The Durand dilemma

Understanding the problem

The Durand line resulted from a “Great Game” played by Russia and British India in manifesting their desires to expand empires. Russia’s expansion was motivated by her desire to weaken British power, both in India and its extension into Europe. On the other hand, the British followed a “forward policy” in order to contain the Russians within Central Asia. Although neither power controlled Afghanistan during this time, Afghanistan’s role as a buffer between them grew throughout the 1800s, leading to repeated clashes on its fringes. In eighty years, the British fought three wars in Afghanistan. After the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880), two important developments resulted: first, the treaty of Gandamak on May 26, 1879 that ceded strategic border areas to the British (notably the Khyber Pass, Kurram Valley, Pishin and Sibi,); second, it enabled British to control Afghanistan’s foreign affairs and rise of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in Kabul. Amir Abdul Rahman Khan ruled Afghanistan for two decades. In his view, reforms were not possible until a boundary line was marked along the perimeter of Afghanistan so that people could know what provinces really belonged to Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Britain and Russia almost went to war on the Panjdeh crisis of 1885, leading the two powers to form a number of boundary commissions (1887, 1891, 1896) to demarcate Afghanistan’s eastern border. Abdul Rehman made a request to the British Viceroy, Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British India, to head the mission for negotiations. The boundary, as decided upon by the parties, was made the subject of an agreement by the amir on November 12, 1893. The border line split 17 million Afghan, non-Afghan, Baloch and Brahui tribes on both sides. Later on, the Afghan rulers reaffirmed the treaty three times in 1905, 1919 and 1921. Although the Durand line was confirmed by successive Afghan governments, it was not accepted by the government of King Zahir Shah after the withdrawal of British from India. What follows is a description of the arguments which Afghan people forward for the invalidity of the Durand Line.

For half a century after the signing, every Afghan ruler had reaffirmed the validity of the Durand Line as the agreed upon frontier between Afghanistan and India

At this point in history, the Afghan government had two objections to the treaty: first, the Durand Line was established under duress; second, since the British government in India had ceased to exist, the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 was null and void. Thus, they have laid claim to all areas between the Durand Line and the River Indus.

Pakistan contends that Durand Agreement was negotiated at the request of Amir Abdul Rahman himself, with a British official of the amir’s own choice, and the amir and his advisor publicly accepted the agreement, thereby declaring that they were satisfied with it. Hence it was likely not signed under duress. Moreover, for half a century after the signing, every Afghan ruler had reaffirmed the validity of the Durand Line as the agreed upon frontier between Afghanistan and India. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that the government of India Act of 1935 formally defined India to include the tribal territory. With regard to the second argument, it is a well-settled proposition of international law that according to the principle of ‘res transit cum suo onere’, treaties of extinct states concerning boundary lines… remain valid, and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the absorbing state. The United Kingdom government had also expressed its public agreement regarding the validity of Durand Line, in favour of Pakistan.

Afghanistan, following the argument that the Durand Line was accepted under pressure, contends that Pushtuns living on either side should have the right of self-determination, as they were forcibly separated from their motherland. Secondly, the Afghan government argues that the inhabitants of Pushtunistan are one nation and that the Durand Line arbitrarily splits the nation into two. Pakistan contends that Pushtuns’ vote for Pakistan in the 1947 referendum in Peshawar refutes validity of the Afghanistan position. Secondly, Afghanistan’s concern for the unity of Pushtuns is unfair as Afghanistan does not include the Pushtuns on its side of the line in the proposed state of “Pushtunistan”. Instead, Pushtunistan in Afghanistan’s conception would consist solely of areas now within Pakistan. The Pushtuns would, therefore, continue to be split between two sovereign states. The demands for an independent Pushtunistan lost their momentum after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. Presently, the issue fails to capture the hearts of Pakistani Pushtuns anymore due to their absorption in the Pakistani state, and the sad plight of both Afghans and Afghanistan. However, the issue has the potential to again strain Pak-Afghan relations in the future.

The roots of the issue, besides other factors, however, lie in lack of proper information and misunderstanding of related documents

The Durand Line remains a contentious issue in Pak-Afghan relations since the birth of Pakistan in 1947. The people and various governments of Afghanistan have raised, from time to time, a number of questions on the acceptability of the Durand Line agreement, signed between British India and Afghanistan in 1893. The roots of the issue, besides other factors, however, lie in lack of proper information and misunderstanding of related documents. Historical documents signed, ratified and endorsed by successive Afghan regimes negate the claim that validity of the agreement has expired. Research also proves the view of the line being an imposed border as dubious. International law does not support the stand that the agreement is not enforceable in the post-British period.

Promoting a better understanding of the issue among the Afghan government, civil society and people may lay the foundation of warm relations between the two countries that both need. Pakistan should also try to address the genuine apprehensions of its Afghan brethren. Thus, conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan appears unlikely to be over with regard to the issue of Pushtunistan unless a pragmatic leadership on both sides decides to get over with it. Ghani and Sharif may be rightly remembered in the annals of history to do so.