Those forgotten, formative years of Pakistan
When Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif taunts the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf chief Imran Khan that instead of persisting with the slogan of “Naya Pakistan”, he should first build a “Naya Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”; the latter should heed the call because a research published by Farmanullah in the latest issue of the journal of the Research Society of Pakistan on party identification in the electoral politics of KPK concludes that voters primarily vote a party into power not just on the basis of their ideological affinity but on the performance of the party while in office. This determinant in voting stands valid among all sorts of voters be they be residents of urban or rural areas or whether male or female. In fact, the more poorer the voter is, the more likely is (s)he to change the voting preferences in the elections.
We do know that that there was and is, even today, grinding poverty in some areas of Punjab but when compared with other regions of the subcontinent, this province was relatively prosperous due to mild climate, rich soils and the perennial availability of water for irrigation for agriculture to flourish
Then there are two more books: one authored by Professor Dr Massarrat Abid and the other jointly written by her with Professor Dr Qalb-i-Abid. “Punjab politics” focuses on the politics of Punjab between World War I and the partition in 1947. Although we do not know the reasons, Punjab has been a fertile ground of communal hatred primarily based on religious differences notwithstanding its long sufi syncretic traditions of tolerance and pluralistic mutual coexistence. We do know that that there was and is, even today, grinding poverty in some areas of Punjab but when compared with other regions of the subcontinent, this province was relatively prosperous due to mild climate, rich soils and the perennial availability of water for irrigation for agriculture to flourish. The Punjabis could enjoy the four seasons and other bounties of life yet they hated and killed one another. I have yet to come across a research investigating the question whether the communal hatred was ingrained in the Punjabi psyche or was orchestrated by the communal politicians for their nefarious designs.
In contrast to the moderate political parties like the Congress and the Muslim League, the communal parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha had significant appeal among the Punjabi populace, therefore, even the moderate “nationalist” Muslim politicians like Sikandar Hayat, Mian Iftikharuddin, etc, also lost ground to hawkish Fazle Hussain, Sir Shafi and Noon, who advocated a hard communal stand in the provincial politics. It were these Punjabi propensities which compelled the Congress and the League to also indulge in communal politics in this province. The culminating point of this communal politics was the passage of the Lahore Resolution in 1940 in the heart of Punjab. Now, one can understand why the League preferred to adopt such a divisive resolution in Lahore when it had the option to do the same in any other city of India including the ones in the Hindu majority provinces yet it chose Lahore because it thought that such a move would have wide acceptability among the Punjabi Muslims despite the fact that there was a government of Indian “nationalists’ and not communalists in the province in the decade before partition. Some may say that this communalism was fostered by the British colonists but at the same time we cannot forget that the top British policy makers in Britain and the executors of their policies in India such as Linlithgow, Wavell, Zetland and Amery were all against the division of the subcontinent. So overwhelming was the tide of communalism that despite their best efforts, the British governors of Punjab such as Glancy and Jenkins felt helpless.
Dr Massarrat Abid’s book “Britain, India and Pakistan” picks up the thread from 1947 and conducts a historical survey of the relations among these countries up to the mysterious assassination of Pakistan’s first Premier Liaquat Ali Khan. Just before and immediately after partition, Pakistan desired to have close relations with Britain and the Commonwealth countries. Issues with India, however, became the irritant in this budding relationship. The Cold War rivalries between the communist and the capitalist blocs added new twists to the complex Anglo-Pakistan relations. Britain was an important member of the capitalist camp led by the US, therefore, one of its objectives was to restrain the Soviet influence in the region. To achieve this goal, it wanted both Pakistan and India to resolve their disputes and stand by the capitalist world. Dr Massarrat is privy to the military documents which show that even after partition the top British military officers assiduously worked upon the idea of prevailing upon both India and Pakistan to agree to a united military command to counter the communist threat.
When the goals are different, there can be hardly any synchronisation in actions. Dr Massarrat’s research proves that there were more differences and hardly any shared strategic aims in Anglo-Pakistan relations between 1947 and ‘51. Pakistan wanted to use the British connection as well as the Commonwealth platform to its advantage at the expense of India whereas Britain did not want to antagonise India just to please Pakistan. Incidentally, both Jinnah and Liaquat desired close ties with both Britain and the US, however, British pragmatism compelled Liaquat to accept the Russian invitation to visit Moscow at the height of the Cold War, the news of which was accepted with “unreserved approval” by all sections of public opinion in Pakistan.
When the goals are different, there can be hardly any synchronisation in actions. Dr Massarrat’s research proves that there were more differences and hardly any shared strategic aims in Anglo-Pakistan relations between 1947 and ‘51
The announced Moscow visit sent the desired message to the West. Dr Massarrat has dug out two important primary historical sources that lay bare the Western concerns. The then British High Commissioner noted that “Pakistan desires to demonstrate to the UK and Commonwealth and to the US that their alleged failure to give Pakistan proper support against India must lead Pakistan to look for other friends.” Similarly, the Commonwealth Relations Office reported that the intended Moscow visit by Premier Liaquat would make the West realise that they should not take Pakistan’s support for granted rather it must be paid for. In the end, the Moscow visit did not materialise and it was because of the presence of the influential “pro-British and American elements in the Cabinet and the Secretariat – Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Ghulam Mohammad and Sir Zafrullah Khan were mostly responsible for it.”
