Nobody can afford to go back (to the Karzai days)

    0
    112

    Everybody’s on board, finally

     

    Ahmed Rashid talked and warned about the Taliban before anybody else. His Taliban (2000) was the first exclusive account of how this rag tag militia had mutated into one of the most prominent, and potent, players of the ‘new Great Game’. With 9/11, of course, and the long war against terrorism that followed, their ability to influence global events, even when on the run, became painfully apparent.

    Much has changed since he travelled once again to Afghanistan – like the days of the Soviet jihad and later the civil war – and exposed the Taliban’s way of running Afghanistan, their links with notable clandestine organisations, and their ability to influence energy markets.

    Now the Taliban are reasserting themselves after more than a decade of war against the world’s most powerful military machine. And with foreign forces finally (almost) out, this year’s Spring Offensive has been more potent than any before it. They have overrun one province in the north, and threaten taking Helmand, reviving the old supply line that runs parallel across the Durand Line.

    But now they are also willing to talk. And everybody else is just as eager. Kabul, under Ghani, is very different. Pakistan, after Zarb-e-Azb, is all for resetting the relationship with Afghanistan. The Americans want nothing more than peace as they pack up and leave Afghanistan after another decisive war. And even the Chinese are on board. Peace in the region is essential for their plans of connecting north to south, east to west. With their economy tanking, they are determined to make this project a success.

    Yet there are forces, quite obviously, bent upon sabotaging this process. Kabul witnessed an attack on parliament recently, which the NDS (National Directorate of Intelligence, Afghanistan’s security service) quickly blamed on ISI and the Haqqanis. And Islamabad was left with a little egg on its face after its recent disclosure – of facilitating a Kabul-Taliban meeting in north western China – was rubbished by the insurgents. Then, quite suddenly, came the Murree meeting, and Pakistan began receiving international praise, for once.

    Kabul, under Ghani, is very different. Pakistan, after Zarb-e-Azb, is all for resetting the relationship with Afghanistan. The Americans want nothing more than peace as they pack up and leave Afghanistan after another decisive war. And even the Chinese are on board

    A long-time observer of this Great Game, Ahmed believes there is finally a clear path to peace, though one that is riddled with uncertainties. But an encouraging start has been made and, should good sense prevail, there can be a win-win solution for all parties concerned.

    He talked exclusively to DNA regarding what must be done to secure peace.

    “This is definitely a major step forward”, he said. “The Afghan government has accepted the (Murree) meeting as the start of a dialogue and those Taliban factions not represented this time can join later”.

    The second round is scheduled for August and the press speaks of a common desire to take the peace process forward.

    The ‘progress’ no doubt calmed nerves in the Ghani camp, which had come under immense pressure because of its attitude towards Pakistan. Not just the opposition, but coalition partner Abdullah Abdullah’s group was also unhappy, and pretty vocal about it.

    “The most important thing is that the deputy foreign minister, Hekmat Karzai, represented factions that harboured doubts. Now, with comprehensive representation, nobody can afford to go back”, he continued.

    Ghani must have welcomed the outcome all the more because of other problems on his plate. “He is facing another domestic crisis that has nothing to with the Taliban or war, but the constitution and elections, forming the cabinet, implementing an economic agenda, etc”.

    These problems are not going away, but less Taliban pressure will give him more elbow room.

    But are things really as simple as Ghani expects? He seems to have banked on improved ISI-NDS ties – hence the security pact – expecting both to end support for the other’s insurgency. The answer, of course, is complicated.

    It seems the Karzai group, which favoured the former president’s anti-Pakistan position, wanted to talk to the Taliban, but without Pakistan on board.

    “But the Taliban were living in Pakistan. They were supported by Pakistan. Ghani adopted a different, more practical, approach. He decided to woo Pakistan to connect to the Taliban. Hopefully this has worked”, he explained.

    Things are still far from clear, though. Why would the Taliban talk now of all times. The spring offensive is on a roll. They are stronger now than they have been since the war overthrew them. And would they really talk as long as ‘occupiers’ remain? They only agreed to talk when it seemed the differences with the Karzai government over the Bilateral Security Arrangement (BSA) would finally force NATO to leave. They even toned down their attacks a little. But now, with foreigners still around even if in much smaller numbers, why would Taliban rethink their original policy?

    ‘In the worst case scenario, we’ll be back to the Karzai days. The Taliban offensive would strengthen and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan would sour again’

    “It is natural for fighting to continue, even worsen, as talks continue. If you remember the Vietnam War, fighting continued through to the end, and even stepped up close to the withdrawal”.

    Fighting towards the end, it turns out, becomes more about improving one’s bargaining position during negotiations than long-term territorial ambitions.

    “And the troops-on-ground issue was only propaganda, not real Taliban policy”, he added. Fewer foreigners obviously mean more influence for Taliban.

    “Pakistan will maintain its Taliban assets, just as NDS will probably also maintain its TTP leverage. Such links are not finished off completely”, he added. However, he did caution that a comprehensive power-sharing deal now could change the situation. With the Taliban on the side of the government, there will be less breathing space for al Qaeda, IMU, TTP, etc. Even LeJ might feel the heat.

    And what about Da’ish, or IS? What did they suddenly do that the Taliban had to warn them in writing? Are they really a significant player in the endgame? Or does a new Great Game await us; one where the caliphate advances to South Asia?

    “This is largely exaggerated. They are pretending”, he said. “The government, the Taliban, even other political parties are trying to win international funds by raising the spectre of IS. It’s a convenient tool”.

    All bets, it seems, are on the talks. If they weren’t so important, international players long used to pointing the finger at Pakistan for everything going wrong in AfPak would not be showering praise on Islamabad. The Murree meeting was nothing short of landmark. All that needs to be done now is to keep moving the process forward.

    “In the worst case scenario, we’ll be back to the Karzai days. The Taliban offensive would strengthen and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan would sour again. Nobody can afford to go back to that”, he concluded.

    It is also important, he cautioned, to safeguard this process. There will naturally be more attempts at sabotage.

    “Not all of the Taliban representatives were named because of fear of assassination, sabotage, or both”, he pointed out.

    More will come to light when all sides sit down to talk again in August.