Who did what in the Indo-Pak war of 1965
“In war, truth is the first casualty”, a statement oft quoted, is attributable to Greek tragic playwright Aeschylus (525 BC – 456 BC). There are two aspects to this; firstly, the most fundamental of the Chinese fifth century strategist and General Sun Tzu’s principles for the conduct of war is that: “All warfare is based on deception.” Secondly, in the fog of war, facts and figures pertaining to losses and even accomplishments get buried or distorted. With time, historians, analysts and scholars tend to sift through the chaff of disinformation to reach the kernel of truth.
In the case of Pakistan and India, who have been to war thrice, have engaged in limited skirmishes a number of times and been on the brink of war on numerous occasions, one would expect that in this age of information, assisted by technology, it would be less painstaking for researchers and history buffs on both sides of the divide to come out with accurate versions of the various episodes of each engagement, whether on land, sea or air but alas that is not so.
Charity begins from home; this scribe went to great lengths to conduct research on the genesis of the 1965 Pakistan-India War, commencing with a study of “Operation Gibraltar”, interviewing the living participants and eyewitnesses and consulting the literature available from overt sources. The resulting study ‘Operation Gibraltar—an unmitigated disaster?’ which is part of my book Defence & Diplomacy, 2015 (pp 513-545), reveals that Operation Gibraltar was the code name given to the clandestine raids carried out into Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) in July/August 1965, which became the immediate cause of Pakistan-India war in September 1965.
The operation itself may have been bold and audacious in its planning but immature and unprofessional in execution, which was admitted by the C-in-C Pakistan Army General Musa in his book My Version (page 6): “The sponsors and supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out armed conflict with India’ …to the extent that the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian-held Kashmir, codenamed ‘Gibraltar’, was the brainchild of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth.”
However, General Musa assuming full responsibility for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination of the entire operation, adds: “Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir pass areas, we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening Akhnur through the Chhamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.” Thus in order to ease the pressure on the 12th Division which was defending against repeated Indian attacks and to guard against the threat to the important city of Muzaffarabad, which resulted from the gain by Indian forces of strategic areas, like the Haji Pir pass in Azad Kashmir, the Pakistani Army commenced Operation “Grand Slam” at 0500 hours on 1 September, 1965.
Operation Grand Slam was four-phased: the capture of Chhamb, the crossing of River Tawi and consolidation, followed by the capture of Akhnur, and finally severing the Indian lines of communication and capturing Rajauri. Despite the difficulties of terrain, specially entailing a river crossing, the possibility for success lay in the bold audacity of the plan, which necessitated speed in execution, since if there was sufficient time permitted to the Indians, they would reinforce Akhnur and it would be impossible to capture. That opportunity was squandered by “changing horses midstream” when Major General Akhtar Malik GOC 12 Div (and perpetrator of Operation Gibraltar) was replaced by Major General Yahya Khan on September 2. If Akhnur had been captured and the Indian lines of communication severed, the Indian attack on Sialkot could never have occurred.
The operation provided remarkable opportunities, which were missed due to a lack of initiative by the army, despite the fact that the Air Chief, Nur Khan, who had not been taken into confidence yet, anticipating all out war, had put the PAF on full alert and when four Indian Air Force Vampires belatedly came to assist their ground forces and tried attacking the Pakistani ground forces spread invitingly across the river late in the day on 1st September, they were summarily shot down by Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqi and Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti.
The Indian leaders were clearly warning that if Pakistan did not stop its adventure in Kashmir, then the conflict could spread to other areas. But Pakistani leaders did not take these threats seriously until the direct Indian attack on the Pakistani cities of Lahore and Sialkot in order to release the pressure on the retreating Indian forces in Kashmir took place.
Hamid Khan, in his book The Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 2001, (p. 179) reveals: “When India attacked Pakistan, the man most surprised was Ayub. His surprise was shared by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. They had been assured by Bhutto, Foreign Minister, and Aziz Ahmed, Foreign Secretary, that India would not cross international borders to attack Pakistan. They had even suppressed a message from Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi sent through the Turkish Embassy to the Foreign Office in Islamabad that India was planning an attack on Pakistan’s territory on 6 September. Ayub was woken up at 4 o’ clock in the morning on 6 September and given the news of Indian advance towards Lahore. He telephoned General Musa who said that he had also heard the news but was waiting for confirmation. All this badly exposed the military genius of Ayub and his army chief.”
The 1965 War galvanised the entire nation that united to stand like a solid edifice to defend their country but on the golden jubilee of this major event, it is time to do some soul searching on both sides rather than live with lies and cover-ups.
Note: This is part one of a three-part article. Part two can be accessed here while part three can be accessed here.