Failure of the government or limits of the system
Why has Musharraf gone? Why the government let him go out of country despite so many high profile cases against him? Can a person alleged of committing high treason be let off the hook on so flimsy grounds? Where is rule of law? What’s the message in it; what is its meaning in the larger political context? These and many more like these are the questions that are agitating people’s minds after the departure of former president and army chief, Pervez Musharraf, from the country last week in a seemingly unexpected manner.
But, frankly speaking, he had to go. From the very beginning, it was a matter of when, not why. And the reasons are obvious. When Nawaz Sharif let his intentions known on June 24, 2013, that his government was going to try the former military dictator under Article 6 of the Constitution, he was advised by many well-wishers not to start a project that was sure to end in failure. But he didn’t budge. The results are now before everyone to see.
This is not just the letting go of a person charged with high treason but that the ill-planned and less thought-out – though well-intentioned – adventure resulted in further weakening the already fragile civilian/democratic system. And herein lies the answer as to why the government took his name out of the Exit Control List (ECL).
To begin with, the democratic system was not capable of condemning a military dictator just after five years when democracy was allowed to return to Pakistan. The PPP government had completed its tenure under very difficult circumstances and after making some hard-to-believe compromises vis-à-vis the military establishment. Politically speaking, Nawaz Sharif entered the scene in shaky circumstances. But he took his almost two-third majority to heart and started like a ruler who had absolute authority to take his decisions.
And he took three fatal decisions without first consulting – or getting prior approval of — the ones who are the most vital part of the decision-making process since 1958 – with the negligible interregnum of 1971-1976. These were; building bridges with India, starting negotiations with Taliban and trying Musharraf. Together, these issues brought the civil military relations to an all-time low. Though the civilian government wasn’t allowed to move on the first two issues as it had wished and planned, it was the latter misadventure that literally brought Nawaz Sharif government on the verge of collapse – almost.
And it was when Nawaz Sharif reneged on his words to let go Musharraf if he personally appeared before the court to be formally indicted. Nawaz Sharif’s changed stance that he will only be let off the hook after he is handcuffed for even as brief a time as five minutes let loose Azadi and Inqilab marchers’ onslaught who sieged the capital for good 124 days. The government was saved only after some behind-the-scene understandings and when a positive change was seen in Nawaz Sharif attitude towards Musharraf affair.
The military could not afford and allow one of its former chiefs to be convicted under Article 6 as it would bring a bad name to the institution which he not very long ago headed, demoralise rank and file, tilt the civil-military balance in favour of civilians, erode the dominant position the army enjoyed in decision-making and make a dangerous precedent of bringing to book army generals for any past and future acts of omission and commission. Nawaz Sharif was not in a position to carry out what he had planned for his former tormentor when the army was weaker compared to its current standing. So, how was it expected that things in this matter will be allowed to move according to the book now when the army is in a much stronger position and when it is on the verge of appearing victorious in what is termed to be one of the bold and bloodiest wars against home-grown terrorism?
Besides the army’s displeasure, there were some problems in legal cases framed against Musharraf that made his conviction in most of them a very far-fetched possibility. For example, the washing of the crime scene soon after the fatal attack that killed Benazir Bhutto, though it made the culpability of state apparatus more obvious, yet it also made the case against Musharraf hard to prove in a court of law; unless someone was in a position to bring everything upside down to prove that state machinery was involved in the crime at some level.
In Akbar Bugti murder case again, it was legally hard to prove (under the prevailing circumstances) that the decision to sort out the Baloch sardar was a personal one of Pervez Musharraf, though this element was very much present. It also points to the sad reality that how state interests/actions are equated with the thinking/decision of certain individuals in certain places. But this is how it is. Lal Masjid case is also fraught with some lethal possibilities. If Musharraf or any other head of state or government or army chief is held responsible and punished for taking action to restore the writ of the state in the face of an armed rebellion, then it will practically become very difficult to run this state or maintain/establish its monopoly on (legal use of) violence which is the sine qua non of a state –any state.
The high treason case was the menacing of all. The government, were it desirous to make it more meaningful, had to start it from October 12, 1999, when the original sin was committed. But it decided to try Musharraf on actions that were taken by him on November 3, 2007, and after. In the first scenario, it was obvious that many of the generals (or almost all of the corps commanders at that time) would face the same charges as that of the actual abrogator/subverter because the 18th Amendment in the Constitution has made it abundantly clear that those who abet, aid or collaborate in the abrogation or subversion of the Constitution, shall be equally guilty of high treason. But the buck wouldn’t stop there as people serving in high echelons of bureaucracy and implementing orders of military high-ups could be charged of committing the same crime. Add to it the judges of the superior judiciary who provided legal cover to the 1999 take-over of Pervez Musharraf – going the whole hog to even empower him to amend the constitution single-handedly in Syed Zafar Ali Shah case (2000), and one can easily reach the conclusion that a logical end to high treason case against Musharraf was next to impossible.
In simple words, our system has not matured to the extent that it can absorb such a huge political shock or where the civilian side can go to the extent to convict a living former army chief for abrogating the constitution and then send him to the gallows.
And this takes us to the point where the opposition criticism of the government over Musharraf issue clearly appears to be political in nature which is aimed at gaining some political mileage out of it and nothing more. This is particularly true of PPP which did nothing against Musharraf during its five year rule. It is a fact that no political party or government in the present shape of things can do something of the sort against military generals. Criticism of Nawaz Sharif seems out of place particularly as his government, on this one issue, did more than what appeared possible. It, in its foolishness, put its government on the line.
If Nawaz Sharif must be castigated it should be that he went into the dragon’s den ill-prepared. The cases were not well though-out. The judges were let loose on the influential culprit to the extent that it annoyed everyone, particularly those who matter. And by doing so, he has done a disservice to the democratic project in the sense that the civilian/democratic side not only surrendered on the policymaking front, tilting the balance more in favour of the military but also that the dream of creating a deterrence in the way of potential adventurist pushed further away.
