Pak-Afghan border must be fenced
This situation has arisen, in my opinion, because civilian government and military leadership are not on the same page. Nawaz Sharif seems to have a strange decision making problem, especially with regard to foreign policy
Once again Pakistan is being overtaken by events, and once again it is because of our own inaction that we are behind the curve. At home everything takes second place to the ruling family’s political survival. It is not even about PML-N anymore. The opposition, even PTI, is fine with the party staying as long as the PM steps aside and the investigation reaches its conclusion. But the Sharifs will have none of it. And, therefore, neither will the kitchen cabinet; they depend, after all, on Sharifs’ largesse or they’d still be scattered, second-tier politicians.
Nawaz will do anything to keep from being thrown out a third time. Even PPP managed better. But this fight for survival is already consuming all the government’s, and the opposition’s, energies. That is why the ruling party is foot-dragging on the ToRs. And of course it doesn’t mind that the opposition’s own breakdown is helping prolong the issue.
Yet things have already reached the point where Nawaz has no easy choices. Even a clean run to the finish line will, eventually, most likely lead to disappointment. He’s been unable to do anything about his main campaign promises. There’s no expansion of the tax net. Exports are brining no more foreign exchange than the previous regime, and the power crisis is still as big a nightmare. Then, of course, there were Orange Lines and some mega projects, but if the last couple of years winding the cycle are consumed by politics of survival, there’ll be little to sell at election time.
But these are hardly Pakistan’s biggest problems. Mian sb, even with the open heart surgery, cannot afford not to be concerned by the country’s deepening international isolation. First the Afghans, suddenly and apparently unilaterally, threw us out of the Quadrilateral. Then, expectedly, came a whole lot more ‘do more’ from the US. The tone was clearly stiffer this time. The F16s did not come. And there can be little ambiguity about the Haqqanis from here, especially since the new Taliban leader has brought them back to the forefront of the insurgency just as it is cutting deeper into the American withdrawal program.
Then, of course, there is the deepening chill with India. Things seemed suddenly moving in the right direction last December – when Modi surprisingly dropped by for Nawaz’s birthday – but Pathankot put a spanner in the works that is yet to be straightened out.
These developments were bad enough in isolation. But now, with the India-Afghanistan-Iran pact, Pakistan is suddenly far more isolated than before.
To understand this situation, DNA talked exclusively to Khursheed Kasuri, the most successful of Pakistan’s recent foreign ministers.
If the Americans are really serious about cross border infiltration, they should help Pakistan fence the border. If India can do it, so can Pakistan. I raised this point at a Nato summit in Potsdam in ’07
Question: Were you surprised that three of our neighbours entered into a pact that left us out? What does this development signify for Pakistan? What lessons should we learn from this?
Khursheed Kasuri: I’m not surprised at all by these developments. They were building for ten years. It’s quite simple to understand, really. If we don’t grant India the trade way it is seeking, it will obviously find another route. And even with Afghanistan, we have only given it one-way access. So, it is natural for it to find an alternative. These countries were working on just such a plan for a while now. And now things have come together for them. That is why I’m not surprised at all.
What this signifies for Pakistan is that our foreign policy is in the doldrums, which is unfortunate. We should have pursued very active diplomacy with Iran in the immediate aftermath of its lifting of sanctions. Iran’s natural inclination was to tilt towards Pakistan as well. But we did not handle that situation properly at all. Therefore, it was natural for those three countries to watch out for their own interests.
This situation has arisen, in my opinion, because civilian government and military leadership are not on the same page. Nawaz Sharif seems to have a strange decision making problem, especially with regard to foreign policy. There is no discussion about different options. There is no input from the foreign office. He does not like debate. He just relies on close family and associates for all decisions.
Q: Why is there still no foreign minister? Has not having one made the situation worse?
KK: What can I say about the foreign minister question really? Obviously not having a full time, dedicated foreign minister has created a huge vacuum. Resultantly, there is no movement in foreign policy. It has become static. It is a disastrous situation. And like I said, there is no involvement of the foreign office. That is especially regrettable. Even without a foreign minister, simply taking input from the FO can benefit the prime minister to a large extent. The FO is a highly trained and professional institution. In fact, I would say that after the armed forces, it is the most professional institution in the country.
And to come back to the question about the minister; it is probably because the prime minister lacks confidence. Maybe a strong and assertive foreign minister would make him uncomfortable. But that, too, is difficult to understand. This is his third time as PM. He should have overcome such things by now. Also, he really needs to work on his decision making skills.
Q: Considering much of foreign policy was being handled by the military, do you see some of these problems as a failure on the part of the military to handle the external environment?
KK: I don’t see it that way. It is the responsibility of the government to steer foreign policy. But the Afghan situation, especially, is complicated. The country is in a bad state. The government is dysfunctional. They still don’t have a defence minister or a foreign minister. There are still large differences between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah.
But Ghani did go out of his way to make peace. And now that it has not worked out, Pakistan is being blamed for all the problems. There is no doubt Pakistan has problems. We have been struggling with these problems since ’79. And now, finally, we have begun confronting some of them.
Yet our partners in this war must also take responsibility for their own shortcomings. US policy in the region is just not sustainable. Simply blaming Pakistan will not make those problems go away.
As for the military running foreign policy; when the government backs down from active control of policy, a vacuum is created. It was natural for the army to fill this vacuum. It is important to realise that foreign policy has a very direct bearing on national security, especially in times like the present.
Q: Do you fear more attacks of the kind that took out Mullah Mansour?
KK: I hope not, but I can’t really rule them out. However, such tactics are always counter-productive. The US might seem tough pursuing this policy, but in fact it is an admission of defeat. Obama himself said negotiations were the way out not too long ago. Earlier on, too, he called Afghanistan the good war and Iraq the bad war. He was going to wrap this up properly. But now, after trying for peace and involving four countries, having to drone inside Balochistan is an admission of failure of the original policy.
I can’t see how bombing Balochistan will serve American interests. Perhaps it’s for internal political consumption ahead of their presidential election. The Republicans have hounded the Obama administration for a weak foreign policy, especially regarding Pakistan. Perhaps this was meant to send different messages to different players.
Eventually, though, they will come back to the talks. If 150,000 troops could not end the war, 10,000 cannot either. The Iranian connection shows that they, too, understand the Taliban reality and the need to talk.
And if the Americans are really serious about cross border infiltration, they should help Pakistan fence the border. If India can do it, so can Pakistan. I raised this point at a Nato summit in Potsdam in ’07. This was the site of the historic Potsdam Conference of ’45, where Stalin, Truman and Attlee met.
I told them that if checking border incursions was so important, they should help build a fence on the border. The Canadian foreign minister agreed with me, but did not comment openly. Karzai had made a big fuss over the Durand Line at the time.
But they have to be practical. They have spent trillions there. And they still keep blaming Pakistan for all sorts of movement on the border. In everybody’s interest, therefore, they must cooperate with the fencing. I strongly advocate it.