Is it only Pakistan that is at fault?
The argument used to block the subsidy resides in the older thesis that the F-16s would be used against India, not the militants
Pakistan has been denied the sale of eight F-16s through the Foreign Military Financing Program (MFP) by the US. If Pakistan still desires to buy these aircraft it has to pay the full amount of $700 million, which in case of the subsidy would have gone down to $270 million.
Senator Bob Croker, chairman of the senate foreign relation committee, has raised the issue of Pakistan’s involvement in the recent spate of violence in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network, the alleged perpetrator of the attack, said the senator, has been provided safe haven in Pakistan. “Prohibiting a taxpayer subsidy sends a much-needed message to Pakistan that it needs to change its behaviour (…),” the senator reiterated.
The argument used to block the subsidy resides in the older thesis that the F-16s would be used against India, not the militants. In March 2015, the US house committee on foreign affairs froze $150 million in FMF and put hold on the delivery of a number of used US navy US cutter vessels. The argument given for the hold again revolved around Pakistan’s inability to fight extremists using the weapons in question.
In the end Pakistan is back to square one with the US on fighting militants as far as Afghanistan is concerned.
Continuity has never been part of US-Pakistan relations.
Historically Pakistan was abandoned once the US agenda needing Pakistan’s intervention in a crisis ceased to exist or had been accomplished. Soviet-Afghan war is quoted as one such example.
The creation of al Qaeda and subsequently of Taliban is blamed on the vacuum the US left in Afghanistan once its interest dissipated in the region with the retreat of Soviet forces. Pakistan is considered the main recipient of the disaster following Soviet-Afghan war that painted US as a partner who could not be trusted completely. We had seen public opinion crafted at the state level against the US while we received loads of cash under different programs. The situation was identical in the US. Pakistan has been distrusted and considered a partner who would hoodwink the US for the accomplishment of its paramount goal: defeat India in the region both psychologically and physically.
The nuclearisation of Pakistan soured many years between the two countries. After 9/11, when the war against terrorism began in Afghanistan, one fear that had been discussed ad nauseam was the nukes Pakistan held. The fear had been that the arsenal might fall into the hands of terrorists since Pakistan has been considered breeding some of these elements.
The question is where the problem lies now, especially since Pakistan and the US are finding themselves once again on the brink of collapse
The US’s intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 proved to be another disaster.Fifteen years later the country is as ravaged of war and civil disobedience as it had been when the Taliban were trying to Islamise the country. The onus eventually was thrown at Pakistan for keeping the fire alive in Taliban. That Pakistan was supporting the Taliban while handing al Qaeda to the US was soon seen as stabbing in the back of a benefactor who had been pouring dollars into Pakistan’s coffers for its supposedly sincere services to the US.
The government of Northern Alliance and India’s dominant role in the economic and military affairs of Afghanistan, while styling Pakistan into the mould of mediator and not a real player to bring Afghanistan back to its feet, did not sit well with the military under General Pervaz Musharraf. Pakistan’s security concerns that the country felt had been ignored in the process provided more reasons to Pakistan to fall back on its own foreign policy imperatives. Hence began the avalanche of indictments.
The crux of the matter is that Pakistan’s alliance with the Taliban has been seen as the crusader against US presence in the region that the world’s only super power could not counter in spite of all the power at its disposal.
The question is where the problem lies now, especially since Pakistan and the US are finding themselves once again on the brink of collapse for the same reason: Pakistan’s support to the Taliban.
Is it only Pakistan that is at fault? Is Pakistan’s security as much a US concern as it is of Pakistan’s given that Pakistan has not only been the main actor in the war on terrorism but has faced the major brunt of the war’s fall out? Why is Pakistan’s ability to thwart terrorism under the new military leadership of General Raheel Sharif not being appreciated in the context of domestic peace the initiative has achieved? Why is Pakistan expected to pay the price of Afghanistan’s political turmoil when the country has failed to garner support of its warring factions due to Afghan government’s internal squabbles?
These are hard questions that perhaps Pakistan is hard put to seek answers to in order protect its boarders first. However there is no denying the fact that the country needs a new paradigm in its foreign policy where the space for extremism is further tightened and eventually dispensed with.