It was inevitable
Turns out that Shuja Khanzada kept a surprisingly low profile considering the important nature of his job. He was Punjab’s NAP man, after all. That gave him – policy wise, at least, considering Pakistan’s present position – the most important portfolio in the most important province. Turns out also that he was the only one – in Punjab, at least – who really believed NAP should mature from policy paper to policy action. And that, ultimately, proved his undoing. Talk about paying the price for doing your job.
Now this marks the ‘next step’ in the war against terror in a number of ways. Zarb-e-Azb was never meant to be confined to the badlands. Its real test was always meant to come when it moved down to urban centres, particularly Punjab, where those proxies bloated on decades of state patronage have long been housed. That is why the press gulped the on-way information from Waziristan. It’s OK if there’s no independent confirmation of casualties, etc, so long as the army says it is serious. The litmus test would come soon enough; when it moves down to Punjab, and finally confronts those lashkars and jaishes everyone has known everything about for a long time.
Those with slightly long memories will remember where they came from. Didn’t they spring from the same machine of the Zia era that made the mujahideen, who later became the Taliban?
Yet this is precisely the moment PML-N has dreaded for a long time. The Sharifs have their own reasons for not wanting to fight the fight, especially in their home province. Those with slightly long memories will remember where they came from. Didn’t they spring from the same machine of the Zia era that made the mujahideen, who later became the Taliban? Weren’t they, by design, just another outgrowth of that extreme right frenzy that had gripped Islamabad during the Russian jihad? Not surprising then, really, that their core vote bank also came from the Deobandi clergy that also comprises the militants’ main support base, is it?
Then there is the fear factor, of course. Taliban are known for their revenge attacks, if nothing else. And the Sharifs just didn’t have the stomach for a fight where the enemy might hit back. That is why Chief Minister Shehbaz cut a sorry figure back when he suggested that the Taliban not attack Punjab. That he’s still in the same seat in the next cycle tells something about some electoral trends in the province. In other words, NAP was not implemented not just because the ruling party had concerns about voting patterns in the next election, but also because it was afraid of what the enemy would do when it got angry.
How ironic that Khanzada’s assassination would both confirm and refute this thinking. Confirm because he got killed precisely because he went after the bad guys. And the bad guys struck back with force. And refute because as much as the Sharifs would have liked to keep the fight away, it has still come to their door. Taking out the sitting home minister is a savage blow to any government. If he can be targeted, then surely everybody (in the party) is fair game. What, then, must they do? And more importantly, what will they do? Try to pacify the mullahs again, or finally accept the inevitability of the fight?
The government did not bring the roof down on the party that took responsibility of killing its sitting home minister. It, instead, waved fists, thumped chests, and made bold claims
But things are rarely as straight forward in this Islamic Republic. It’s not as if the N-league does not still have its own lines with the hardliners. Word has it that the Rana Sanaullahs of the party were not particularly pleased with the Shuja Khanzadas, especially since the latter finally put NAP into action, however briefly, and removed the former’s good friend Malik Ishaq from the equation forever. And it’s not as if those that collected the blood debt in Shadi Khan cannot tell one from the other, or that the waters do not muddy further as these links are investigated.
Going by the initial government reaction, it’s not too difficult to make out which part of the party exercises greater influence. The government did not bring the roof down on the party that took responsibility of killing its sitting home minister. It, instead, waved fists, thumped chests, and made bold claims. Nothing intrinsic happened, at least not in the first week. But with the military sweep of the tribal area coming to an end – the Shawal operation being the ‘final phase’ – and the Taliban leading a mullah revolt in Punjab, the N-league cannot afford to treat things as they were. The cannot, for example, brush Khanzada under the carpet like the old days. If they do not follow up on him, they will not be able to pre-empt the threats to their own selves.
It seems that the military, the intelligentsia, even the Taliban, have realised that the time has come for the decisive Punjab fight. The only people still blind to this inevitability seem the provincial government.
