NSG membership and Pakistan

A policy of mutual inclusion bears mutual benefits

Ever since the civil nuclear technology deal was struck between USA and India and the US manoeuvred NSG waiver for her new partner, Pakistan has been striving hard to convince the US and the international community about its credentials to deserve membership of the group and the adoption of a non-discriminatory approach in regards to admittance of non-NPT states to the NSG. While US has stood for Indian membership of NSG all along, it has not been favouring the same consideration for Pakistan.

At the third Nuclear Security Summit at Hague, the prime minister made a forceful case for Pakistan’s inclusion in the NSG. He staked his claim for the membership of group and other international control regimes declaring that Pakistan had been running a safe and secure civil nuclear programme for the last 40 years, attached highest importance to nuclear security and had the expertise, manpower and infrastructure to produce civil nuclear energy. It has pursued a policy of restraint as well as credible minimum deterrence and its nuclear security is supported by five pillars – a strong command and control system, an integrated intelligence system, rigorous regulatory regime and active international cooperation. The security regime covers physical protection, material, control and accounting, border controls and radiological emergencies. Pakistan, he said, has also been regularly submitting reports to the UN Security Council 1540 committee on the measures that the country has put in place to exercise control over transfer of sensitive materials and technologies.

Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry (representing the Prime Minister at the fourth and the last Nuclear Security Summit in April), also strongly pleaded for Pakistan’s inclusion in NSG, saying that not only were Pakistan’s nuclear installations secure, but that the world also acknowledged that they were. He rightly emphasised that a policy of inclusiveness, rather than erecting barriers to the participation of wider circle of responsible states, would serve far better the common goals of strengthening global nuclear security. He said any discriminatory actions were bound to create fissures and apprehensions about the motives of the powers trying to sell the idea of non-proliferation and nuclear security.

It was indeed a very logical argument and a perfect recipe for obtaining unqualified support of the countries of the world on the issue. An incisive look at these claims reveals that they were very much in harmony with the NSG requirements and the objectives of the nuclear security and qualify Pakistan for a place in the comity of nuclear suppliers and other international regulatory regimes on export of nuclear materials.

The diplomatic offensive of Pakistan produced positive results. US authorities confessed that they were impressed by the steps that Pakistan had taken to secure nuclear weapons and materials since the beginning of Summit process. In their view, Pakistan took this issue very seriously. Another big gain of this interaction with the global community and the US President was that President Obama told a post-summit press conference “we need to see progress in Pakistan and India, making sure as they develop military doctrines that they are not moving in the wrong direction”. It was a visible departure from the previous stance of US on the nuclear question when it invariably chose to advise Pakistan to cap its nuclear programme unilaterally without giving same advice to India.

Reportedly, a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the eighth round of Pak-US Security, Strategic Stability and Non-proliferation working group in Islamabad recently stated “The US delegation recognised Pakistan’s significant efforts to harmonise its strategic trade controls with those of NSG and other multilateral export control regimes. Both sides agreed on the value of Pakistan’s continued engagement, outreach and integration into international non-proliferation regime’.

Encouraged by US change of mind and expression of support, Pakistan has formally applied for the membership of NSG and the group which is likely to have two meetings on 9^th and 23^rd June respectively. In these, they will deliberate on the requests of both India and Pakistan for inclusion. Pakistan has invariably stressed the need for a non-discriminatory criteria-based approach in regards to inclusion of non-NPT states in the NSG. It is however not certain of the fate of these requests as opinion within the NSG on inclusion of new non-NPT members is divided. The existing rules and criteria does not provide for admitting the non-NPT members into the NSG fold. To pave the way for any such initiative amendments will have to be made to the existing rules.

Some countries did express concern about India expanding its nuclear arsenal by diverting the fissile materials for production of nuclear weapons when the NSG waiver was given to said nation. These concerns still persist. Some international agencies have come up with reports recently that, after the NSG waiver, India has indeed expanded its nuclear arsenal. US Senator Markey in a senate hearing recently said “since 2008 when we also gave them exemption, India has continued to produce fissile materials for its nuclear programme virtually un-checked. At that time Pakistan warned us that the deal would increase the chances of the nuclear arms race in South Asia.”  Despite this, the US and some other countries would like admittance of India in the group. However to achieve consensus on the issue they will have to adopt a non-discriminatory and criteria-based approach.

Any discriminatory treatment towards Pakistan in regards to membership of NSG would push Pakistan for ‘full nuclear deterence’ viz-a-viz India which will deal a big blow to the efforts of the international community to promote the cause of non-proliferation. Simultaneous inclusion of Pakistan and India in the NSG will not only establish the principle of non-discrimination but would add to the strength of NSG in furthering the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and well controlled export of nuclear materials for promoting international nuclear trade cooperation. Pakistan would be in a better position to contribute to firming up and refining the regulatory guidelines and safeguarding its interests as an NSG member. It would also allow Pakistan to export nuclear materials to other countries under the gaze of global community in a legitimate manner – with all the accompanying economic benefits – as well as reinforcing its credentials as a useful member of the global community.

It is hoped that the members of NSG, US and its allies will keep all the foregoing variables into consideration and give adequate and well deserved attention to the security concerns of Pakistan while deciding the fate of the request of both the countries.