood and beyond, and the lack of appropriate responses to it. The discussion at times however, narrows down to the absence of a fulltime foreign minister as being the biggest reason of the mess that has piled up on the foreign front. But is it really so?

External situation at the moment is that, we are at our ‘default loggerheads position’ with India. Relations with Afghanistan are at its worst during recent years; these are not so good with Iran either. Pakistan and USA are informally separated. They are on the verge and something untoward can make this ‘separation’ formal.

The neighborhood around also seems to be turning antagonistic with India, Iran and Afghanistan coming closer. While its erstwhile ally, USA has finally closely embraced its erstwhile enemy India. Not only this, there are strong indications of reduction in direct US military aid and in reimbursement of Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to Pakistan. Analysts fear that even civilian aid may be affected if both the countries continued to move the divergent paths that they are treading for the past some time. It has also kept Pakistan out of its plans of a ‘rebalance’ in Asia but instead included India in it.

This is not a promising scenario. It will have geostrategic ramifications for both the countries. But Pakistan will be most affected as such a situation will have internal economic and political consequences for it, along with a specter of further international isolation.

True, that the country if faced with such an eventuality can turn to China or Saudi Arabia for help but that can’t be a remedy to the huge multi-dimensional losses that it is likely to suffer. Also, it will have a price of its own as there are no free lunches in interstate relationships. Nor can a country put all its eggs in one basket.

Why does Pakistan have bad – mostly inimical – relations with almost everyone around, except China? Why are others ganging up against it, or why they have started ignoring it? Why is it suffering from international isolation, which is feared to increase? Has Pakistan’s foreign policy contributed to its current predicament? If yes, then which wrong policies it has pursued and why it did so? Is it because there is no fulltime, active civilian foreign minister to steer the ship? If there is no one to run it then who is in the driving seat of the country’s foreign policy – if it has one? How can a positive change be brought to it, and whether if that is possible at all?

The fact of the matter is that the problem has less to do with the absence of a full-fledged foreign minister than with a long-term policy itself. Victim of its geostrategic location, Pakistan has always had a sense of self-importance. But being incommensurate with its economic, scientific and technological standing, this geostrategic position has given it that permanent feeling of ‘insecurity’ which it wants to address all the time. This is not the only country with such an advantageous geographical location. There are many more. The real problem with it occurred when in 1958, the army entered into the political sphere. From then on, there was no looking back.

Instead of formulating a cohesive foreign policy with a corresponding, but subordinate, security policy, things went the other way round. The military rulers – because of their training and threat perception – devised a particular security policy; with the passage of time, the country’s foreign policy became subservient to it. The lacking’ if any, was addressed by Zia when Afghanistan occurred in 1979. Internal political dimension, institutional interests of the army and its effort not let go its control and influence over the decision-making process of the country made it almost an impossibility to introduce some positive change in the status quo, both in terms of policy and its management process.

Now, the country is faced with a situation in which there is little control of the civilians to formulate the country’s vital internal and external policies. These are mostly left to the military establishment to take care of. But it is taking care of it according to their threat perception to the country’s security.

But that is not the only problem. Whether indigenously or as a result of Pakistan’s policies, antagonistic developments are taking place in the region and beyond that Pakistan genuinely considers being against its core interests. The stubbornness that is currently on display from the Afghan side and the coming closer of USA and India – particularly their cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear technology – are something that are bothering Pakistan. It considers such developments damaging not only to peace in the region but also negatively affecting balance of power between India and Pakistan.

Coming to the political/civilian side, it is but a fact that; 1) they lack moral authority to assert itself in decision making, 2) they lack competence and competent people to lead both in internal and external spheres, 3) political parties and leaders are themselves divided over policy options as much as they are confused about the terrorism phenomenon, 4) religio-political parties have sympathies for the non-state actors who are a major irritant in Pakistan’s relations with the rest of the world.

External policy of any country is mostly a reflection of its internal political dynamics. Pakistan is no exception. There is a dominant political role of the military establishment domestically. And exactly that is reflected in its foreign policies. And since this is an organisation in the true meaning of the word, therefore, there is a visible inertia and resistance to change.

The question, therefore, is not that whether if all of the Pakistan external problems are because there is no foreign minister in the country and who should occupy that seat; it is how to get Pakistan out of this quagmire.

There is no doubt that the world cannot run the way Pakistan wants it to. There must be things which it will certainly not like. But it cannot go to war with every country that does not behave to its liking. Nor can it reverse everything undesirable that occurs on the international scene. It is for the leadership of the country to formulate, with the help of an efficient foreign office, an intelligent and flexible foreign policy keeping the long term interests of the nation in view – and then let professional managers execute it. There can’t be any alternative to that. Military establishment, running foreign policy alone, is no answer; though in a situation like Pakistan the most important input must come from their side.

Only then can we hope to appropriately respond to developments that take place around us. And only then can we hope of timely adaptation to undesirable occurring. It’s time we adjust both internally and externally.