In my experience, they are as Pakistan-centric as we are India-centric
As a former student of political science, I was no stranger to the career of Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, the Pakistani politician who had served as the country’s Foreign Minister for five years during Pervez Musharraf’s government. It was in his tenure that significant achievements were made in the peace process between India and Pakistan, especially on the issue of Kashmir. Currently the chairman of Regional Peace Institute, he is a member of the Core Committee of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and is the Chairman of its Task Force on Kashmir. It took him took four and half years to write Neither a Hawk, Nor a Dove, his book that will be available on Tuesday, because he had to research everything meticulously. “You can’t build a story out of thin air,” he explained. An initial draft of approximately 2,000 words was thus edited until it became, to quote the author, “more readable”. The published manuscript, around 850 pages, has been heralded as a most detailed and comprehensive analysis of Pakistan’s foreign policy, with deliberate focus on the Kashmir issue and Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, India and USA.
The DNA recently had a chance to sit with Mr Kasuri. Here are detailed excerpts from that interview.
DNA: What brought on the desire to document and publish “Neither a Hawk, Nor a Dove”?
KMK: That’s a good question. The reason is very simple: Very few people in Pakistan write about their time [at a powerful position]. Frankly, sometimes people write to get some recognition, sometimes for money. I’m very grateful to God I already have both. I actually thought it was a duty. I became FM after 9/11 when in the words of many “the world changed” and the world changed for Pakistan dramatically. I felt it my duty to record my experiences with India, Afghanistan, and US in particular but it would give a wrong signal not to mention our closest friends. This is not a book on politics — it’s a book on foreign policy. Only in one section of the very first chapter I’ve mentioned my early life, my father’s house — people who used to stay with us, who the early influencers were etc. Another thing: if one is putting so much time, it has to be objective, otherwise it’s a waste of time — you can’t have a propaganda broadsheet. I will not indulge in unnecessary rhetoric. I was fair to my political opponents in my book. I was compelled to do it — Mian Nawaz Sharif, Bhutto sahib – I could not bring my personal prejudices in on it.
You need to spend political capital. Sometimes you need to pay a price, and Nawaz Sharif did both. I had to recognise his courage in taking on India. I felt that otherwise I’d be falsifying history.
There are only three people in the whole world – myself, President Musharraf and Dr Manmohan Singh who knew the details of the Kashmir framework and it was a duty on all of us to record what happened because what happened was historic. There were of course three Indian Foreign Ministers and two more from the backchannel: Mr Tariq Aziz and Mr Lambha, but they didn’t have all the details. I don’t think Dr Singh will write; he’s a very, how do I put it, a quiet man. And President Musharraf has already written a book but it is a very different type of book. Perhaps he shall write on this in future. So now the duty fell on me. I wanted to tell people: “See, how much we have resolved” because it’s often said that Pakistan and India can’t resolve anything regarding Jammu and Kashmir. Given political courage and statesmanship, things can be done. Another lesson was to try and do those things quietly, that’s why we had backchannels. Now I’ve put it on record – the entire Kashmir framework on record – let the Indians deny it. And if they do, that is also a good thing because they can’t deny all of it, and I’ve tried to be as objective as possible and have given India’s perspective where necessary.
DNA: Near the beginning of your book, you have mentioned an anecdote with reference to the Quaid’s vision for relations between India and Pakistan. In it you mentioned that he had hoped that the “significant minorities” both countries possessed would “guarantee friendly relations between the two”. That quote was one that struck me because it implied the importance Pakistan’s founding fathers gave to the role of the non-Muslims — the “white” in the green flag. Yet, as recently as 2014, Pakistani Hindus have sought asylum in India on grounds of religious prejudice and mistreatment. In 2012, over 900 Pakistani Hindus who reportedly left the country for the same reason were considered eligible for Indian citizenship. How can a country whose independence movement was spearheaded by a religious minority has failed its own minorities so badly that they no longer consider it their home?
KMK: I entirely agree with you. I am most unhappy with what happened to them. And to make matters worse: I was invited to the Jaipur Literature Festival this year. I saw a handsome young man who came up to me. It was very touching. He said, “Sir, I learned English from you.” I was shocked. “I’m a Hindu from Tharparkar, I used to listen to your speeches on TV.”
“Are you on a visit?” I asked.
“No sir, I’ve migrated.”
He wanted to be photographed with me. It was very touching. He still associated himself this way with Pakistan. And I am so unhappy that we did not live up to the Quaid’s vision. In fact we tried to distort his speech. By doing so we’ve distorted his vision. He created Pakistan in the name of Musalmanan-e-Hind. It was not for Sunnis, Shias, Barelvis or Deobandis. If it had been, Pakistan would never have been created. Quaid-e-Azam was not from a majority sect. Nor was his Highness, Sir Agha Khan, the first president of the Muslim League. Nor was the chief financier of Muslim League. And there were very prominent Sunnis who were supporting them. I mentioned these three because they were both very prominent and not Sunnis. My own grandfather was one of the most prominent leaders of the Khilafat Movement and the Ahl-e-Hadith movement which was diametrically opposed to what the Quaid-e-Azam stood for. I’ve mentioned in the book that my grandfather and people like Maulana Maududi were very good Muslims but they could not have united the Musalmanan-e-Hind. You know, we have hurt ourselves to no end and I’ve tried in the first chapter to say we have, what’s the word, in some cases murdered and distorted history.
And India’s done the same regarding Muslim League and Quaid-e-Azam. And the more you go wrong, the more you mislead your own countrymen. We are therefore facing more problems in our country. Can you imagine mosques, imambargahs and shrines are being attacked by Muslims?
DNA: As a student, there were often two descriptions of Pakistan’s FP that I heard in classrooms: that it was traditionally India-centric, and that it was – just as traditionally – reactive. Owing to a shared history – that you’ve highlighted in your book – Pakistan may find it difficult to shake off the first of these factors, but how can Pakistan shift from being a reactive state to a pro-active one when it comes to framing its foreign policy?
KMK: I agree with what you’re saying, partly. I used to tell the Indians to their face: “You say we’re India-centric, your army tells our army that it is India centric. Ironically, you’re a much larger country and you’re Pakistan-centric.”
Their foreign policy has always been aimed at Pakistan. On the issue of Pakistan being India-centric, let me tell you: in my experience, they are as Pakistan-centric as we are India-centric. What they do is for them to decide what is good for them. I can tell you it is not good for Pakistan to be India-centric. Pakistan is a big country. Yes, smaller than India but still big. We have a large army. Yes, it is not as large as India’s but still big. We need to react not as a small state; we are people in our own right, and we need to assert ourselves on the international stage. In order to assert, we have to generate positive vibes. We have to recognise that soft power today is in some cases more effective than hard power. India has been more successful in projecting soft power.
Pakistan has a lot to offer which we tried to promote during our tenure. But you see, most people don’t recognise those things. That’s why I put them down which you won’t see in most books on foreign policy. I think we’ve become prisoners of it which is the reason why you’re absolutely right when you say we can’t completely wash out what has happened in the past. They stopped our water. Pakistan is an agricultural country, dependent on water and we couldn’t forget that. In 1970s, they came in to Bangladesh. Yes, we made our mistakes and that is why Bangladesh was created. But the Indians did not go into Bangladesh as liberators; they took advantage of Pakistan’s difficulties, the first opportunity they had, they tried to destroy it. And I remind the Indians: they were the first to go into Siachen when they start talking about Kargil.
Admittedly, these things have had a deep impression on our psyche. Having said that, are we going to live in the past? Pakistan is not an easy morsel for anybody, more so now that Pakistan and India are both nuclear powers. Both have a second strike capability. War is no longer an option. I ask Modi in my book: Is he going to be a statesman and change the face of South Asia? I ask myself and Modi: Isn’t it a shame that China has managed to bring 600 million people above poverty line in the past three decades and there are 600 million people below poverty line in India and Pakistan? Isn’t that something we should be ashamed of? Does he wish to go down in history as a successful prime minister? If he does, he has no option but to talk to Pakistan substantively.
DNA: The Indian Army chief just two days ago ordered his troops to prepare for “short or long term conflict”. In response, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has said that Pakistan is ready to face all such challenges head on. Do you think that war is a possibility at this time?
KMK: There are two things which I’ve said particularly in the book. One I called the McCain episode — you must have gone through. I won’t go into too many details because I’ve written in the book. Holbrooke – Obama’s representative – accompanied by Senator Lindsay Graham, such a highly powered delegation, asked me: “We want your advice. You’ve been foreign minister until recently so you know the army. You’ve been a politician, so you know the public opinion. We’ve come from India, we fear there may be a war between Pakistan and India” I was very upset hearing this from them: “But here is our suggestion: in order to stop an all-out war between Pakistan and India, what if the Indians were to make a limited aerial strike and destroy Muridke?”
So I told them a story. I said: “I can understand why you’re suggesting it but let me tell you that when India detonated its five nuclear devices, there was a lot of pressure on Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was repeatedly rung up by President Clinton asking him not to respond and offering huge American help, economic rewards, etc. But, there was public pressure. Under public pressure, India had detonated five, we detonated six.
So I said, if there is an attack on Muridke, let me tell you, within five minutes, there will be a response from Pakistan Army. I told the Senator, “When Pakistanis respond, can you guarantee the Indians response? Once you’re up the escalation ladder, there is no end. And I can’t predict, so my advice to you is to tell them not to try this because there will be a measured response of the same intensity. That’s limited war.
The second thing I’ve described in the book is what is called “Cold Start Doctrine”. You see, the Indians used to be very unhappy because despite having a larger army, whenever they used to try and threaten us, Pakistan Army was able to very quickly mobilise, they’d get alert and get warnings by their intelligence. So they came up with this Cold Start doctrine since they had the bigger army, they’d strike without notice and mobilise later, attacking at 8 or 10 points, try and overwhelm Pakistan and then send reinforcements later on so Pakistan would have no opportunity to prepare. Our response to this threat – because they do have a larger army — was to go for tactical nuclear weapons. We can’t destroy big cities – we destroy Delhi, they’ll destroy Lahore – so the response was to just destroy the invading force by nuclear weapons in a very limited range, in the theatre of operations. And hence these weapons are called “theatre weapons”.
So I’ve asked Narendra Modi – and this is also the answer to your question – “if you want limited war, first there is the Muridke incident. Some of you advocate Cold Start doctrine; there are people in Pakistan who advocate tactical nuclear weapons. For heaven’s sake: don’t go down that road.”
DNA: Considering the internal and external pressures on the nation, how would you think the country would fare in the case of limited war with India?
KMK: We can’t afford a war with India, I’m quite clear. But can they afford a war with Pakistan? When I was FM, they had 1 million troops, eyeball to eyeball. Without a shot being fired, 1,871 Indians lost their lives in Angha. This is an admission by their defence minister in Lok Sabha, it’s not my figures. India withdrew its troops, it could not cow down Pakistan. We can’t realistically think of cowing them down either. I’m not saying that they can’t but we can — we can’t do it either. So I’m saying we’re on the same path. So I’m telling Narendra Modi: everything has been tried. We’ve had five wars and five near war situations which I’ve described in the book. In other words, we’ve had 10 wars and near war situations, million troops mobilised – the largest mobilisation of troops since the World War. Nothing has helped. So the only way out is dialogue.
DNA: You mentioned in an interview last December that the reason the Kashmir crisis was discussed in backchannels was to avoid leaks. You’ve also said in your interviews that any successful decision would only be possible with Kashmiri, Indian and Pakistani authorities in agreement. In your opinion, how close were the Indian and Pakistani sides at that time in creating a framework that all three parties would approve of?
KMK: I was compelled by history and by my conscience that I should put it in record that it took us three years. We know their bottom line and they know ours. When we were making this framework, Musharraf was very, very correct in saying he wouldn’t represent the army, and instead the army was represented by General Ahsan Saleem Hayat who was the Vice Chief and effectively in charge of the army. The ISI was represented by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. I and Foreign Secretary Riaz Muhammad Khan represented the Foreign Office. Do I believe that Manmohan Singh did not have similar people, that he was doing it on his own? He’s not a fool, he’s a very experienced politician. This is why I’ve come to the conclusion that there is no other way out except dialogue.
It wasn’t like Agra: sometimes we prepare something and it still fails. We said we’ll prepare a paper and we did. We even sat down correcting mistakes and punctuation which I’m sure the Indian side must have had to do on their end. And then there came the problem: Pakistan said, “We won’t accept the status quo.” India said, “We will not accept change of boundary.” Kashmiris in Occupied Kashmir – to whom I spoke openly and privately to understand what they really wanted. My fear was if we – India and Pakistan — produced something and the Kashmiris in occupied Kashmir rejected it, the people of Pakistan will instantly reject it. So there was no sense having an agreement of this kind with India. I’ve mentioned that in the book. I heard their (Kashmiris’) problems regarding the Indian Army. They said: “Our women and children have become psychological wrecks. Please do something. You can resolve Kashmir in due course, but we want Indian Army out of urban areas.” I’ve described the whole process (in the book).
DNA: You’ve devoted an entire chapter to the attitude of the Pakistan Army to the peace process with India and Kashmir. You’ve been a speaker at the National Defence University and Command and General Staff College. And you’ve been privy to the meetings of the Formation Commanders. How would you describe the attitude of the armed forces regarding the backchannel discussions with India?
KMK: Why did I write that? Every Indian I met – and lots of westerners – said, “Kasuri sahib, you’re trying hard. Nothing will come out of it. Pakistan Army will never let peace come because it’s in their interests to continue this hostile atmosphere. Because if there’s peace, importance of Army will go down and their size will be cut.” So I thought I needed to address this head on.
People used to ask what the role of the Foreign Office was. It’s the Army which makes foreign policy.” So I needed to address that too. That’s why I’ve written an entire chapter on army and an entire chapter on the role of the foreign office. I’m not an academic, I’m not an expert on war but I’ve done something which others have not experienced. I have interacted, observed, debated with, agreed with and disagreed with them. In five years, with innumerable meetings – I’ve been a speaker at National Defence University and Staff College as well – I’ve only faced one and a half hostile question by junior officers. I’m no expert on Pakistan Army but I’ve quoted writers like Shuja Nawaz, Stephen Cohen and Anatol Lieven and many others in my answers. And based on my experience, in all this time, I think it would be wrong to say that the Pakistan Army is, per se, opposed to peace. And I’ve proved it. People used to say: “Musharraf is gone, now that’s over” or “Raat gayi, baat gayi”. But through WikiLeaks, we have proof: Two years after he left, Ann Patterson met General Kayani and General Pasha and told them that she’d met me and that I’d given her the outlines and framework and that I’d suggested Rizwan Akhtar as backchannel negotiator and they agreed to both. I’ve tried methodically to prove that it’s a wrong to say the Army will never allow peace. They want peace in Jammu and Kashmir and resolution to all other outstanding issues. If it’s a just and fair arrangement, the Army will back it. But it will not stand for a secondary position in South Asia for historical reasons and others that I’ve mentioned in the book.
DNA: Indian PM Narendra Modi made waves with his visit to UAE and the subsequent multi-billion trade agreements reached there. India seems to be making moves on what have traditionally been Pakistani allies – KSA, UAE, Sri Lanka– with some success. What should Pakistan do about that?
KMK: First of all, there’s one thing you must read in my book: the role of the foreign office. At one stage, when President Musharraf was flying very high, there was a move by the United States and Saudi Arabia that he must play an international role to resolve the Palestinian dispute. But when we looked at the fine print, it looked to us that it aimed to also isolate Iran at the same time. So the Foreign Office decided this was not in Pakistan’s interest. I call it the “go slow approach”. We did nothing. We must not repeat that with Saudi Arabia. We must not forget that these countries – UAE, Saudi Arabia, Turkey — have been very close friends to Pakistan.
This Yemen crisis was grossly mishandled. I agree with the decision of not sending in troops but we should have handled it far more gracefully. Saudi Arabia has been our traditional friend; we should have at least sent troops inside Saudi Arabia. And what was much worse was public posturing. It appeared as if the Prime Minister had an agreement with the KSA because the Pakistani flag was displayed, but they later realised that Pakistan could not support. The worst thing to do was call a session of the parliament; the constitution does not require it. There are people who hate Saudi Arabia; there are people who hate Iran. So we’ll have all sorts of speeches and the result was that they said “we’ll remain neutral”. We didn’t have to say anything. I’ve written a special piece on this. Religion, culture and history bring us closer to countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran, but it is also what divides them. We have mishandled foreign policy very badly on this issue. My advice is, with these three or four countries — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE — the ISI and Foreign Office should work hard to resolve the damage we’ve done here. We cannot afford to lose old friends.
DNA: In every social gathering, there is talk about the state of affairs in the country and its spillover effect — especially among the youth, who may be prone to discussing it as often if not more than their elders. One concern that I’ve heard debated thoroughly is the alleged isolation of Pro-Pakistani elements in Kashmir because of internal conflicts in the country. How would you respond to such concerns?
KMK: As a result of our negotiations, the Kashmiris have become more pro-Pakistan. Even traditionally Indian political parties — PDP and National Conference – even they have started saying that “participating in elections doesn’t mean we’ve accepted accession to India, it’s only to resolve our municipal problems, our daily affairs.”
We’ve actually strengthened the idea that Kashmir is a disputed territory. There is proof of that. A lot of attempts were made by television channels to ask visitors from Kashmir about their opinion on Musharraf, calling him a dictator and implying that as such he hadn’t done anything or talked to anyone but none of the Kashmiris fell for that trap. The Kashmiri journalists who came recently said that they agree that what was being done (in the Musharraf era, regarding Kashmir) was right. We’ve not been able to resolve an issue in which all three parties – India, Kashmir and Pakistan – have differing views.
DNA: As recently as this year, the Chinese have emphasised the role of Afghanistan in the development of CPEC. Chinese President Xi Jinping has said that improving Pak-Afghan relations is vital to the CPEC project and China has also been a part of the Afghan reconciliation efforts. Many credited the Murree talks to improvement in relations with Afghanistan yet disturbing revelations by the NDS regarding the demise of militant chief Mullah Omer seem to have thrown those in a loop. What, in your opinion, should be the government’s policy in overcoming this setback and do you see the developments having a negative effect on CPEC?
KMK: You know when you’re dealing with Afghanistan, it’s a very tricky issue and I credit President Ghani for having the courage to try and change policies. But he’s under grave pressure internally. Most people feel that we’re playing a double game. It’s easy to say that without understanding the other’s position. We’re trying to placate the international community on one hand and our Pashtun brothers on the other – there are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than Afghanistan. So it’s all very complicated. My advice is: keep out of the affairs of Afghanistan. Also, on this issue, we should continue doing what we were doing – explain to Afghanistan in private and the international community in public that, yes, we’re trying to bring the Taliban to the table but they’re split up among themselves. That’s because of many things: Mullah Omer is dead, the ISIS is attracting a lot of their people and that we can’t command them. We have limited options. We must support the current government, realising that the Ghani government is under pressure and is required to speak in this situation, but we should still try to bring them to the negotiation table.
