Counter terrorism is civil admin’s domain
After the information minister’s recent run-in with madrassas – over reforms, of course – it seems that much about the much trumpeted National Action Plan (NAP) will not materialise. Seminary reform was, after all, in many ways the gist of the program. Had there been no factories that churn out these mullah clerics in the first place, the world would not face a war on terror at all. So it was thought important to check madrassas when NAP was rolled out.
Yet for some reason this was one area the government chose to stay well clear of. But as time was passing and eyebrows were raised, Pervez Rashid pulled a surprise by challenging seminaries. The storm that followed left the information minister apologising and the government visibly on the back foot. Does this mean that NAP has essentially run out of steam? Or is his particular factor just one of the things that the government will take up in due time? Also, is the counter insurgency aspect explained well enough to the people? Especially where and how it differs from counter terrorism, which is, it turns out, a more wholesome and enduring part of the cleansing operation.
DNA talked Air Marshal (r) Shahid Lateef, veteran fighter pilot and prominent commentator on defence and security affairs.
Question: How do view the overall implementation of NAP?
Shahid Latif: As far as the matter of implementation on the National Action Plan is concerned, let me say that the government’s performance in this regard is quite poor. We know that the governments in Pakistan have a bad history of implementing strategies. And so is the case with NAP. Let me remind my readers that we heard about a national security plan upon completion of one year of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s term. But despite the tall claims, they could not implement the plan and it was thrown into cold storage. Later, the rulers woke from their slumber when horrible acts of terrorism happened and terrorists attacked APS Peshawar.
Then again tall claims were made when NAP was unveiled. Now another six months have passed but nothing has happened.
As far as counter insurgency is concerned, the armed forces have come up with proper planning and execution of their role to combat insurgents and clear areas held by them
In my view, NAP was a faulty policy as it missed the crucial role of police, which provides the foundation of any security strategy. Out of the 20-point action plan, there was not a single point which referred to the reforming of police department. This shows the seriousness of the rulers and the minds of the strategists who drafted the NAP. It seemed as if people kept bluffing each other.
I think there is no serious approach to revamping the system and once the armed forces complete their part of the operation in the tribal areas, it would be back to business as usual.
Q: If NAP was a failed strategy, do you think that the input provided by the armed forces and ISI was also flawed?
SL: Your question reflects just how much society is confused about counter insurgency and counter terrorism. The armed forces are trained for counter insurgency, not for counter terrorism.
As far as counter insurgency is concerned, the armed forces have come up with proper planning and execution of their role to combat insurgents and clear areas held by them.
You have to understand that the armed forces can strategise and take action against insurgents in the most difficult terrain, jungles or elsewhere in the country for that matter. But tackling terrorists in urban and civilian areas is not their job. They are not skilled for this sort of operations.
Yes, the army can take up the job of counter insurgency. This is what armed forces are doing in Waziristan and they are successful. These operations are in the final phase. It would soon be over as the army would be able to clear some pockets still held by terrorists.
But counter-terrorism is domain of the civil administration. People have been confusing both these terms. Counter-terrorism has to be taken up by the civil administration and police has a key role in counter terrorism. Unfortunately, police reforms were given no importance in NAP. The government needs to wake up to this reality and the people responsible for this job should push for police reforms.
Q: Do mean that the military operation would soon be over and the police would have to conduct counter-terrorism operations in urban areas?
SL: Yes, this is what the chief of army staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif tried to tell the civilian administration when he said in his recent statement that the political leadership needs to take decisions now for taking this war against terrorists to the cities.
This statement was very important. The COAS tried to differentiate between the two operations we just discussed. He asked the civilian administration to take Zarb-e-Azb to cities so that those sleeper cells, facilitators and abettors of terrorists could be tracked down.
The army eliminated the terrorist apparatus in Waziristan besides killing hardcore terrorists. However, some of those who escaped from those areas might have taken refuge in urban areas. The COAS was hinting to the government that civil admin need to take action against them.
The government needs to pull police out of the VVIP duties and shift their focus to security provision to ordinary citizens rather than protecting important people. Otherwise, the terrorists would continue attacking here and there.
If we had police on its job in Karachi, the Safoora Goth attackers may have executed their planned action but they would not have escaped after striking. This is the point COAS is trying to tell the government. There has to be a proper mechanism and you need to get police into action. Wherever they need help, they can have support from the armed forces.
Q: Why do you think madrassa reforms — a major component of NAP – are still not implemented? Do you think hate speech has been curtailed?
SL: The government is not really taking ownership of NAP. The COAS has been saying that action against terrorists needs support from the people and the government.
When you analyse NAP, each point needs a plan. To execute each point, the government needs to evolve mini plans. It seems, however, that despite the passage of six months, no steps have been taken to implement NAP.
The government needs to pull police out of the VVIP duties and shift their focus to security provision to ordinary citizens rather than protecting important people
The government has not taken any step to perform its duty. So progress is quite poor. It seems as if madrassa reforms are not on the government’s agenda. Registration of madrassas are also not happening. So is the case with banning the proscribed organisations. The government expressed its weakness when the religious parties led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman resisted madrassa reforms.
But the government provided the religious leaders with an opportunity by including a clause in the 21st Constitutional Amendment which said that religious terrorism cases would be tried by military courts.
Now there was a legitimate concern among religious parties about the government making an effort to save terrorists who were not religious. Why did the government stop short of saying that all kinds of terrorism shall be dealt by military courts? It seems as if the PPP and MQM leaders had put pressure on the prime minister because both parties have militant wings. Moreover, Nawaz Sharif also wanted to save terrorists of Balochistan. So, biased approaches always backfire. This is what happened in this case as well. The government came under immense political pressure and the prime minister backed off. Moreover, no step has yet been taken to deny oxygen to terrorists by eliminating their funding network.
On the other hand, it is unfortunate to note that the government is reluctant to provide funds to operationalise National Counter-terrorism Authority (NACTA). The main cause of the bickering within the federal cabinet is that the powerful finance minister has been reluctant to provide funds to the interior ministry to help activate NACTA. The interior minister had said that he needs Rs30 billion to set up NACTA. The government’s priorities can be assessed by the fact that this small amount of money was not paid to interior ministry while billions have been pumped into the metro bus system.
Establishing the joint directorate of intelligence also remains a false promise. We were told by the government that officials from the intelligence wings of armed and civilian agencies like FIA, IB and others will sit under one roof and jointly curb the menace of terror by sharing info to track down terrorists.
Interestingly, there is no action taken to plug non-stop foreign funding to the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with dubious role who are carrying out foreign agendas. It seems that some of the NGOs are fairly strong and they put up strong resistance and the government buckles up. The government lacks the will to stop foreign fund as India, US and European states are pushing their support to such NGOs.
Q: The PML-N government abandoned Information Minister Pervez Rashid who was under attack from the religious right after his remarks on madrassa reforms. Do you think it is the same pattern as former Punjab Governor Salman Taseer when he was abandoned by the then PPP government?
SL: This reflected the government’s weakness. Whenever the religious fanatics don’t follow the law, the state has to take action. In such cases of intimidation, the law should take its course otherwise terrorists would get a breather. When the army wanted to take against the terrorists in North Waziristan, the government kept saying that it wanted to hold a dialogue with the TTP. Not much later terrorists hit the country hard. So any inaction by the government sends a very wrong signal to non-state actors. If a government is unable to provide justice to its ministers, what would be the fate of a man on the street?
