The good and the bad of it
It seems that the differences and tensions in Pakistan’s civil-military relationship are here forever.
Despite PML-N’s statements that all is well on the civil-military front, there are severe strains put on this relationship by some real-time issues. The list of destabilizing elements – in the order of severity of impact – can be something like this; 1) military’s insistence to enter Punjab and start an operation against terrorists and other ‘criminal elements’ in Punjab, 2) army’s demand for formation of an independent/above board authority for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)’s administration, 3) disagreements over Sindh/Karachi operations, 4) disagreements regarding Pak-India relations, 5) corruption hullaballoo (particularly after the Panama Papers), and 6) army’s image building campaign and taking credit for all good occurrences in the country.
While some of the above-mentioned are ‘active’ in form (the Punjab operation), others are indirectly contributing negatively to the already imbalanced civil-military relations (i.e.: army’s image building campaign). However, both put tremendous pressure on the entire political system.
There are both good and bad aspects to this situation; but the balance is overwhelmingly tilted towards the bad. What first comes to mind is whether the issues that are souring the working relationship between the civilian and military sides are in fact real. The second is; is it constitutionally right for the army to take up some – or all – of the issues with the civilian government and insist on solving it according to its liking? But more than that; is it politically right for the government to shun everything without addressing the issues on its own, which is, fulfilling its own responsibilities first?
The answer to the first question is mixed. Some of the issues are real; some, real but manipulated and some fabricated in order to get political mileage out of, and to weaken, the civilian government. However, not everything is black and white. For example, Punjab needs some grand LEA’s operation – but what sort of operation, against whom and by whom? Likewise, Karachi’s operation – to the extent of establishing the writ of the state and maintaining law and order – is right; but where should the line be drawn? Should it expand to white-collar crime? If yes, whose jurisdiction is it under? Also: can military or paramilitary involvement in rural Sindh without the consent of the provincial (civilian) be termed right? Above all, is the ‘political side’ of Karachi operation handled wisely?
But then there are issues like the army’s CPEC administration concerns, its insistence over combing operations against miscreants all over the country, Pak-India relations and across the board accountability which is a real need and a general consensus among the masses for some visible and quantifiable measures which can’t be deferred indefinitely.
Even if all the issues are genuine, some of them don’t fall within the purview of the armed forces constitutionally; even if they do, they have to follow the government and not lead or coerce it into decisions making. Overplaying of issues like corruption also seems to be politically motivated. The COAS’s call for across the board accountability was damaging to the political government both because of its timing and because the media took it upon itself to chase the government and try to bring it down.
The real bones of contention, however, are the Punjab issue and CPEC’s independent authority. Both are politically important to both sides. For the Sharifs, it is Punjab in both the cases; the operation in Punjab considered as an ‘invasion’ of a personal fiefdom, while the authority on CPEC will deprive it of the unbridled powers to favour Punjab by manipulating or bending some of the CPEC projects. For the army, it is political and strategic, national and international, Punjab and China – both equally important for the country. The list of participants of the PM/COAS meeting throws some light on the central theme of Tuesday, May 10’s discussion. One wonders why only Punjab’s CM was invited when the meeting was to discuss ‘national and internal security’, Zarb-e-Azb and IDPs. After all, it wasn’t a visit to China or Turkey for which the PM could handpick his favourite CM to accompany him.
It is clear that both the sides are playing political games and the fight is a political turf war. All moves of the contesting sides are based on personal and institutional interests. But the military has an upper hand in this struggle because of three reasons; a) all the issues have some element of ‘truth’ and ‘national interest’ – and some are sold like that, b) politicians’ low moral and political standing vis-à-vis the army because of their two inherent weaknesses – corruption incompetence, and c) the army’s charm offensive and its successful, invisible campaign to build a national narrative – both about the perception of ‘national interests’ and against the political side.
But leaving aside who is winning and who isn’t, this divide is resulting in both long and short-term problems for the country.
First is the political instability which consequently entails economic pitfalls. Right now, the weak political government (including the provincial governments) is preoccupied with the issue of its survival. This among others, does not allow the government to pay attention to the real long-term issues faced by the country, and instead pushes it towards knee-jerk reactions, like announcing less-needed but politically beneficial developmental project in an effort to maintain its dwindling popular support base.
Keeping the political losses in mind, the political government is unlikely to fight extremism, sectarianism and terrorists’ urban sleeper cells with vigour and determination – though the active fight against ‘terrorists’ is less likely to be affected as it is being fought by the armed forced with single-minded determination. Currently, the government can also not give full attention to the country’s foreign affairs and multilateral relations –not only because of its preoccupation with self-continuation but also because of the decisive say the army enjoys in the foreign policy domain due to the uneven civil-military balance.
In any ‘normal’ country, the civilian government and its armed forces complement each other -with the armed forces taking the back seat despite its physical superiority. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, they are at loggerheads with each other, causing serious long-term damage to the state and society. Besides other such bad consequences, it is harmful to the country in the following ways.
The civil-military tug of war is resulting in the deceleration of the political development process, pushing the democratic goalpost farther away. It is but natural that it will also delay establishment of the rule of law, a corollary of a truly democratic setup. And unless the latter is practically established, corruption and bad governance will not only continue but grow.
Last, but not the least, it will keep the state internally divided, thus weakening everything except military power. But can that alone guarantee the future of a modern or post-modern nation state? This question is especially relevant to Pakistan, where the population has exploded but the civil-military wrangling, terrorism and corruption has been holding it from investing in ‘society’ and addressing real issues?
But if history is anything to go by, there is little possibility that things on this front will change only by discussing pros and cons, which protagonists on both the sides will be quick to agree to term as ‘subjective opinions’ aimed at tarnishing the others’ image. The situation is not going to get resolved anytime soon; at least, not until one of the quarrelling parties overpowers the other, something bad happens to the country, or it is realised that a great damage has already been done.