Connecting the dots
Why is the Sindh chief minister complaining against Rangers and FIA? Why do some people think that Malik Riaz’s blackmail allegations are in fact an extension of the Karachi imbroglio? Why did the city’s supremo of 30 years get up one fine morning last year and start accusing and literally abusing top military leadership for no obvious reasons at that time? Why is the Balochistan situation becoming a hurdle in sorting out Altaf Hussain out once and for all? If the establishment is hell bent on bringing the curtains down on the leadership clique within the MQM that is considered to be at the bottom of everything that is wrong with Karachi, then what is the meaning and relevance of Khawaja Saad Rafique’s statement advising an amicable resolution of the ‘tiff between MQM and law enforcing agencies’ ? (It will benefit none, he says.)
The story of how Karachi reached the current stage has become old, in fact, so old and obsolete that no one cares about its history anymore. But almost everyone, except the two main parties of the province, wants the state to break the status quo, bring an end to violence and lawlessness, and create a semblance of normalcy so the city dwellers can lead life like human beings. Though it is not asking for the moon yet keeping the ground realities and political environment in mind it’s still a tall order.
The question that agitated everyone’s mind some time back was how to get Karachi out of this quagmire as civilian institutions were weak, political leadership was both incompetent and corrupt as well as unwilling and the option of military intervention impractical and out-of-tune with existing times. These were the times that Raheel Sharif happened to us. And that meant a whole new game with new approach, new principles, and new rules. By that time Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, with the help of the media, had weakened democratic government and democracy as a whole to the extent that the civilian government had no option but to submit to the establishment’s will. Resultantly, a brand new civ-mil hybrid was introduced in which all important matters were taken control of by the army without occupying the driving seat.
The question that agitated everyone’s mind some time back was how to get Karachi out of this quagmire as civilian institutions were weak, political leadership was both incompetent and corrupt as well as unwilling and the option of military intervention impractical and out-of-tune with existing times
Karachi’s situation demanded an overhaul for a long time. But political expediency would not let the provincial government initiate the required measures; first, because there was need of one party not to annoy the other to the extent that the largest city of the province becomes ungovernable, and second, because the ruling party was knee-deep in corruption and incompetence itself and of which it didn’t want to come out at any cost. Having started the process of establishing its monopoly on violence from the western side of the country, the military had made up its mind to do away with the scourge of violence that had made the eastern side hostage for a long time and where new, but potentially more dangerous, players had started entering to get a foothold. The process of ‘fighting terrorism of all hues and colours’ would have been incomplete were Karachi left untouched. Just consider, if a state wants to establish it writ and starts a war in areas (FATA) where only three percent of population (3.5-4 million) resides, then how can it leave a city of over 20 million people hostage to gun-wielding mafia, no matter if it operated under the umbrella of a political party.
Sensing that the army was up to something dangerous, MQM runaway leader reacted the way he had always reacted to such developments in the past. But the outburst was disproportionate in which he did three dangerous things all at once; 1) he challenged the army, 2) he hinted at using the ethnic card, and 3) he abused high level army officers and generals up to the level of DG, ISI designate –even naming him in a way – leaving the seat saying, ‘it’s better I leave, lest I abuse someone else too’. That was the turning point which changed everything that followed. The army may have settled with comparatively less by folding up only the militant wing of the party – defanging the leadership which ran this mafia – but now it acted with a vengeance. It seems the decision to do away with the higher cadres of leadership that was involved in criminal acts was taken after that fateful speech on September 27.
The fact of the matter is that the operation was never intended to be against a certain political party or ethnic group. Nor was it meant to be confined to the elimination of gun-toting groups or individuals. It had to encompass other burning issues like corruption, bad governance and incompetence of the politicians ruling Sindh and beyond, as later developments showed. But it was necessary to start with the biggest culprit in town which, of course, was considered none other than MQM and its affiliate groups; objectives cannot be achieved if smaller fish are targeted while the crocodile is allowed hunting and muddying the pond as usual. This is a simple administrative principle the use of which was hastened by Altaf Hussain himself.
But as the ultimate objective was not just nailing down MQM, therefore, it was necessary to lay hands on the provincial government and other big and small groups. This was started under the National Action Plan with the help of the federal government –interior ministry-Rangers-FIA mix. Another element was added in the form apex committees which were not only used to the full but which also formalised the role of military in civilian governing setups – though the legal status of these committees itself is shrouded in mystery. When the PPP, which was already doubtful about the army’s grand designs, got a clue as to what was in store for it, its leadership panicked. Asif Ali Zardar went berserk and repeated the same mistake which Altaf Hussain had committed earlier; throwing the gauntlet the army’s way, threatening it and pointing towards the generals in a way bordering or showing inner contempt.
Not bringing into question a political party’s right to express its views about the army, the moves by these parties were ill-timed, politically wrong and opposed to political realities on the ground; one, the threats were exaggerated – not matching the popular/political strength of both the parties; two, they themselves were standing on weak ground with stigmatised reputations; three, there were many skeletons in the MQM and PPP leadership’s cupboards; four, both the parties are way behind in popularity and goodwill race vis-à-vis the army; five, people are fed up with the status quo and the real and perceived loot and plunder which these and other political parties are generally believed to represent and symbolise; and last but not the least, the army in this country is not used to tolerating those who commit the wrong of its collective/institutional insult – at least, this is what history tells us.
The army accepted the challenge and confronted both these parties’ corrupt/criminal leadership. In the case of MQM, these are the money-laundering and Imran Farooq murder cases which are very successfully used as a real, physical noose around Altaf Hussain’s neck. But if we don’t see any speedy developments on these fronts, it is because the army apparently wants to resolve the issues with MQM behind the scene. Moving with haste can result in fixing Altaf Hussain but in that case the army/government will have to show and do away with its trump card. And that, it seems the army doesn’t want right now because it will result in undesirable consequences for the city of Karachi. Moving slowly and with caution can result in Altaf Hussain cracking under pressure and giving in to government’s demand to step aside, along with partners in crime, peacefully and of his ‘own free will’ – minimising chances of violence and bloodshed in its aftermath. As for the MQM as a political party, it seems that efforts are on to spare it of total disintegration and (if possible) to avoid the politically hazardous step of imposing a ban on it. Wilful retirement on the part of Altaf Hussain will also ensure a peaceful leadership transition of what remains of MQM.
There are indications that things between the army and PPP are getting worse instead of the existing tensions easing out. Apparently, Rangers’ raid on Sindh Building Control Authority on June 15 prompted Asif Ali Zardari’s outbursts against the generals, threatening to demolish them ‘brick by brick’ two days later
MQM and the leadership which is considered ‘innocent’ (or sold to us as such) can be allowed to exist and play its role (whatever that remains) once the undesirable element steps aside and law and order is restored in the city. But the agenda for PPP doesn’t seem to be that promising. Call it hard luck, the baggage of its own misdeeds and/or boomeranging of the diatribes of its leader, the master of reconciliation, or simply caught in the cross hairs of the army’s ‘bigger agenda’, but the price for PPP is likely to be higher (quantitatively, that is). There are many reasons which bring one to that conclusion. The first among these is that the party has historically been in the bad books of the powers that be, so much so, that it has developed an institutional hatred towards this hitherto most popular party of the country. But more than that it is the army’s current leadership’s greater agenda and the party’s leadership’s own misdeeds, which have not only brought it to a historically low, depriving it of sincere, credible and capable leadership but also making it an easy and convenient target for those who (supposedly, some say) are out to cleanse politics and society of the evils that are taking the nation to a slow death. In common perception, Asif Ali Zardari, his close friends, his relatives and his party are the biggest culprits and majority of the people are with the Rangers and the army in this war.
There are indications that things between the army and PPP are getting worse instead of the existing tensions easing out. Apparently, Rangers’ raid on Sindh Building Control Authority on June 15 prompted Asif Ali Zardari’s outbursts against the generals, threatening to demolish them ‘brick by brick’ two days later. But it is said that he had run out patience because of the maligning campaign that had started against the whole of PPP leadership since the arrest of Ayyan Ali on March 14. Some of the observers believe that besides exposing the real worth of the master of reconciliation, the antagonistic moves by the Rangers and FIA in Karachi pushed him to commit more blunders behind the scenes.
It is said that Malik Riaz’s blackmail saga, in fact, was an effort to throw a feeler towards the army that he had not thrown hollow threats and that if push came to shove, many of the serving and retired army officers’ names will be exposed to bring the army into a defensive mode. Conspiracy theorists, like yours truly, also think that the rumour of ISI requesting the court to be made a party in Ayyan Ali was not without a purpose which quite effectively conveyed a shut-up call to all concerned. Whether it is true or not, only time will tell but the picture on the political front is definitely not rosy for many parties. For Karachi and Sindh, change is in the offing. If the army succeeds in its planning, not only political but also financial crime will substantially come down along with a decrease in violence and marked improvement in the law and order situation. In addition to that, sectarian and banned religious/terrorist outfits and/or their sleeper cells will be targeted to reduce their presence and power; the same goes for small-time criminal gangs and individuals who thrive due to the presence of big political and criminal mafia in the city.
So far, so good. Questions, however, remain: Will the army’s plans to rid Karachi of crime and corruption succeed? What will be the final shape of things if political government is targeted and it either opts out of the clean-up operation or is kicked out? But, then will governor rule solve the problems? Will the federal government comply with the army’s wish to impose governor rule? And will the army alone be able to cleanse the political stable if politicians stop cooperating or they were not taken on board? And the mother of all questions; is Karachi an end in itself or is it just one more, but important, step in the army’s journey towards more peaceful times? Let’s keep our fingers crossed.
