Terrorists in urban areas

Who is more efficient, the terrorists or law enforcement agencies?

Operation Zarb-e-Azb launched last year in North Waziristan has achieved major successes. The capacity of the terrorist networks has been considerably degraded. The networks which had turned the Agency into an international hub of terrorism have been mostly thrown out of their safe haven. Their bomb and IED making factories have been destroyed while terrorists’ networks have been deprived of the facilities for weapons training, brainwashing and motivating young people to turn them into suicide bombers. North Waziristan provided different terrorist groups a contact point. With the agency under army control, the terrorists have lost an accessible and safe meeting place.

The ill-conceived decision to hold talks with the TTP allowed the terrorists to continue their activities as a result of which hundreds of people lost their lives. These deaths could have been avoided if Operation Zarb-e-Azb had been started earlier.

Even when it became widely known that the army had decided to initiate a military operation it took nearly a week for the go-ahead to be given. The element of surprise that could have helped neutralise the terrorist leadership was lost. This provided important terrorist leaders and commanders the opportunity to escape from the agency. This explains why no major TTP figure could be apprehended or taken out during the operation. With the TTP leadership intact, it became possible for the scattered activists to gather round their leaders and initiate their deadly activities within months.

The ill-conceived decision to hold talks with the TTP allowed the terrorists to continue their activities as a result of which hundreds of people lost their lives

As a result of the destruction of the cadre and resources of the TTP in North Waziristan, the incidence of terrorist activities in urban areas significantly came down in the wake of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. For nearly four months there was no terrorist attack causing double digit casualties. Whatever incidents took place showed poor planning and a lack of sense of priority. Terrorists in urban areas, having lost contact with the leadership, unburdened themselves of whatever destructive material they had in their possession in the easiest possible way. The initial incidents were mostly confined to settled districts adjoining the tribal belt. The idea was to tell their sympathisers that the terrorists were still alive and kicking. Here and there a high profile target was chosen but the casualties remained limited.

In about four months time, the terrorist leadership managed to re-establish the links broken as a result of the military operation. Fresh suicide bombers were procured and sleeper cells in the cities reactivated. The terrorists who were on the run in the tribal areas decided to take revenge in the cities.

In the first week of November came the first major attack. A suicide bomber killed over 60 unwary enthusiasts who had come to witness the flag hoisting ceremony at Wagah parade ground in Lahore. The attack badly shook the peoples’ confidence in the law enforcement bodies.

In December came the carnage at the Peshawar Army Public School which was unprecedented in Pakistan, leaving 145 dead that included 132 students. The barbaric killing of innocent children was a tragedy whose impact was felt in many countries.

The attacks that were to follow in various cities indicated better planning. The TTP was short of physical resources as well as suicide bombers. The indiscriminate attacks at public places reminiscent of the earlier days were abandoned. The terrorist leadership henceforth concentrated on two targets: religious and sectarian minorities and personnel of law enforcement agencies. Only here and there individual choice led to deviation from the plan.

In the months to come members of the Shi’a community, or sects considered to be close to the community, were to be the principle object of attacks. Other minority communities like Ahmadis and Christians too were considered fair game. Soon a situation was created when the number of terror attacks in the urban areas surpassed those in FATA.

Over the years the law enforcement agencies have brought about some improvement in their working. This led after 2012 to a gradual decline in the rate of civilian deaths. In the final analysis however the toll is determined by who is more efficient, the terrorists or law enforcement agencies. The fact that the terrorists are still capable of pulling off devastating attacks at Wagah, Army Public Schools, Shikarpur and Youhanabad proves that unless the intelligence agencies are better able to pool their resources and collate their information the terrorists might succeed in raising the figure of the civilian casualties.

The TTP has lost numerous activists and commanders in the military operation. This has hampered their activities. In case hundreds of extremist volunteers, who left Pakistan to join the IS decide to return, this could turn the TTP and its affiliates into a deadly killing machine. Even if this fails to happen, the terrorist networks are already getting a regular supply of new volunteers both from the mainstream educational institutions and the madrassas. The terrorists will never be short of recruits unless measures are taken to block the recruitment.

In the first week of November came the first major attack. A suicide bomber killed over 60 unwary enthusiasts who had come to witness the flag hoisting ceremony at Wagah parade ground in Lahore

The text books taught in the mainstream educational institutions on the one hand inculcate hatred against other sects and religions and on the other lead to the acceptance of violence as a justified tool in the service of religion. They also propagate conspiracy theories. This explains why there is a fairly long list of highly educated persons ending up as terrorists beginning with Ahmad Omar Sheikh and Aafia Siddiqui and leading to Saad Aziz.

Most of the madrassas promote extremist thinking while many tell their students that all sects except the one they belong to are outside the pale of Islam. This explains why the first generation of Taliban were entirely the products of religious seminaries. It is therefore a religious duty to wage a jihad against them. The present leadership of the TTP and its offshoots are all madrassa products, Qazi Fazlullah being the most outstanding example. Most of the terror commanders are Qaris, the title indicating their connection with the madrassas, The notorious Qari Hussain, who trained hundreds of suicide bombers, had also received madrassa schooling .

As Operation Zarb-e-Azb takes toll of terrorists in the tribal areas, another generation of terrorists is being raised in the cities of Pakistan. The desire to uproot terrorism from Pakistan will remain a dream unless a comprehensive attempt is made to de-radicalise the mainstream educational curricula and regulate the madrassas.