Déjà vu all over again?
The attack on Bacha Khan University (BKU), Charsadda, by the Pakistani Taliban was as gruesome, merciless and unrelenting as the Peshawar attack a year ago, which resulted in the deaths of more than 140 people, mostly children. Reportedly, more than 20 people died and scores were left fighting for their lives.
The start of the New Year has been brutally effective for terrorists. In just first 20 days of 2016, more than 60 people have lost their lives in terror related incidents. Pakistani Taliban’s name has resurfaced again, renewing existing concerns that the Taliban insurgency – even if reduced – has survived and retained its previous ability to strike back. Moreover, the attack on BKU was claimed by the same person who is known to have planned and executed the Peshawar massacre, which left the entire nation petrified.
A year-long military offensive against TTP – largely celebrated as a success – has been put into question, along with other elements of the National Action Plan (NAP) – a 20 point plan devised to tackle militancy and extremism in Pakistan.
Moreover, recent back-to-back assaults by the Taliban have also raised concerns about the legitimacy of claims made about the decimation of the enemy’s infrastructure on Pakistani soil. Rather, it appears otherwise: since their formation in 2007, the Taliban has attacked polio campaigns, security infrastructure and the educational sector; these targets were visible in the latest carnage, which demonstrates that the group is not desperate to recover its lost infamous viciousness by choosing random targets.
A year-long military offensive against TTP – largely celebrated as a success – has been put into question, along with other elements of the National Action Plan (NAP) – a 20 point plan devised to tackle militancy and extremism in Pakistan
Under the NAP, we have tried all knee-jerk options ranging from stiff military action to execution of hard core terrorists. According to officially released numbers, under NAP, more than 2,159 terrorists have been killed in Pakistan. As a result, we may have enjoyed some temporary lull, but it does not – in anyway – present solution to Pakistan’s chronicle militant problem.
Permanent respite from terrorism resides in parts of NAP which have largely remained overlooked: we may be going after some hardcore insurgents but we are not going after the ideological reasons which drive such insurgencies across Pakistan.
Taliban’s resurgence has taken place at a time when other militant groups are trying to fill the vacuum left by the former: the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and groups associated with it, are posing a serious threat in this regard. The group has been actively looking for recruits in the country. A few weeks ago, dozens of suspects across the country were detained by the security agencies in connection with the group.
The group’s ideology and propaganda tactics make it far more lethal than Pakistani Taliban or any other group with militant roots in the country. Its virtual presence across the globe has turned it into a successful terror brand which every militant group wishes to follow or affiliate itself with. The recent attacks in Jakarta, Indonesia, are an example that ISIS is rallying other militant groups under its banner.
Thus far, ISIS’s recruitment patterns in the country have emerged across all spectrums of society, raising grave concerns for what may transpire in the future. The group has reportedly vowed to unite all Pakistani militant groups, particularly sectarian, under its banner. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is said to have established close contacts with it, among other sectarian organisations. Moreover, more than 100 people, including a large number of women and children, have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for the group.
In the past, promotion of radical Islamic culture in the country resulted in increasing radicalisation of Pakistani society. Moreover, the institutionalisation and selective use of Islam for segregation and restrictive purposes, internally and externally, has opened up several battlegrounds across Pakistan with disastrous results.
Pakistan’s militant problem is like a paradox: certain militant groups are perceived as grave threats to national security while others are let off the hook. As Zahid Hussain, a prominent South Asian security expert, recently argued, “Most of Pakistan’s terrorism problems have roots in our past policy of promoting militant groups”.1
Glorifying children as symbols of bravery and promoting hash tags such as “Never Forget” or “Never Again” will not resolve the underlying reasons which give rise to this nuisance
The recent attack on BKU and an earlier attack at an Indian air base illustrate such attitudes. Just hours after the Taliban took responsibility for the BKU incident, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Chief Minister Pervez Khattak, in an absurd, irrational and sweeping statement, said that somehow the Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), was involved in the attack. Just days before the BKU incident, the federal government sent a clear warning of an imminent attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and yet no measures were taken to prevent it.
In a similar vein but from a different perspective, the recent attack at an Indian air base was publicly claimed by the Jaish-e-Muhammad, which is based in Pakistan. The group continues to operate freely despite the fact it was banned years ago. Furthermore, the United Jihad Council (UJC), an umbrella organisation of various militant groups which also claimed responsibility for the Pathankot air base attack, recently held an open really in Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir.
Glorifying children as symbols of bravery and promoting hash tags such as “Never Forget” or “Never Again” will not resolve the underlying reasons which give rise to this nuisance. In addition, senseless killings and executions will not solve the problem either unless we address the root causes which exacerbate radicalisation in Pakistan. And until we do so, such unfortunate and bloody attacks will continue to take place.