Where to go from here
This is the final piece of my articles titled ‘In the fog of war’ carried in this very space. In the previous two, Pakistan’s launch of Operations “Gibraltar” and “Grand Slam”, the follies leading to debacles were presented. Worse still, General K M Arif’s Khaki Shadows disclosed that “Soon after the war the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date.” This action does not fall under the purview of “Fog of War” but a deliberate attempt to hide facts. If lessons had been learnt, Kargil would not have occurred.
Let us now turn to India, where a fog of war of a different nature persisted for 50 years. Suddenly waking up from Rip Van Winkle’s slumber, New Delhi has declared that it won the 1965 Pakistan-India War. Indian celebrations of September as a victory month comprise carnivals, stage shows, parades and tableaus. The plan, however, hit a snag from the outset. The Hindustan Times website revealed that retired personnel of the Indian army boycotted the government’s 1965 war anniversary celebration over the failure to break the deadlock of the one rank one pension (OROP) issue. Retired Indian military personnel say that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had made solemn promises about increase in the pensions with regard to OROP in his speech on August 15, but nothing had been done yet.
The OROP scheme ensures the same pension paid to veterans of the same rank, regardless of when they retired. The veterans are demanding an annual increase while the Indian government has suggested an increment every five years which is not fair as the increase should be based on inflation and in relation to ever-rising prices.
In the previous article, two Indian authors, veterans of the 1965 war, Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh, GOC Western Command, and Major General Joginder Singh, COS to India’s Western Command, were quoted admitting Indian failures against an enemy much smaller in size. Numerous other Indian authors have acknowledged that failing to take advantage of India’s numerical superiority and the “element of surprise” was in fact a defeat in otherwise a stalemate.
Two new books have been commissioned by the Modi government. The first, 1965, Turning the Tide: How India Won the War has been written by defence analyst Nitin Gokhale, sponsored by Indian Army’s official think-tank Centre for Land Warfare Studies. The book claims that India captured 1,920 sq km of Pakistani territory while losing 540 sq km of its own; India lost 2,862 soldiers whereas the toll for Pakistan, it said, was 5,800. Elsewhere the author contradicts himself, acknowledging that Pakistan said only 1,033 of its soldiers died in the war. Moreover, it claims that Pakistan lost over 450 tanks while India lost less than 100 which is a travesty of the truth as India and Pakistan had around 700 tanks each. It has been acknowledged by the defence analysts that India had lost a lot more tanks than Pakistan in Chawinda battle. The 280-page book also dwells upon India’s defensive mindset, cautious military leadership and intelligence failures during the war. The author goes on to state that “India committed a major blunder in accepting the ceasefire on September 22. If the war had continued, India perhaps could have celebrated it as a decisive victory like the 1971 war.” The scurry for a ceasefire was based on the then Indian Army chief General J N Chaudhuri’s advice to then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri that his forces had exhausted most of their frontline ammunition.
The second book, released on September 1, 2015, The Devils of the Himalayan Eagle, the first Indo-Pak war, authored by retired Indian Air Force (IAF) Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, attempts to glorify the role of the IAF but grudgingly admits that India bore heavier lose in 1965 Indo-Pak war as Pakistan gunned down 35 Indian jets in just two days. He claims that during the war, India destroyed 43 Pakistani jets and Pakistan shot down 59 Indian jets. He also claims that PAF aircrafts were superior to the IAF inventory. That is stretching the truth since IAF inventory comprised Russian made MiG-21 fighter aircraft which were the latest then. Its Hunters were superior in performance to the F-86 Sabre while both forces flew the same category of Canberra B-57 bombers. PAF did have the F-104, which were more lethal in reputation than reality while IAF Gnats were deadly and at times got the better of PAF Sabres.
Additionally, the official account called ‘The India-Pakistan War of 1965’, a history (editor S N Prasad; general editor U P Thapliyal) issued by the ministry of defence’s history division, is also being reviewed under the supervision of Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar.
A Freudian slip occurred in a “Victory Day” advertisement published by Indian dailies, who erroneously handed over victory to Pakistan. The text of the full-page official advertisement spoke about the role of the 15th Infantry Division during an attack near the west of Ichhogil Canal, stating the “Indian Army responded to the Pakistan attack with fear”. Additional faux-pas took place in the ads, failing to credit the Indian Army: “Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan and by September 10 nearly 100 tanks lay destroyed in what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar.”
Realism is presented by Kuldip Nayar, who in his article ‘The truth about the 1965 war’ carried on September 13, in the same space, states: “If at all New Delhi was keen to talk about the 1965 war victory, however limited, it should have dwelt more into the benefits of being a democratic state instead of violence and weapons. Democracies celebrate Magna Carta, not war victory. Such actions only encourage Bonapartism and, in no way, strengthen the people’s say.”
Fifty years down the line, let us embrace facts and draw lessons rather than blow our trumpets in the shadow of lies. Otherwise genuine valour too gets enveloped in the fog of war.
Note: This is part three of a three-part article. Part one can be accessed here while part two can be accessed here.
