Some constructive steps
The meeting between the Afghan government delegation and the Taliban was a class apart from earlier meetings of the sort. The Afghan delegation was led by Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai. It was for the first time that a senior government figure was involved in direct talks with the Taliban.
The other delegation was led by Mullah Abbas Akhund, the Taliban’s health minister from 1996 to 2001, and a spokesperson for the group’s supreme leader Mullah Omar. The Taliban’s negotiators included its interior affairs committee chief Mullah Abdul Jalil and Mullah Abdul Razzaq who was the leader of the forces which stormed Kabul.
It was significant on Hekmat Karzai’s part to concede that the people they met had the support and permission of the Taliban leadership.
The presence of the US and Chinese observers in the meeting added further importance to it as it showed that the two major powers considered it a much more important meeting than those held earlier. Their presence also indicated to all stakeholders that the US and China supported the talks.
A day after the parleys White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest told a briefing in Washington: “This is an important step in advancing prospects for a credible peace.” He further said, “We both (the United States and Afghanistan) acknowledge and appreciate Pakistan’s important efforts to host these conversations.”
China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said Beijing had a positive appraisal of the rendezvous and believed it would help promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
The presence of the US and Chinese observers in the meeting added further importance to it as it showed that the two major powers considered it a much more important meeting than those held earlier
The talks went off well and it was agreed to hold the next meeting after Ramzan. Preconditions, which had in the past hampered attempts by the US to engage Taliban in talks, were avoided this time. There was no demand from the Afghan side to end the attacks and no offer to stop large-scale military operations against the Taliban. Both sides agreed on the need to devise confidence building measures.
The meeting was a good start. There are however pitfalls and dangers in the way capable of derailing the talks in days to come.
To start with there are divisions within the Taliban as well as within the Afghan establishment which can foil the attempts at reconciliation. The house of the Taliban is divided. So is that of the Afghan establishment.
A section of the Taliban comprising some of the moderate members of Quetta Shura was supportive of talks with the Afghan government in the past also. They were willing to enter into talks with Hamid Karzai’s government. In 2008 Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, Mullah Omar’s deputy, allowed members of the moderate group to talk to the Afghan government officials. The move ended two years later when Baradar was detained by Pakistan. It was widely understood that Pakistan’s establishment did not like the group to talk to the Afghan government, bypassing Islamabad.
The moderates among the Taliban are challenged by hardliners who include Mullah Omar’s current deputy, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. Mansour thinks that the Taliban can again be in possession of Kabul by continuing the jihad. The group is convinced of its victory in the battlefield and is opposed to peace talk. It would agree to nothing less than the overthrow of the pro West Afghan administration through armed struggle. The extremists would then promulgate the Taliban era constitution in the country.
Any important Taliban victories in the battlefield would make those wavering join the extremists. Conversely, if the hardliners fail to control any major towns, particularly provincial capitals, the position of the moderates would be strengthened. The question is whether the Afghan security forces will be able to withstand the successive waves of Taliban offensive?
The Afghan establishment is also divided. This is reflected in President Ghani’s failure to form a cabinet for months after being sworn in. While the cabinet is finally in place, there is still no agreement between Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah over the appointment of a defence minister who is to play a key role in the fight against Taliban.
Former President Hamid Karzai is deadly against any deal with the Taliban that involves Pakistan. He still has pockets of support in the Afghan bureaucracy, parliament and media that he built during twelve years of rule and which he can use to derail the talks.
The fault-line between the Pashtuns and the former Northern Alliance still exists and can become active if the non-Pashtun politicians are not taken on board. Also if Iran thinks that the deal with the Taliban does not suit it. It remains to be seen if President Ghani is able to take Abdullah Abdullah along.
Is Pakistan establishment fully supportive of the ongoing dialogue?
The Pakistan army would prefer a strong US presence in Afghanistan as long as the terrorist threat persists. But the idea of the US keeping a watch on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from bass in Afghanistan is disconcerting for it
The Taliban were recruited, trained and helped to capture Kabul by Pakistan’s establishment. The idea was to have a pliable government in Afghanistan willing to provide the army strategic depth whenever needed. Successive governments in Pakistan were pressurised to seek international recognition for Mullah Omar’s government. As Musharraf bluntly put it, ISI cultivated the Taliban to counter Indian action against Pakistan.
Of late there has been some change in the army’s thinking. This is the result of a debate over what suits Pakistan best, a victory by Taliban or a neutral government in Kabul? Despite the change in thinking the establishment has for quite some time remained double-minded over how much pressure was to be exerted on the Taliban for talks. The present effort to bring Taliban leaders to the negotiating table indicates the victory of those supporting increased pressure on Taliban. How deep is the new realisation remains to be seen.
How strong is the American commitment to a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan?
The US wants a government in Kabul which can ensure that it will not allow al Qaeda or any other extremist outfit with an international reach to operate from its territory. On this point there is a commonality of interest between the US, Pakistan, Iran and China. But Americans have other ambitions also that arouse suspicions. Afghanistan is considered an ideal place by American strategists from where the US can watch what it considers its interests in Central Asia. When President Obama announced that all US troops would be withdrawn after 2015, many in the US strongly opposed it.
The US can keep a large presence of troops in Afghanistan only if the country faces a permanent threat of terrorism. In case of peace returning to Afghanistan, it will not be possible for any government in Kabul to justify the presence of US troops or military bases.
The Pakistan army would prefer a strong US presence in Afghanistan as long as the terrorist threat persists. But the idea of the US keeping a watch on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from bass in Afghanistan is disconcerting for it.
Once peace returns to Afghanistan, all the countries in the region and beyond including China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Iran and India would like to see the American troops leaving Afghanistan.
Will the US leave or support some sort of turmoil through militant groups to justify its presence in Afghanistan?
