Is there a solution for the Baloch?

No in the present scheme of things

After the fall of Dhaka, the Baloch movement has posed as the single biggest challenge to the two-nation theory. Yet all the efforts on the government’s part to stultify the grievances and alienation of the Baloch population have been futile so far. The narrative differs depending on which side you listen to. The civil-military establishment blames the archaic Sardari system. The Baloch, in turn, point fingers at the denial of rights to the local population for managing their resources, amongst many other issues, as the single most formidable reason for the prevailing conundrum. Today, the grievances stemming from decades of expropriation and marginalisation have alienated the Baloch to the extent that they are not willing to settle for anything less than self-determination. Even the policies that are introduced to pacify the Baloch are, at best, short-sighted and ironically deepen the sense of depravation amongst them. If the decision makers at the helm were to sit on a psychoanalyst’s couch today, the only possible diagnosis would be debilitating myopia.

The current movement, more threatening, powerful and mighty than all past efforts of Baloch for self-determination, is a result of their helplessness and the downright imperialist policies of successive governments in Islamabad. Yet the federal or the provincial governments seem incapable of steering the province out of the current impasse and bringing the Baloch separatists to the negotiating table. In absence of effective political leadership to solve the issue, GHQ and Aabpara direct the course of action. With the military establishment making the policies for bringing the province out of the existing quagmire, the chances of any solution are non-existent as the Baloch, weary of being hoodwinked by state in the past have great mistrust for any compromise short of self-determination.

In order to comprehend the alienation of the Baloch, we need to understand the intrinsic complexities of the province and the government’s insipid, ill-conceived policies over the past six decades

A case that illustrates the extent to which the state has lost its credibility is of Nawab Nauroz Khan Zehri who agreed to give up the armed struggle for amnesty and settlement of Baloch grievances in 1959. When the Nawab came down from the mountains, Tikka Khan (called ‘Butcher of Bengal’ for his atrocities in East Pakistan later on) who was posted as Lt Colonel in Sibi at the time, went back on his word despite having sworn on oath on the Quran. Zehri, along with his family members and tribesmen, was sentenced to death on charges of sedition, but owing to his frail health and old age the Nawab was spared execution and died a prisoner in Kohlu jail in 1964. Nawab Zehri and his followers were fighting against the state following the introduction of One-Unit policy that had broken the earlier agreement between Khan of Kalat and Quaid-e-Azam, under which the federal government would only control defence, currency, foreign office and finance, while the Khanate would be autonomous in all other spheres.

In order to comprehend the alienation of the Baloch, we need to understand the intrinsic complexities of the province and the government’s insipid, ill-conceived policies over the past six decades.

The sixth, ongoing insurgency in Balochistan — among many other reasons — started over the government’s attempt at trying to pacify the Baloch and bringing them into the national mainstream by introducing mega projects. Ironically, this made Balochis feel more alienated than ever before as they felt threatened by the impending influx of educated middle-class workers of other provinces and ethnicities, especially in Gwadar; the fears were warranted as the city with a population of 60,000 could hardly provide the labour force for completion and running of the planned port project which needed a skilled workforce of about one million people. Similarly, the slowing population growth of the Baloch did not make the situation any better and the lesson of Sindhis being made alien in Karachi was not lost on them.

The army made the already difficult situation impossible when Musharraf, with his high-handed way of trying to put an end to the conflict, openly threatened Akbar Bugti by warning him that “don’t push us. It isn’t the 1970s … this time you won’t even know what hit you.” The final and most significant blow — which can be labelled as the final parting of ways — came with the Nawab’s cold-blooded assassination that made him a towering figure among Baloch nationalists and cemented his place as the hero of secessionist movement.

The incidents led to the nationalist movement finding widespread support amongst educated youth, intelligentsia and middle-class Baloch. The struggle has recently seen a tectonic shift; it is no longer led only by a Nawab or Sardar as the educated middle-class youth are an integral part of it. The rise and prominence of Dr Allah Nazar Baloch is telling in regard to the degree to which the movement has evolved over the decades. Similarly, the centres of the Baloch movement have shifted from Sardar dominated areas of Kohlu, Sibi and Dera Bugti to the Makran coast in the south where there are no tribal chieftains and the insurgency is led by secular, nationalist and educated middle-class.

The security agencies’ increasing use of brute force in the form killing and dumping of the Baloch youth has dumped any possibility of reconciliation. Similarly, despite the presence of a paramilitary check post for every 500 people and the construction of ‘qilas’ (mini-cantonments) every few miles, the state has failed to restore order or reign in lawlessness in the province. The presence of military has only exacerbated the conflict by making the Baloch feel insecure in their own homeland. Instead of making them feel safe, the heavy military presence makes the people feel colonised.

Over the span of over six decades, Balochistan has been perceived as a barren land used only when the state wanted to test its nuclear capabilities in mountains of Chaghi or for provision of natural gas in the urban centres of the country. As such, it perfectly fits Edward Said’s definition of imperialism; “practice … of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory”.

The past has a way of walking around in the present, acting as if it were not dead. Therefore, the fall of Dhaka holds a lesson for those who opine that using brute force against the retrogressive Baloch chieftains and nationalists is the only way to solve the prevailing stalemate. The government accuses Sardars of blackmailing the state and blocking development works. Yet the state is, to a large extent, responsible for this situation as it frequently and excessively employs patronage and bribery to buy the loyalties of corrupt politicians instead of improving the lives of ordinary Baloch.

The state has little option except for giving in unconditionally to demands of the Baloch including minimal interference in the provincial matters and provision of best possible infrastructure and other facilities to improve quality of life in the province

Bringing the Khan of Kalat back from exile might be a good start at trying to address Baloch grievances but doling out funds and privileges to a select few chieftains will not solve the problem. The only way now is to not only pacify the disgruntled Sardars but also reach out to improve the lives of ordinary Balochis by providing them with basic infrastructure as well as health and education facilities. Instead of introducing mega development schemes, the government should focus on trying to bring the infrastructure in Balochistan at par with Punjab. After all, the hierarchical society and Sardari system was equally rigid in other areas such as DG Khan, Muzaffargarh and Rajanpur, where Baloch tribes reside. Today the hold of Sardars in these areas has been reduced and change in voting pattern reflects this shift. Similarly, the powers of feudal lords and Pirs in south Punjab have also been fractured by the provision of basic facilities and awareness amongst people with the advent of mass media.

The state has little option except for giving in unconditionally to demands of the Baloch including minimal interference in the provincial matters and provision of best possible infrastructure and other facilities to improve quality of life in the province. Cessation of all kind of military activity in the province is a corollary to making any of the aforementioned steps effective because the on-going counter-insurgency and efforts towards reconciliation cannot be carried on at the same time. Doing so reminds one of George W Bush’s claim that the US planes were carrying out relief efforts and dropping food while bombing Afghanistan at the same time.