We’re back to square one
After the Kabul attack a week ago, President Ashraf Ghani, in a speech given before the Afghan Parliament, accused Pakistan of sheltering various anti Kabul militant groups. He further said that his country no longer expects Pakistan to play any role in bringing the Afghan Taliban to peace talks; and rather demanded an action from Pakistan against militants who have targeted Kabul’s interests and are believed to be based in Pakistan.
Undoubtedly, the peace process, spearheaded by Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States and China, has hit a dead end. But is Pakistan to blame for the failure of peace talks? Or is President Ghani trying to save his own skin by targeting Pakistan – since clearly, the Afghan security forces have been unable to contain the spiraling Taliban insurgency?
On the other hand, there are legitimate questions regarding Pakistan’s role to earnestly support this process by effectively utilizing its decades old influence over the Afghan Taliban. No one is sure whether Pakistan has given up its policy of making distinction between different militant groups – commonly known as “good” Taliban and “bad” Taliban.
While Ghani’s government has clearly failed in reining in the Taliban insurgency, Pakistan’s role has been dubious: Islamabad’s efforts and commitments to target all sorts’ of militant groups based in the country have met with skepticism internationally. Reportedly, Pakistan’s own fight against militant groups based in the country’s tribal region has been indiscriminate, meaning it has targeted all terrorist groups, including the Haqqani network.
“…there are legitimate questions regarding Pakistan’s role to earnestly support this process by effectively utilizing its decades old influence over the Afghan Taliban. No one is sure whether Pakistan has given up its policy of making distinction between different militant groups – commonly known as “good” Taliban and “bad” Taliban.”
However, there is growing evidence to suggest that Pakistan has continued its policy of patronizing different militant groups. The National Security Archive at the George Washington University recently published a number of unclassified documents which claim that “A large majority of the Haqqani Network (HQN) funding comes from the Quetta, Pakistan-based Taliban leadership.” Moreover, the US state department recently said that Pakistan continues to tolerate militant groups which have targeted Afghanistan. “We have consistently expressed our concerns at the highest level of the government of Pakistan about their continued tolerance for Afghan Taliban groups such as the Haqqani Network operating from Pakistani soil,” said the US State Department.
Regardless of how costly Pakistan’s policy choices have been in the last two decades, it is not yet ready to give up on militant groups which have acted as a neutralizer in Afghanistan vis-à-vis other neighboring countries, particularly India.
Pakistan is interested in peace in Afghanistan but not at the cost of its support base there. The Afghan Taliban is now in a much stronger position than they were few months ago. Clearly, Pakistan has not forced the Taliban leadership into peace talks for it doesn’t want to lose whatever support base it has in Afghanistan. It appears as if Pakistan is not interested in forcing the group to an extent where they get estranged from the former.
Hassan Abbas, in his book, The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan and Afghanistan Frontier notes that the Haqqani group, which is “considered an asset,” deals with Pakistani intelligence on its own terms and in many cases operates quite independently. “It knows Pakistan’s security vulnerabilities and long-term interests in Afghanistan and blackmails it. Pakistan plays along – at times happily.”
Pakistan remains apprehensive about India’s involvement in Afghanistan. This apprehension, however, is unjustified in many ways as Islamabad has only operated under the premises of denying New Delhi any space in Kabul. What Policy makers in Islamabad need to understand is that like their own country, India also has some legitimate economic as well as security interests in Afghanistan. No one is denying that Pakistan should not be sensitive to its regional security concerns but how credible and grounded those concerns are, remains a question.
Pakistan may have some influence over the Taliban but it doesn’t mean the latter are Pakistan’s puppets. Since the 9/11, when the international troops arrived in Afghanistan, the group’s demands have been clear: unless the international forces leave Afghanistan, they will not particulate in any peace process. Thus far, Taliban’s brief participations in the peace talks have been the sheer outcome of Pakistan’s influence on them.
“Pakistan may have some influence over the Taliban but it doesn’t mean the latter are Pakistan’s puppets.”
The United Kingdom’s Foreign Affairs committee in the House of Commons published a report in 2010 saying that “If Pakistan believes that its influence is insufficient [in Afghanistan], it will not support the process, yet the perception of excessive influence could provoke opposition inside Afghanistan or countermeasures by neighboring countries.”
Ghani’s policy change from reconciliation to confrontation – or the blame game – is perhaps the direct result of this building pressure from opposition parties and also from other neighboring countries, particularly from India. The worsening security environment in Afghanistan has essentially weakened President Ghani politically at home. After the Kabul attack last week, Ghani could not justify his reconciliation approach towards Pakistan anymore which has yielded no results.
Pakistan’s democratic government has been talking much of the blame for this reconciliation approach towards Afghanistan which has clearly failed. Nawaz Sharif’s role as the Prime Minister in this regard, has been virtually non-existent; in Pakistan, any interaction related to Afghanistan and India sit beyond the civilian government’s control.
Beyond the realms of who controls Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan, the authorities in Kabul need to look inwards in order to resolve their internal problems which have severely hampered the peace in Afghanistan. While international support is essential for any peace process to succeed in Afghanistan, Kabul needs to initiate intra Afghan dialogue by accommodating legitimate demands of the Afghan Taliban.
Moreover, Pakistan on its part should fulfill its commitments by reaching out to Kabul again. Meanwhile, Kabul should understand Pakistan’s security concerns which have been the sole reason for the latter’s support for insurgent groups.
