Army runs the show

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    The tower that nobody can miss

     

    Never in the history of Pakistan did any elected prime minister meet the army chief so frequently. Never during any civilian government did foreign government functionaries call on the COAS so often. The army has particularly played a crucial role in devising the NAP, instituting the military courts and sending the condemned prisoners to gallows.

    The army continues to dictate on foreign policy issues and internal security policy. The peculiar placing of the chairs of the PM and the COAs at joint meetings indicate that the two co-chair the meetings. This has led to a perception that the army rather than the civilian leadership calls the shots.

    This was not how Nawaz Sharif had originally visualised civil-military relations. During the five months of Kayani’s tenure, Sharif tried to be on the best of relations with the army chief. He knew the process for the appointment of the new COAS was about to begin in four months’ time. He was hopeful of extending the civilian influence once an army chief of his own choice was in place.

    Kayani spared no opportunity to assert the army’s authority. US Secretary of State John Kerry had telephoned Sharif soon after his assumption of office. Kerry visited India in June and he was scheduled to come to Pakistan on August 1. While in India Kerry discussed the situation in Afghanistan and the role India was to play in the restoration of peace in the country. Kerry had also tried to allay India’s concerns regarding talks with the Afghan Taliban.

    Nawaz wanted improvement of relations with the US which had touched the nadir a year earlier and were taking time to normalise. Top on Kerry’s agenda were regional issues that included Islamabad’s relations with Afghanistan and India.

    The army was seething over Kerry’s statement regarding a role for India in Afghanistan. Gen Kayani was strongly opposed to a military operation in North Waziristan or action against the Haqqani network.

    Gen Kayani held a lengthy meeting with Nawaz Sharif a day earlier, telling him of his reservations and the need to give them consideration during talks with the Secretary of State. Sharif followed the advice.

    Nawaz wanted improvement of relations with the US which had touched the nadir a year earlier and were taking time to normalise. Top on Kerry’s agenda were regional issues that included Islamabad’s relations with Afghanistan and India

    It became clear in the next few months that there was no difference between Sharif and Kayani over refusal to conduct the operation in North Waziristan, support for the Haqqanis and the attitude towards the TTP.

    Nawaz Sharif had a soft corner for extremist networks which claimed they were fighting for the enforcement of the Sharia, an aim Sharif also sympathised with though he did not approve of the violence they employed to achieve the end. He was worried that terrorist activities discouraged investors and caused losses to the economy.

    The army under Kayani considered TPP as a potential asset against India but was opposed to its violent activities inside Pakistan that included attacks on the army. For Kayani, the various TTP groups were allies who had gone astray.

    Sharif and Kayani agreed that there was a need for an APC to create national consensus on talks with the TTP. It was presumably on Kayani’s encouragement that Nawaz Sharif called the APC on TTP in the second week of September. Kayani and DGI ISI were also present in the meeting to brief the participants on the internal and regional situation. The resolution adopted had a strong anti-American angle. It maintained, “We declare that we shall ourselves determine the means and mode of fighting this war in our national interest and shall not be guided by the United States of America or any other country in this regard.”

    The talks went on for the next 10 months. These suited the TTP as it was not required to stop terrorist attacks. In fact the terrorist network conducted some of the worst attacks during the period.

    The new army chief was due to take over in November 2013. While it was expected that Nawaz Sharif would choose the senior most serving general as COAS. He decided to promote the third-most senior man. Presumably, Sharif wanted to make a statement about the civilian government’s primary role in formulating foreign and security policy, a domain previously dominated by the military. The prime minister hoped that the new chief could keep hardliners within the military in check and allow his government to play the more active role in formulating the defence and security policy that he desired.

    The expectations were not fulfilled. Differences developed soon between the government and the new army chief. The army leadership was unhappy with the government’s policy towards India. In May Nawaz Sharif went to New Delhi to attend Modi’s inauguration. This was not appreciated by the army.

    Another source of friction was the treatment being meted out to Musharraf. Some in the army were unhappy with the way a former COAS was being dragged from court to court. The way the prime minister handled the Hamid Mir affair sent a message that he was on the wrong side of the ISI.

    Kh Asif’s remarks about the army generals made during the Musharraf era were again aired on the media. The defence minister particularly faced the ire of the army. Raheel Sharif, however, reacted cautiously to the provocations.

    It was Raheel Sharif who decided to go ahead with improving relations with Afghanistan. He even suggested that Pakistan army would support the Afghan security forces, despite long-held reservations about the size, purpose and viability of the foreign-funded Afghan National Army

    The ongoing talks with the TTP were another major source of friction. With the TTP continuing to attack both the civilians and the army personnel and the government doing nothing to stop the attacks, the army was getting fed up with the talks. It was being increasingly realised that the TTP was using the talks to gain time. What is more the army leadership was convinced that North Waziristan was the sanctuary from where the terrorists proceeded to launch the attacks and returned after performing the job.

    In March the army told Nawaz Sharif there would be more talks with the Pakistani Taliban and took matter in its own hands. “We will avenge the blood of every last soldier. Talks or no talks, the army will retaliate,” told a military official to Reuters. “TTP will not be given an inch to breathe. Major surgery is now urgently required and has been agreed to remove the cancer of terrorism,” observed another.

    The attack on Karachi airport in June by terrorists emanating from North Waziristan led the army to decide to launch a full-fledged operation against the TTP, setting aside the PML-N’s reservations. The PML-N leadership was simply told to own operation Zarb e Azb.

    Nawaz Sharif’s position vis-à-vis the army started weakening with the launch of the anti PML-N government movement by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri in August. Within a short period the army had gained the initiative.

    The operation was welcomed all over the country. The Americans were also pleased with it. Nawaz Sharif was forced to step back on his India policy. Over the last few years the emphasis had been on increased trade and people to people relations with Kashmir recognised as an important problem that could be taken up after enough confidence had been generated on both sides. With the change of policy Kashmir became the first and foremost issue that needed to be resolved “in accordance with the will of Kashmiri people as enshrined in the UN resolutions”.

    It was Raheel Sharif who decided to go ahead with improving relations with Afghanistan. He even suggested that Pakistan army would support the Afghan security forces, despite long-held reservations about the size, purpose and viability of the foreign-funded Afghan National Army.

    The decision not to commit any military elements to the Saudi government’s Yemen adventure was also made by the army and Sharif was required to own it. The army has turned into the proverbial Faisalabad watch tower. Whichever part of the city one stood, one could not miss to see the tower.

    2 COMMENTS

    1. This had to happen. Very soon NAP will also be executed by the Army. No more giving space to these civilian govt. Now, the political parties nor the literate class should complain that effectively, it is now the Army who is pulling the strings. This is only due to the lethargic attude of the political parties & govt who are least interested in the welfare of the general public. If the Army has to get the largest chunk of the budget, so it be.

    2. I am really confused by the points made in this article. I thought that TTP and BLA, and all other terrorists in this country were supported and paid for by RAW, the Indian spy agency. But this article states very clearly that Gen (Ret) Kayani considered the various TTP groups to be allies (of the army and pakistan). But, but… wait! That would mean that Kayani supported the activities of RAW, which means that the Pakistan army was a front for the Indian spy agency, and was selling Pakistan down the tube to those darned Indians, which means… Oh! I give up! This is getting too confusing.

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