Peshawar killed a part of Pakistan’s soul
There’s usually layer upon layer in such ops, or so the shadow people tell us journos. They should know, they wrote the book on it. There’s always funding and arming where there are insurgencies. And since time immemorial principal sources have been outside forces, even if they have no immediate scores to settle. Remember the Soviet war and the ‘strategic depth’ hangover?
So it is entirely possible that someone funded, and someone else armed, and someone in this case also housed, the enemies of our state who committed the Peshawar atrocity. That is why Lateef Mehsud’s repatriation was so important. Count on information squeezed from him, in addition to phone transcripts of the Peshawar attackers, to be on the dossier Gen Raheel left with President Ghani. Yet, tragically, however real or mythical the outside hand, those carrying out these operations are invariably locals. There’s some food for thought for conspiracy theorists there.
The spooks tell more, though. Surely a lot of planning goes into such attacks; the suicide blast at Data Darbar in Lahore for example or, more ominously, the killing of more than 130 children at the Army Public School in Peshawar. Whether at the funding, or the arming, or the operations level, someone must have suggested to someone to pick these particular targets. ‘Mostly fauji kids, unprotected, perfect target’, someone must have suggested. ‘What a good idea’, someone must have acknowledged. Then there must have been the jihadi spin – that we created and mastered, again, so mujahideen could flush out godless Communists from Afghanistan – and some Pakistanis would have been green-lighted to kill hundreds of little Pakistani children. ‘Job well done’, someone would have grinned as hundreds of mothers howled and the nation went into shock.
And, again ominously, however true the foreign agendas and planning part, don’t count out that the Pakistani insurgents, even those in Afghanistan, did not really believe that the perpetrators of Peshawar would be with their 72 hoors before the military could successfully secure the school. Shooting children at point blank range, plucking out eyes, beheading some, setting teachers on fire as students watched, was really part of their noble jihad. Such is the power of this brainwash factory. And just so we don’t forget, this was the bright idea behind the CIA-ISI Great Game, lubricated by Saudi petrodollars, of course, that finally pulled down the iron curtain and ended the bi-polar world. “We did what Napoleon and Hitler could not do”, Gen Musharraf boasted in his book. “We beat the Russians!”
Surely a lot of planning goes into such attacks; the suicide blast at Data Darbar in Lahore for example or, more ominously, the killing of more than 130 children at the Army Public School in Peshawar
And this part, particularly, infuriates today’s intelligence corps. How could things come to this? We told them, and taught them, lots of things, but this was not among them. And now that they are such a potent part of the mainstream, especially in the forces, what can really be done to really “flush them out”, as Zarb-e-Azb is supposed to do?
This, probably, is where Nawaz will hit another brick wall. Imran’s lifted the dharna, and Plan-C, threat – which is smart politics since the boots would have been quick to give him a call otherwise – so now another trial awaits N, one that will test his mettle as commander in chief. Ironically, this comes when N is at his weakest, that’s another thing ‘they’ tell journalists these days – he is weak, not only politically but as a politician, as a leader, as a man.
The signs are already showing. Almost a decade-and-a-half into the war against terror there is Peshawar, and they still need a week to hash out a counter-terror strategy. The Lal Masjids of our Islamic Republic are back to their belligerent, provocative, insulting best. And when people, not the state, protest, police push them away because of the state’s inability to protect them if things get worse. And those that mobilise the Hafiz Saeeds of this world have done what they always do; they have mobilised Hafiz Saeed. Gen Raheel bolstered his no-nonsense-soldier credentials with his Kabul trip. But at home, just like the government, the military is in a vacuum beyond the bombs and bullets of Zarb-e-Azb.
Now, with the political spectrum firmly behind Nawaz in the country’s time of need, he will have to pack quite a punch to knock out the Taliban, and their many affiliates, peers and spillovers. But most of N’s inner circle wanted to continue talking to them even after the Karachi airport attack. In fact, if Gen Raheel hadn’t put his foot down, the government might have wanted to continue talks even after Peshawar. The maulanas N trusted with the negotiations continue to harbour sympathy for the Taliban, which is a strange but fair reflection on the prime minister.
Almost a decade-and-a-half into the war against terror there is Peshawar, and they still need a week to hash out a counter-terror strategy. The Lal Masjids of our Islamic Republic are back to their belligerent, provocative, insulting best
How well N understands 21st century mutation of militant Islamism became apparent recently. When Da’ish announced its bloody caliphate, and Saudi patronage of al Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra proxies in Syria strained historic Washington-Riyadh relations and jolted a number of long-standing international arrangements, what did Islamabad do? N red carpeted the Saudi crown prince across the capital. There was credible chatter that with the Americans turning to Iran – and realising they should have done so far sooner but didn’t because of Israel and Saudi Arabia – the Saudis turned to Pakistan for protection, etc. N, apparently, came close to accepting the Saudi request to arm and train the Syrian resistance – various groups that soon came to be known as ISIS – but had to cut a sorry figure when the military would have none of it.
No wonder then that Islamabad is still numb, and the only thing that comes out of the prime ministers mouth is condolence, not a concrete action plan. Even the go-ahead for executions came because of the military. The ability of the leadership to deliver, therefore, is suspect, especially now since most people want nothing short of finishing off Taliban and their apologists to the last man.
And talking about people, don’t take their anger over Peshawar for an official narrative. That, sadly, is still lacking. And neither the civvies nor the military have been any good on that front. The only way Zarb-e-Azb can succeed is if it is wholesome. That means first taking out active Taliban, then picking up dormant sells, then rounding up their sympathisers, and all the while forcing a counter-narrative, one that will finally begin to undo the institutional indoctrination of the last three-and-a-half decades. And not only will Ch Nisar have to stop listening to Maulana Sami and Rana Sanaullah stop taking Malik Ishaq’s calls, it will require a steely resolve and an iron fist to crush all those who have become too used to rubbishing the state’s writ.
The military’s got the hardware covered. And ISI has a good idea of where the intel-intensive phase will have to concentrate. But is the other part – the long haul that requires brave, determined and focused leadership – really N’s cup of tea? Peshawar killed a part of Pakistan’s soul with it. And somewhere in the sick cross-play of superpower rivalry and concepts of supreme interest, just like the Taliban, N too has his roots. In reality he is as much a concoction of the Zia machine as the Taliban, though in a different way. How ironic that destiny now demands that he fight the old system to its death, whatever the cost.
