How to do it and how not to do it
As a news subject, few topics generate more platitudes per hour than corruption. It is a favourite among media personnel on the lookout for an issue that manages to evoke an emotional response in an otherwise cynical and desensitised nation. For all the trials and tribulations Pakistanis have faced, corruption still hits home. While the media does its job of highlighting the operational side of state corruption, the discourse rarely focuses on the future course of action. Of how corruption reforms have succeeded and why they’ve often failed in Pakistan. Of the obstacles to be overcome and the costs for those executing the scheme.
As a first in initiating any anti-corruption drive are the legal and regulatory reforms that allow for the establishment of bodies and procedures for tackling corruption. A government’s seriousness in pursuing an anti-corruption stance can be gauged clearly at this crucial stage. In particular the powers provided to the anti-corruption body. For instance the extent of the body’s powers, can it investigate as well as prosecute or is investigation the sole purpose of the body? Does the body have the power to detain, prosecute and investigate on its own without prior approval of legislative or other governing bodies? Which arms of the government can be investigated? Are cases fast-tracked through courts or do they proceed in the manner of established norms? Is the body allowed to investigate and prosecute sitting members of parliament and senior government officials? Can the body move retrospectively or does its mandate encompass only current instances of corruption?
The regulatory framework provides the bulwark against which corruption reform rests. In Brazil’s case, Lula Inacio de Silva and Dilma Rousseff were key figures in establishing Brazil’s current anti-corruption regime. In a supreme twist of fate and as a testament to the legislative strength of the laws, both are under investigation by the same authorities they helped set-up.
As far as regulatory bodies are concerned, Pakistan certainly has the raw manpower. There is the National Accountability Bureau, provincial Anti-Corruption Departments, KP’s Ehtesab Commission and the Federal and Provincial Ombudspersons. However, despite years of operations, they have been unable to provide much meaningful contribution to the country’s on and off anti-corruption drives.
What these organisations lack is creditability. Credibility comes from consistency and consistency requires that legislation be applied evenly across the political and governance spectrum. Herein lies the second test of a government’s seriousness in tackling corruption. How far the organisationcan go is a matter of its mandate established under the regulatory framework. How far the organisation is allowed to go is an altogether different issue, a political decision that has to come from the top.
Indonesia provides a powerful, illustrative case study. During Suharto’s thirty one year rule spanning from 1967 to 1998, Indonesia was governed through a system that revolved around the systematic management of corruption and patronage. Although Suharto delivered on economic growth and reduced poverty, his governance style resulted in government institutions that could never hold their own against money and power.
On the flipside, this ubiquity of corruption created a strong anti-corruption sentiment within the country which was leveraged by Susilo Bambang Youdhyono to achieve electoral victory and become Indonesia’s prime minister. Mr Yudhyono proceeded to create Indonesia’s corruption watchdog, Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi or Corruption Eradication Commission. Over the years, the KPK has prosecuted high-ranking officials and powerful politicians and achieved a 100 percent conviction rate in its cases. Among those convicted was Aulia Pohan, related to Mr Youdhyono through filial marriage. Despite targeting a member of the prime minister’s inner circle, Mr Youdhyono ensured a policy of non-interference in the commission’s working. Consequently, the commission was able to secure a four and a half year prison term for Aulia Pohan. Similarly in 2004, Aceh’s powerful governor Abdullah Puteh was prosecuted and convicted by theKPK, resulting in a ten year jail term for the ex-governor.
Other examples come to mind. Rwanda has been able to reduce corruption drastically through a sustained campaign that has had unflinching political backing from the presidential incumbent, Paul Kagame. Similarly in Brazil,despite immense pressure, the incumbent did not succumb to interfering in the ongoing Petrobras corruption investigation. If anything, the Brazilian president has been cooperating fully with authorities and has not tried to thwart the investigation.
Where Indonesia, Rwanda and Brazil provide examples of non-intervention, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mr Najib Razak’s thwarting of the 1MDB fund investigation provides a succinct study on how to intervene in a corruption investigation. Oust party politicians starting to ask uncomfortable questions? Check. Pressurise investigation officials? Check. Shutdown dogged press outlets? Check. Force out chief prosecutor from his office on ‘health ground’? Check. Mr Razak’s handling of the 1MDB case is the political equivalent of penguins walking. Awkward and graceless.
At its core, corruption reform is a zero-sum game. If successful, anti-corruption drives will likely whip up resentment from individuals and organisations who stand to lose out, prompting such individuals and organisations to sabotage the anti-corruption drive. This is especially true if the campaign’s focus is on senior government officials and sitting parliamentarians. The pushback is likely to be sustained, growing in magnitude as the anti-corruption drive unfolds. At this point, it is vital that political support to the anti-corruption body remain steadfast. In case support wanes, the most likely outcome would be a legislative defanging of the organisation leading the anti-corruption drive, stalling the campaign and rendering the organisation ineffective.
Which is where public opinion comes in. For all its inherent flaws, the intrinsic power granted to people in a democracy should never be underestimated. It is easy to be cynical about the very nature of democracy and its usefulness as a mode of governance, given that the process seems to grind on indefinitely without noticeable improvements. Despite its shortcomings the system invests individuals with powers that are simply not available in any other form of governance.
Again, Indonesia’s case-study provides an interesting guide to the power of public opinion in sustaining a corruption drive. As the KPK was investigating the inspector general of Police, alleged to have amassed assets far beyond legal possibilities, Indonesian police officials, in a move reminiscent of our own security agencies, tried to arrest the lead prosecutor in the case. As the police tried to lead away the lead prosecutor, civil society protestors gathered outside the point of arrest, forcing the police officials to retreat without the lead prosecutor. Eventually, authorities had to back down and the inspector general of Police was convicted of having amassed resources beyond his means and handed a ten year prison sentence.
In another instance of sabotage, two officials of the KPK were accused of graft, later proven to be untrue. This incident triggered a sustained episode of public outrage, vented through social media and through street protests, underscoring the support the organisation had built among the public.
Given historical precedent, cynicism surrounding anti-corruption drives is justified. Sustaining and initiating an anti-corruption drive is an uphill battle that requires immense political will and public support. More often than not, ruling parties will find themselves dithering on the issue when the campaign threatens to envelope its cadres, which is usually the point where the drive loses momentum and credibility. However, despite the immensity of the task and despite there being a low rate of success, corruption has been successfully contained in developing countries in relatively short periods of time.
