Islamabad’s Isolation

No end in sight

The present state of affairs is indeed dismal. In the region, Islamabad has frayed relations with its neighbours excepting China. There is a complete breakdown of talks since the Pathankot incident with its traditional adversary India

That Islamabad is isolated in the region and its foreign policy is in shambles is the dominant view being expressed in the media. The perception has been further strengthened afterthe killing of Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mansour by a US drone strike in Balochistan.

Some critics contend that Pakistan does not have a foreign policy; rather it has a security policy that dominates our priorities in the domain of external and regional relations. Undoubtedly, Pakistan has remained a national security state since its very inception. And as such, an ever-assertive military leadership has determined priorities.

The present state of affairs is indeed dismal. In the region, Islamabad has frayed relations with its neighbours excepting China. There is a complete breakdown of talks since the Pathankot incident with its traditional adversary India. And there is no breakthrough in sight.

When Ashraf Ghani assumed power in Kabul in September 2014, there was a lot of goodwill and bonhomie expressed between the Pakistani and Afghan leadership. But this was soon squandered away to the extent that Ghani is now overtly hostile in his statements, accusing Islamabad of fomenting trouble within Afghanistan through its proxies.

Similarly, after a lot of dithering on part of Pakistan a thaw was in the offing with Tehran. But while Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was on a state visit just two months back to Islamabad,our security establishment chose the timing to publicly accuse Iran of harbouring RAW agents.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on a visit to Iran, has inked a tripartite deal along with Afghanistan to build a road linking Afghanistan with Iran though the Chahbahar Iranian port. This is being viewed as the Indian response to Gawadar port and Islamabad’s consistent refusal to give transit facilities to Kabul and New Delhi through its territory.

Of course the tripartite agreement has strategic implications for Pakistan and China as well. However both our advisor on foreign affairs Sartaj Aziz and Iranian ambassador to Pakistan insist that Chahbahar and Gawadar are complimentary rather than rival ports.

Even with Russia only halfhearted efforts were made to mend relations. Defence co operation was also pursued.

But perhaps Moscow views Islamabad, despite the warts — firmly in the American camp, inextricably tied to its strategic priorities. Our foreign and military establishments traditionally feel comfortable in bed with the west ever since the heady 50s, when Islamabad was part of US sponsored security pacts like SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation).

But perhaps Moscow views Islamabad, despite the warts — firmly in the American camp, inextricably tied to its strategic priorities. Our foreign and military establishments traditionally feel comfortable in bed with the west ever since the heady 50s

So far as the US is concerned, Pakistan remains a quasi-ally, appropriately christened by critics not as a friend but as a ‘frenemy’. Osama bin laden was killed in a clandestine US Navy Seals operation five years ago in Abbotabad and now Mullah Akhtar Mansur has been eliminated in a US drone attack in Balochistan ostensibly both without taking Islamabad on board. This speaks volumes about Islamabad and Washington’s yawning trust deficit.

We are assiduously stuck to our failed security paradigm, claiming that we do not make any distinction between the good and bad Taliban.We also want American largesse for services rendered.

The US administration has clearly drawn red lines. They want Islamabad to go after the Haqqani network and abandon its tacit support for the Quetta Shura. Washington, all set to leave Afghanistan, has linked supply of the promised F16s to Pakistan on Islamabad delivering the Afghan Taliban.

Pakistan has been unable to, or some allege unwilling to, bring the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Its critics view the quadrilateral process involving Washington, Beijing, Kabul and Islamabad as just a charade.

Mullah Mansour and others of his ilk using Pakistani documents and moving freely has irked both Kabul and Washington. It is another matter that how, by eliminating their leader, will the Taliban be inclined to come to the conference table?

Even President Obama knows this and has expressed his skepticism about talks with the Taliban starting anytime soon. The quisling ‘president of Kabul’ Ashraf Ghani, buoyed by the killing of Mansour, has predicted his successor Mullah Haibatullah meeting the same fate. As a part of the sordid proxy war between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Ghani is harbouring the Pakistani Taliban terrorist Mullah Fazaullah.

All this does not auger well for Pakistan. According to Balochistan Interior Minister Sarfaraz Bugti, six Afghan spy agency operatives have been arrested in the province.  It seems Balochistan is infested with RAW and NDS agents.

Thus, Pakistan’s largest and strategically located province is not only infiltrated with foreign agents but it is also the home base of the Afghan Taliban.

During the tenure of Mohammad Maalik, the nationalist chief minister of the province, the separatists were engaged in some sort of negotiations with the government. Reportedly under his PML-N successor Sanaullah Zehri these talks have broken down.

The country seems to be in a royal mess both internally and externally. On one side the fate of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hangs in balance owing partly to the combined opposition led Panama leeks probe. On the other Islamabad seems increasingly isolated in the region and internationally as well. The only friend it can count on is perhaps China.

The fact that Sharif has kept the foreign affairs portfolio with himself and his two foreign policy advisors are too ineffectual to deliver is only part of the story. For far too long traditionally the military has dominated decision-making in the domain of foreignaffairs in the name of the ubiquitous national interest.

Its ingress has become more pronounced and invasive since the so-calledAfghan jihadthat started on the watch of dictator General Zia ul Haq, after the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979. UnderZia, jihad-for-hire became our policy pivot. Under Musharrf post 9/11 Pakistan again became an ally of the US in the so-called war on terrorism.

However, a more nuanced policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hares was adopted. On one side we were backing India-centric and Afghan-centric terrorists and on the other we were fighting the war on terror alongside the Americans.

It was only after the chickens came home to roost that we decided to go after the TTP or the bad Taliban under the aegis of the COAS General Raheel Sharif. Had it been left to the PML-N government even this would not have happened?

But unfortunately our soft corner for the Afghan Taliban –as evident from Mullah Mansour’s Pakistani travel papers — persists to this date. General Raheel Sharif has expressed his serious concern to the US ambassador about violation of Pakistani sovereignty.

But is it the first or last time that our sovereignty has been violated? The US drones are only one manifestation of this grave violation. The malaise runs much deeper.

On prime minister’s return from London the national Security Council is due to meet. But if the civilian and khaki leadership continues harping on the victimhood syndrome instead of doing some out of box introspection nothing will change. It is bound to get worse.