Protecting national interest or digging our own grave?
The doctrine of strategic depth, a legacy of General Ashraf Beg from the 1980s, is not much in vogue now but has had long-standing implications on our regional stature and defence position.
In military terms, strategic depth is used to denote the distance between a country’s battle front, Pakistan’s eastern border in its case, and the core crucial areas of a country. If we look at the map of the region, pasted below, we come to realise that Pakistani region does not have much depth.
Figure 1 A map of Pakistan’s eastern and western border. Image taken from opinion-maker.org
Therefore, many sources say, the supporting of Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union by Pakistan was an attempt to gain some strategic depth by gaining influence over Afghanistan.
However, no one from the military establishment ever endorses or owns this term.
“There has never been any mention of the term strategic depth in the military establishment, and it is not even feasible. Anyone who knows the psyche of Afghan people would definitely be aware of this fact,” Hameed Gul, former Director-General of the ISI, clearly negated the existence of such a doctrine. “There are security concerns, yes, but the term strategic depth does not exist in the military literature.”
This opinion is widely shared among the khakis.
“Strategic depth has not been used as an official doctrine by the Pakistan army ever,” said Brig (R) Asad Munir, a former intelligence officer. “This term was used in the 1960s and in the time of Gen Aslam Beg, but never has the army adopted it as an official doctrine. Things are hyped up by various factors, media included. Every country has its defence and security concerns, and so have we. It can be argued that the border of Pakistan is a bit shallow, but that does not mean that we have some official doctrine that we are aiming to achieve strategic depth through Afghanistan.”
However, the intervention of Pakistan in the first Afghan war is common knowledge and so are the security repercussions of this generous act of patronising.
Myth or reality
Did such a doctrine ever exist? And if so, why was it necessary in the first place. Was it long-term?
“Well, the doctrine of strategic depth is older than the First Afghan War. However, this gained more prominence in the post-Soviet period,” said Dr Hasan Askari Rizvi, eminent political scientist and security analyst.
“There were two reasons for this. First, there was a notion during that time that whoever controls Kabul can come to Pakistan. Secondly, it was perceived that geographically, Pakistan does not have much depth. Many important locations i.e., all airports of Pakistan are within the radii of 150 miles from India. So this was an important defence concept back in the 1980s.”
Musing on the words of Dr Rizvi it seems Pakistan aimed to kill two birds with one stone; gaining some soft spot in Kabul and a foothold in the Afghan territory in case our not-so-friendly eastern neighbour gave us trouble.
The intervention of Pakistan in the first Afghan war is common knowledge and so are the security repercussions of this generous act of patronising
“We have always been looking for some strategic depth through Afghanistan,” said Ali Arqam, a journalist, researcher and analyst. “This is because we want to keep at least our western border trouble-free. And secondly, the Durand Line is not recognised by Afghanistan. So we cannot really afford trouble. No matter what the extent of the denial is, this doctrine is definitely present in some form or the other. There is enough evidence. Firstly, we always express our reservations on India’s presence in Afghanistan. Again, you could look at the recent talks of Afghan government with Taliban, where people from Haqqani network were also there. So well yes, we do want our influence in Afghanistan and we do aim for strategic depth there. We are ready to pay the price of our flawed policies in the form of radicalisation of society and sectarian violence, but we still are not prepared to crush militants, as we might need them at some point.”
However, the military establishment does not think so.
“Anyone who thinks we are aiming for strategic depth is maybe stretching his imagination a bit too much,” said Brig (R) Saad Muhammad. “Let us suppose that there is some problem on our eastern border, what will we do? Are we going to carry our tanks and ammunition to Afghanistan? Do we have the necessary infrastructure and communication required? And the biggest question is will Afghanistan ever allow that? They are a sovereign state after all. There are just two routes that connect Pakistan with Afghanistan and the concept of strategic depth requires proper infrastructure and logistics. I wonder why such things are assumed.”
There has never been any concept of strategic depth in Pakistani army, he added.
“But in the days I was serving, there was a concept and a drive for a friendly Afghanistan. And of course, it was not because of some dire need. We never faced any insurgency from Afghanistan during our wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Afghanistan played a very good role back then.”
All this talk about strategic depth as a military doctrine of Pakistan makes it look like Pakistan is dependent on Afghanistan. But Brig (R) Saad argued otherwise.
“A friendly Afghanistan is a plausible and feasible concept but that is about it,” he said, adding “if Afghanistan is safe and stable, that is good for us. And Afghanistan definitely is dependent on us for its access to warm waters. There is a route through China, but history and geography both favour the route through Pakistan. So making it sound as if we are dependent on them and not vice versa is simply a fabrication.”
This clash of opinions is interesting, since civilian analysts do acknowledge the presence of strategic depth, whereas the military thinks otherwise.
However, one needs to keep it in mind that in the post-Cold War period, wars and military tactics are not just physical or geographical. They can be psychological or even ideological. Same is the case with strategic depth. Finding depth in Afghanistan could mean Pakistan aiming to pursue the support of one of its neighbours if the other backfires.
The troublesome two
Pakistan has been “blessed” with two troublesome neighbours when it comes to security concerns. With India on the east and Afghanistan on the west, we are always on high alert. It is ironic that we have been trying – at least allegedly — to tackle our eastern trouble with the depth we get from our western trouble. The status of India is evident, but Afghanistan too is no less of a security concern.
Brig Asad Munir expressed a similar opinion.
“Afghanistan is a legitimate security concern, not because we aim any strategic depth but because historically it has been hostile, especially from 1963 to 1977. Moreover, it also opposed Pakistan’s entry in the UN. There was a demand for Pashtunistan earlier, but no Pakistani now ever demands this, so we do not have any serious trouble from Afghanistan now or any desire to control them,” he explained.
Military veterans also clarified any doubts about Afghans being our enemy.
“As far as Afghans are concerned, we never took them to be our hidden enemy. They might be politically hostile, we don’t really care. But definitely we would not want an aggressively hostile government in Kabul,” said Gen Hameed Gul.
“When the Soviets came there was a risk that the next spot of theirs to get access to warm waters would be Pakistan, so it was essential to stop them back then. We did not have any other motive. But yes there are certain important dimensions that we need to keep in mind when it comes to relation with Afghanistan.”
What went wrong?
The military establishment clearly denies that the doctrine of strategic depth ever existed. But it cannot be denied that we have been rather fond of checking on our western neighbour, and this definitely did not help us in the long-run.
No matter what this terminology is called and what different stakeholders say, it is evident that we do want some influence over Afghanistan
“Pakistan has used militancy as an instrument of foreign policy in the past. And this definitely backfired on us,” said Hassan Askari.
Brig (R) Saad offered a different take on the issue, although he too declared Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan a flawed policy.
“What happened back in the 1980s sort of backfired on us, and has proven to be a flawed policy over time,” he said. “General Zia supported the Afghan Jihad back in 1979 to create and substantiate his own legitimacy. Moreover, we sided with Afghanistan and this led to the downfall of the Soviet Union. Consequently, we have entered a unipolar world, where the US is the only main power. If there were any other superpower to counter-check US hegemony, then would the US still be able to do what it has done in countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan? The case would have of course been different.”
It is not difficult to understand that protecting and promoting national defence interests and gaining strategic back-up is something any smart nation should be doing. However, for such a policy to succeed, the policymakers need to analyse and project long-term consequence.
The literature on this issue is full of arguments against the concept of strategic depth. Pakistan could employ other options rather than relying on a nation that has always been politically hostile. Moreover, there could be alternatives smarter than flaming jihadist elements. Militancy is a termite that has badly engulfed both the security and the image of Pakistan, and this fundamentalism owes its origin to the Afghan jihad. Ironically, instead of gaining depth for itself, Pakistan offered a lot of depth to Afghanistan. The channelling in of numerous Afghan refugees transformed Pakistan into their second home. And it goes without saying that coupled with their jihadi sentiments, many of these refugees used their second home as an ideal destination to practise their freshly-acquired skills. And even worse we had to switch sides after 9/11, enraging Afghanistan and the Taliban.
Looking for strategic depth is in the national interest of any nation, but the way and the procedure that was followed by Pakistan was flawed. And, of course, there is the ideological aspect. We need to realise that it is just not right to consider the jurisdiction of some other country as our own
The future
Many analysts argue that the strategic depth doctrine is exhausted, while others contend that with Taliban talks going on and negotiations with Afghan government for peace being on the go, there is a probability that strategic depth might be revived and re-kindled.
“When we talk in terms of today, the idea of strategic depth has been given up,” Hassan Askari negated the possibility totally. “The reason is that in the era of nuclear warfare, this concept is absolutely irrelevant and hence has no probability of re-surging. Secondly, Pakistan has realised over time that what we can have is just a friendly government in Kabul, and not someone we need to have direct control over. So in the nuclear era, and especially in the post-2001 era, this concept is no longer relevant.”
Strategic depth was not there in the first place, and now if someone thinks it is re-surging due to negotiations with Ashraf Ghani, this is wrong, according to Brig (R) Asad Munir. “The only thing with Ashraf Ghani is that he is the only wise person in Afghanistan and realises the importance of having a good relationship with Pakistan.”
However Ali Arqam presented a different opinion. “Strategic depth has always been there and it is still there in one way or the other,” he stated.
No matter what this terminology is called and what different stakeholders say, it is evident that we do want some influence over Afghanistan. However, no plan can achieve depth unless it has some depth of its own through sound analysis and systematic projections. This clearly lacked in our search for depth.
