Pak-Afghan ties

Bad to worse

It is unfortunate that last week’s attack in Kabul finally drove that long hovering right through the QCG (Quadrilateral Coordination Group). Ghani clearly went the extra mile to salvage matters, but pressure from the opposition, the Abdullah Abdullah faction of government, and now senior members of his own party made it impossible for him to sell the talks back home any longer. Yet it is difficult to quantify what his detractors might have achieved by cutting off with Pakistan. Everybody seemed happy enough when the talks seemed a reality. And – leaving the Mullah Omar story for another time – it’s not as if Islamabad did not scramble to keep Mullah Mansour from putting his weight behind the Spring Offensive.

Perhaps, ironically, the only people as happy as the opposition in Kabul seem, would be the Taliban field commanders who made sure Mansour stayed with the fight. And for that, they had to keep fighting right through the winter – not allowing for the usual winter lull. Now the immediate future, for the QCG at least, is anything but clear. If Kabul will have nothing to do with the talks, nearly two years’ investment of time and money by four countries will suddenly become meaningless.

That is why there will no doubt be a flurry of diplomatic exchanges routed through Kabul; from as near as Beijing to as far as Washington. Both powers have serious political needs of their own that will not be met until there is peace in Afghanistan. And President Ghani’s government does nobody any favours – least of all his own country – by allowing terrorists to punch far above their weight and dictate the politics of the region. Regrettable as the success of the Spring Offensive is, the QCG must not lose focus. The Taliban’s biggest failing is their inability to reach Kabul. By letting them interfere, Ghani is weakening the fight against terror, not strengthening it.