Changing Pakistan’s foreign policy for the better

A trend seems emerging

A subtle strategic shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy is visible. Various domestic and regional developments, which have taken place in the last few years, are mainly responsible for inducing this change. On the face of it, decades long polices of supporting non-state actors for geostrategic reasons are being discarded. And the reason for that is simple: these groups and associated narratives have harmed Pakistan’s interests and security more than anything else.

Several strategic developments were responsible for this shift in perception. Due to such policies, various terrorist networks with different orientations have flourished in Pakistan. Over the years the terms ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’ have emerged, according to which the former are those who do not target Pakistan’s interests and the latter are those who attack Pakistan’s interests.

Two regional states – India and Afghanistan – have, by and large, remained at the core of Pakistan’s strategic thinking. There are historic, ideological as well as geostrategic reasons for this.

Pakistan’s emergence as a state in 1947 took place in a chaotic milieu that left deep scars of insecurity and uncertainty which still exist today. Primarily, Pakistan’s perceived sense of insecurity comes from its larger neighbour in the east, India, with whom it has long-standing unresolved issues, including the Kashmir dispute. As a result, Pakistan has gone to considerable lengths in its pursuit to contain its perceived external security threat from India, and methods used have included conventional war, proxy war, alliances with global powers, diplomacy, and domestic means.

Pakistan’s relations with its western neighbour, Afghanistan, also commenced after independence and didn’t get off to a very good start. Afghanistan tried to use British decolonisation as an opening to question the validity of the Durand Line, the border separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, and also started to make irredentist claims in relation to Pakistan’s Pashtun areas and parts of Baluchistan. Moreover, Afghanistan was the only country which voted against Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations. Since then the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has remained very porous, particularly in the tribal areas of what was known as the North-West Frontier Province.

By and large, Pakistan has had very rough relations with Afghanistan while India has always enjoyed very cordial relations with that country, except for the few years of Taliban rule. Moreover, Pakistan is very sensitive to the closeness of India and Afghanistan and believes that India operating alone or with Afghanistan can destabilise Pakistan’s obstreperous western border areas.

Thus far, Pakistani state and the military have taken heavy casualties in fighting against their own countrymen. This has led to a substantial change in army’s thinking: while India remains the enemy, these extremist groups have become an immediate problem. A new chapter of sub-conventional warfare has been added to the Pakistani army’s warfare book, called the ‘green book’, which describes the internal threat as the greatest risk to the country’s security.

A sober change has also emerged in Pakistan’s dealings with India and Afghanistan. In a rare move a few days ago, Pakistan shared some credible intelligence with India regarding some terrorists which may target the latter. Moreover, in a previous incident, Pakistan registered a case against some terrorists under the Anti Terrorist Act which were allegedly involved in the Pathankot Airbase attack.

On the Afghanistan front, Pakistan has clearly said that it will not support any group which harms Kabul’s interests. Moreover, Pakistan has also been facilitating the Afghan peace process and has promised to bring the Afghan Taliban to the table. A few days ago, the Pakistani foreign affairs advisor, in a rare admission, said that Pakistan still had significant influence over the Afghan Taliban because the group’s leadership’s families were based in Pakistan. Previously, Pakistan has always denied any such claims.

Undoubtedly, regional pressure, particularly from the China, has also played an important role in bringing about this strategic change. A reason behind China’s investment in strategically placed Pakistan has much to do with its revised approach to foreign policy, which, to some extent, promises to abandon existing approach of using non-state actors for strategic reasons.

Unfortunately, this strategic change is being led by the establishment. Pakistan’s foreign policy – during all these decades – has always remained the prerogative of minority organisational elite that sees Pakistan’s external environment from a wider security and military viewpoint and has attempted to mould and steer other internal and external sources to fit its own standpoint. The military still remains in control of the key aspects of the country’s security policy. Pakistan’s counter terrorism and foreign policy, as far the India and Afghanistan are concerned, still remain the military’s purview.

While Pakistani army has launched its latest military operation in North Waziristan, with claims of targeting all the terrorists, many still remain apprehensive about Pakistan’s intentions of targeting all militant groups.

In the past, Pakistan has always followed policies which were built on wild assumptions and have destroyed it internally. Such policies have given militant groups resources and autonomy to operate and propagate freely. Seemingly the costs of such choices have been much higher, as its presumed utility has declined sharply.