Questions about Karachi

Strategy versus performance

Whatever the purpose of the Karachi Operation, particularly the MQM raid and its fallout, was, it failed to control or contain terrorism in the metropolis. That much was apparent from the Ismaili massacre this week. The hit was not the work of a desperate group on the run after its command and control structure was decimated. It showed that, now more than ever apparently, the enemy is able to strike at will and whim. And it is able to inflict serious damage.

Analysts who understand the military better, along with the deep state’s Old Guard, explained at the time that the MQM raid was an extension of the counterinsurgency operation. The need to tackle political militancy was judged more urgent where it matters apparently, and they took to disarming the only party that had been warning of Taliban incursion in Karachi for years. Whether the operation was really meant to expand beyond MQM – which it has not so far – or whether going after MQM first amounted to taking the eye of the ball will become apparent sooner rather than later, it seems.

And terrorism and militancy are not all of Karachi’s problems. The port city, financial hub, cultural melting pot, etc, is facing acute water shortage, which has led to a whole host of associated problems. The provincial government seems completely out of sorts. Just like in the centre in the previous term, the PPP’s governance in Sindh so far has left a lot to be desired. The military, on the other hand, seems committed to restoring peace, at least, to the city. Yet so far the measures announced and adopted have proved inadequate. Now there is law and order breakdown, a volatile security situation, water shortage and unprecedented political turmoil to deal with. And it does not seem that those in charge have an effective all-encompassing policy to tackle these problems effectively.