Trading interests

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    Till the next Panama

     

    Before the Panama revelations, international media coverage, which tends to strap its reporting with relative stability or instability in the country, calculated Pakistan in the overall stability trends with political and security situation normalising in the country

     

     

    The post-Panama confrontation between the federal government, led by the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the opposition, led by Imran Khan needs to be dissected in the larger scheme of things. Beyond the so called fair and justified probe into this scandal, there are bigger interests at stake which perhaps are driving the principle players – the government, opposition and the military.

    The corruption scandal which by and large has subsided internationally still continues to rock Pakistani politics. The month long corruption saga has altered the country’s political and security dynamics with the power players trying to adjust to new developments while altering their priorities.

    Before the Panama revelations, international media coverage, which tends to strap its reporting with relative stability or instability in the country, calculated Pakistan in the overall stability trends with political and security situation normalising in the country. Now, however, the analysis has again slipped into the traditional reporting of relative instability which has gripped the country since the Panama leaks.

    On May 18, 2016, Time Craig, a renowned journalist and the Washington post’s bureau chief in Islamabad, published an article titled Pakistan’s welcome, if brief, moment of stability may be at an end,’ in which he incisively summed Pakistan’s overall struggle for stability and the interplay of the abovementioned three factors in the context of the latest corruption scandal by arguing that “The roots of the latest tension can be traced to the country’s vicious and vindictive political system, the military’s unwillingness to sever its ties to the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and diffused leadership that can pit a prime minister against his army.”

    I will discuss these three factors briefly. First, after the latest corruption scandal, the government, under Nawaz Sharif’s leadership, has altered its priories or in the words of Tim Craig, “country’s vicious and vindictive political system” has altered Sharif’s concerns from public service to survival. Three considerations in this regard are driving Sharif’s actions.

     

    Sharif understands that his political party is all set to win the next general elections. Therefore, for now, Sharif, who is also the product of this vindictive political culture, has turned his vengeance towards the opposition

     

    First, the PML-N’s leadership wants to reach the finish line by completing the remaining two years in government, in process making history by changing the traditional tag of failing in the middle as it has done in the previous two terms. From winning an election with the two third majority to reaching an almost collapse reveals this marked dilemma of Nawaz Sharif.

    Second, Sharif, in the last three years, has gradually lost control of all matters of strategic importance to the military; this process began with Imran Khan’s sit-in in Islamabad and has continued till today. From national security to foreign policy, Sharif has given away all powers to the military.

    By – voluntarily or involuntarily – ceding powers to the military, Sharif has come to terms with his weakened position vis-à-vis the army, which perhaps is the only life line he has to ensure his survival for the remaining two years of his rule. Without the military’s intervention, in Sharif’s favour or otherwise, the opposition cannot oust the current government, regardless of how severe the corruption charges may be.

    Third, Sharif understands that his political party is all set to win the next general elections. Therefore, for now, Sharif, who is also the product of this vindictive political culture, has turned his vengeance towards the opposition. Imran Khan’s relentless onslaught against Sharif has only weakened the former’s political prospects: a few days ago, Sharif during an address in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) said that “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) is slipping from your hands”. “You will not even have KP in 2018, much less Pakistan.”

    Second, the opposition – led by Imran Khan – which Tim Craig describes as the “diffused leadership that can pit a prime minister against his army,” understands that when it comes to the next general elections, their prospects of coming to power are very grim. Khan’s PTI in particular has tried to “pit” Prime Minister Sharif against the military by gradually weakening him or demanding a direct intervention from the army. Khan is perhaps that one leader who reflects the vicious political cycle and diffused leadership which has historically existed during all civilian regimes in Pakistani history. If the military were to intervene today, Khan would wholeheartedly support it. Khan’s policy of extreme provocation against the government — which is also reflective in the Panama leaks issue – has only harmed his political career.

    Third, the military’s “unwillingness to sever its ties to the Taliban insurgency” or with other militant groups based in the country, has complicated Pakistan’s security as well as the political environment. The military in Pakistan sees the country from the prism of security and any policy which contradicts its understanding of security and interests tied with it, have always drawn ire; be it the Nawaz Sharif’s rapprochement towards India or policy statements regarding the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups during the initial days of his regime. In order to remain in control of these strategic policy areas, the military has always desired a weak civilian government.

    This is what happened to Nawaz Sharif like everyone before him: a gradual taming through direct coercion or positioning political rivals, like Imran Khan. The army’s announcement of the key military operations including Zarb-e-Azb, the operation in Punjab and the formation of the military courts reflect this all.

    Nawaz is tamed now but understands his interests well which also involve falling in line with the military; the opposition, particularly Khan’s desperation to oust Nawaz is likely to fail as long as the latter does not challenge the men in uniform; and the military itself is all focused on what matters – for better or for worse.

    Till the next Panama!