Can’t be any clearer
It’s not usual for the Pakistani prime minister to be in Kabul two times in seven months, especially with the COAS and ISI chief on board. The official language, on this side especially, has not changed since Zarb-e-Azb reset the regional security situation. But judging by the chatter across the border there are indications that many in Kabul, at least, feel the time to back words with action is now, not some time in the future. Therefore there is a need for both sides to finalise a workable, actionable strategy that goes beyond well-intentioned rhetoric.
While use of one’s territory for proxy war against the other remains the biggest concern, there are other matters that will play just as significant a role as this relationship moves forward. Kabul’s talks with the Taliban are an example since they have already caused a stir precisely because they were not well planned or executed. And, contrary to a new trend emerging in the international media, the Afghan Taliban’s main problem is not Pakistan’s involvement in the initiative, rather it concerns the Americans staying beyond the drawdown.
Strangely, that is where the Taliban had a point in common with Karzai – both wanted the Americans out. But after Ghani asked them to stay a little longer, the Taliban’s participation in immediate negotiations became suspect. That also explains the new Spring Offence, which some analysts thought might be held back, at least, till the talks played out. It is also not clear how much leverage Pakistan can have till the Americans are present. That is why Islamabad and Kabul must narrow down areas where they can make a difference. The Afghans have begun sharing more intelligence since Peshawar. They’ve also acted in the Nooristan area and allowed Pakistan to interrogate captured TTP suspects. Pakistan, too, must begin reciprocating the goodwill that Ghani has brought to the table. Losing momentum can pull us back to the estrangement of the Karzai days; which bodes ill for both because the Spring Offensive will be tougher with fewer Americans around, and Pakistan’s Taliban seem determined enough to continue the war on this side. Unless there is quantifiable cooperation, the Sharif-Ghani embrace will not yield desired results. The Afghans, at least, have more than hinted as much.
