The MQM dilemma

To be, or not to be, that’s still the question

Unlike 1992, MQM seems to be on the verge of disaster in 2016. The allegations are not new at all; but those who are making them are. They are ‘close insiders’. And that’s why it is commonly believed that this time they will make a difference; and flocks will follow Mustafa Kamal, Qaimkhani and Dr Saghir.

However, the situation and the intricacies involved do not depict such a rosy picture; it is fraught with dangers. A lot depends on how the trio performs and how many influential leaders among the MQM cadres they bring in with them. This is definitely an effort by the establishment to claim the soul of MQM. But it will own it only when a considerable number of those who really matter in the party come in and carry forward the mission.

It goes without saying that the Karachi Operation has been a phenomenal success as far as improvement in the law and order situation on ground is concerned. Crime rate and number of killings in the city have been brought down to a remarkable extent and the capacity of the trouble-makers and killers has been undermined like never before. The city dwellers seem to have taken a sigh of relief after the return of a sense of security after a long time.

But it is also a fact that the political side of the Karachi problem has either remained unaddressed or it has been handled not-so-wisely. From the beginning of the Operation the two largest political parties of the province have been kept out of the loop. And the reasons are obvious; they were considered to be part of the problem. In the case of MQM – and its militant wing — this perception may be justified. Yet PPP was largely targeted due to stereotype misgivings and trademark institutional hate that the military establishment has been harbouring against it since ZA Bhutto’s time; and due to certain actions and statements of Asif Ali Zardari.

Keeping both parties uninvolved, however, weakened the political side of the operation which led to some setbacks. This is the reason that changes and delays were observed at different stage of the Operation. One of these unexpected developments was both the parties getting popular mandate in recently held local bodies’ elections and by-elections to the assemblies. This compelled the authorities to make amends for the weaknesses and review its plans.

In order to overcome this setback, it was necessary to counter it in the same coin, i.e. politically. But besides the ‘popularity’ problem of the ‘suspect’ parties, there were some other reasons too to fight it out politically and not legally. Speaking of which, isn’t it intriguing that despite the ‘strong’ cases pending in British and Pakistani courts, ‘evidence’ is presented to the people and cases contested in the media?

This, of course, points to two important aspects. First, that the cases are legally weak and the evidence not admissible in the court of law in Pakistan. And second, that there were disagreements with UK government and lacunas in the Imran Farooq murder and money-laundering cases which are pending there. Hence, instead of court, we see media trials in order to make some gains at popular and political levels.

It is likely and largely expected that during the coming weeks and months some important defections may be seen. One of the biggest names is that of the sitting Sindh governor, Ishratul Ibad which is cited as the potential leader of the born-again MQM. The absence from the scene of some other party luminaries, like Haidar Abbas Rizvi, is also prompting rumours that more unpleasant things might be in store for the beleaguered party. But currently these are all speculations. During the coming days the authorities responsible for conducting the Operation and the MQM may encounter many problems.

The establishment may confront the problem of ‘popular mandate’ in the near future as by-election on NA 245 is due in early March. It may also err in handling the political side. The federal government may not take its side openly unless it is sure of the success of the current strategies. The PPP may also not lend it a helping hand so conveniently, as it has some old complaints of its own from the Rangers, etc. And as MQM is already in the wilderness, the establishment may, in the coming days, run out of options politically.

As far as the MQM is concerned, it has apparently nothing left in its hands at the moment to counter the LEAs’ onslaught. Its ‘working hands’ are either in lockups or they are incapacitated. The party is expected to throw out some more dissidents, facilitating the rise of a new leadership from within its ranks. Dissent with the party over policy options and future strategies may increase and put it under tremendous pressure. Desertions are also expected on account of the call of conscience, of being freed from the party’s coercive hold; and of those who will realise that jumping a rocking boat now may help save their skins. Altaf Hussain’s falling health, blanket blackout of his speeches, statements and pictures, added with his loss of control on his party may aggravate problems for the party to the extent that it may break its back for good.

But despite the widespread expectations of large-scale desertions from, and likely division in, MQM the authorities must move with due diligence. The go-it-alone policy of the paramilitary forces may be successful in improving law and order situation, but strong-arm tactics cannot guarantee long-term political stability. Although its arms are apparently open for those MQM people who may run towards it, yet it will be wise to take the Sindh ruling party on board and address the political issues jointly and according to law. The present policy of setting a thief to catch a thief may not pay off well in the long run and may taint the army’s own image. The launch of Anees Qaimkhani and the inaction of the LEAs to arrest him despite him being a wanted man has already raised a few eyebrows and put a question mark on the legality of the tactics adopted for the purpose.

Instead of furthering the interests of some particular organisation, the situation may be used to strengthen civilian institutions that are lacking in capacity and capabilities. Rangers’ request to the Supreme Court for permission to establish its own ‘Police (Rangers’) stations’ in Karachi tantamounts to strengthening one particular organisation at the cost of annexing and weakening other national institutions. The power and dominant position of the military must be used to rebuild the rotten departments, not to raise them to the ground. After all it is a national institution built using national resources. If it is in a position to help, it should help in the right places and in establishing the rule of law and writ of the state through institutions/departments that exist for that purpose.

As for MQM, PPP and other political parties, they must shun the old ways of violence, corruption, patronage and protecting the culprits. They must accept the supremacy of the law of the land. The MQM dilemma must be resolved in the court of law once and for all. If its leadership is really involved in crimes that are propagated through media, then its true face should be shown to the people. If not, they must be left off the hook.

But Karachi must be rescued and freed of constant fear its dwellers have been living under for more than 35 years.