The most important question: civ-mil relations
Pakistan’s transition to democracy, pronounced by Gen Musharraf’s ouster, was followed by a difficult civil-military balance equation. Though Musharraf’s regime was followed by two democratically elected governments in all units, the skeleton of the military’s authority is hard to overlook even today. From the shaping of foreign policy narrative by military on the one side, to the occasional patches of civilian rule on the other, the martial control is now less binary and more amorphous and ambiguous, yet maintaining a hegemony that has no end in sight.
In this regard, the two subsequent COAS’ terms are characterised by completely different approaches to civ-mil equation. However, certain common patterns surface on closer analysis that indicate a deeper, more systemic and invariable set of rules of the game defined by the establishment – what can be termed as Military Doctrine 2.0.
Even during the periods of leanest military control, the establishment has insisted on intelligence gathering being a subject exclusive to it
1: Fill the administrative void, and overshoot. In a developing country like Pakistan, it doesn’t take a genius to identify dysfunction of the political government. Be it the political parties avoiding clear action against religious terrorism or the government’s lack of administrative presence in Balochistan’s B areas, the civilian incapacity calls for occasional relinquishing of power to the military. The military approach, however, is to utilise such opportunity to craft an image of army’s competence and by implication, that of civilian incompetence, and more often than not, use this respect to expand upon control. The PPP government’s malleable foreign policy narrative after the Mumbai attacks resulted in foreign office being exclusively controlled by the GHQ. The PML-N government’s lack of decisive action against the Taliban — indulging in meaningless APCs — resulted in military taking the initiative and further demanding military courts once the offensive gained enough respect. Throughout Gen Kayani and Sharif’s terms, one can see a clear pattern of such strategic expansion of military control that increasingly marginalised the civilian government, while still doing little damage to military’s democratic credentials.
2: Control the intelligence gathering and information flow: Even during the periods of leanest military control, the establishment has insisted on intelligence gathering being a subject exclusive to it. From the case of former DG ISI’s controversy involving a TV channel, to the PPP government’s effort of bringing the ISI under civilian control, the military has vehemently defended its sole right to national information gathering. To date, no charter exists for the scope or jurisdiction of intelligence agencies, their separation of power and mandate or their accountability thereof. It makes one wonder why, even when the military reduced its role in other capacities, it has defended its control over intelligence gathering.
3: Keep the military impregnable: When the TTP beheads soldiers, the military makes it a point to settle the score while civilian killings in other incidents go unnoticed. When the establishment is questioned over its role in the Osama Bin Laden fiasco, or the Supreme Court inquires about missing persons in Balochistan, it fires back in many ways. Be it a physical attack on army by a banned outfit or an administrative effort to control its ranks, the army’s defence of its own ground is impregnable. It makes sense because allowing any of this, in the army’s perception, might open the gates for further inspection into its institutional short-comings, its officers’ scrutiny and accountability. ‘Keep the military impregnable’ seems to be another corner-stone of this new doctrine.
4: Media control 2.0: Gone are the days of state television and blanket censorship, and the military understands it. There is soft control today, however, that allows for mellow criticism while outweighing it with a strong counter-narrative fostered through a mix of respect, investment and fear in the journalistic world. Coercion is exercised only on red-lines, but very decisively.
Gone are the days of state television and blanket censorship, and the military understands it
5: Weaken the political parties, especially the opposition: Of course this well-constructed hegemony can expect criticism from political parties that see martial rule as a threat to their own power. Since the modern-day Pakistani government relies heavily on the army’s role in law-enforcement, it is not necessarily the pliant party in power that is going to lock horns with the military. The opposition political parties can be more liberal in their criticism though. Due to this, be it the PML-N complaining about establishment’s involvement in PTI’s rebirth in 2010, or the MQM or PPP at strife with the army’s presence in Sindh, the effort seems to be to weaken opposition politics enough to bridle its anti-establishment trajectory.
In this post martial-law period, Pakistan’s establishment and democracy are perhaps no different than those of many Latin American countries. Whether this is a transitory phase, where the political institutions lean on military counterparts for occasional void, or a long-term ambition by the military to retain power, is something only time will tell. The civ-mil relationship, however, remains one of the most important questions for the country’s future route.
