INTERVIEW: ‘Our most dangerous war’: Gen (retd) Hamid Gul

The old spymaster is for preserving the old ‘arrangement’ for Afghanistan

Peshawar changed everything about Pakistan. It remains to be seen, though, whether it will change something about Pakistani policy as well. There’s been much chest-thumping by the government, and the army chief sorted some things out with the Afghans and ISAF, implying a more expansive hunt for Mulla Fazlullah. Importantly, rid of political pressure, Nawaz Sharif now bears the responsibility of crushing the insurgency in a way that the public demands. The government has started executing Taliban prisoners on death row, but a lot more needs to be done.

The attack has also led to a far more public debate than before about the birth and evolution of the Taliban – from the days of the Afghan mujahideen to Afghanistan’s Taliban government, and now to the TTP insurgency – and the role of state institutions. Talk of good and bad Taliban supposedly ended with the launch of Zarb-e-Azb, but there was never a real public discourse about ‘strategic depth’. And after hundreds of innocent children were tortured, shot and beheaded in Peshawar, people want answers. Was the basic security paradigm, which allegedly manufactured proxies for the usual intelligence covert business, really worth it? Did securing eastern and western flanks, in the way our security apparatus thought best, really keep us strong internally?

There’s no confusion about how the army sees things today. It’s about terrorists “of all hues and colours”, Gen Raheel has repeatedly assured us. But old hands at the Great Game still advise caution. “There is pain in every war” said Gen (retd) Hamid Gul. He headed the ISI at one of the most crucial phases in the mujahideen’s long mutation into the world’s biggest multi-national, multi-ethnic and single-purpose fighting machine. The genesis of practically all al Qaeda like outfits is traced to those fateful days when Pakistani, American and Saudi intelligence set up factories that produced jihadi fighters by the thousands.

He talked to DNA exclusively regarding Pakistan’s present predicament.

What now?

Immediately after Peshawar, as the state reacts with force, he says the first order of business must be improving the legal process that tries these terrorists.

“The Anglo-Saxon legal system”, which we follow, “is based on the law of evidence, and is too weak to deal with the situation Pakistan faces”, he says.

“The Anglo-Saxon legal system”, which we follow, “is based on the law of evidence, and is too weak to deal with the situation Pakistan faces”, he says

It has definitely proved weak for Pakistan, but that is not just because of the evidence part, though it has been one of the biggest hurdles. Judges have also been harassed and threatened by the Taliban. And in an environment where the more they kill the easier they walk scot free, it’s natural for some to place survival ahead of following the law to the letter.

“We need military courts. They ensure quick dispensation of justice. When terrorists receive immediate punishment, the detrimental value of justice will increase”.

But such systems work best when certain procedures are in place, he points out. Unlike India, Pakistan does not have a Protection of Army bill. And despite its reputation of influence and power, military intelligence lacks certain privileges that can help improve its effectiveness.

“Nobody talks about IB, everybody talks about ISI”, he says. “IB has the power to arrest, but ISI doesn’t”.

It turns out that he did initially lobby to increase the agency’s power, but eventually decided against making too much noise. Plus they had an arrangement with IB, at least till his time. They would provide the people that needed to be ‘questioned’, and the said personnel would be returned after gathering required information.

Also, he finds it strange that while ISI is always in the news, and in drawing room discussions, IB is hardly mentioned. Even though “like the FBI, it is responsible for picking up local intelligence, which is then shared with other agencies”, it escapes popular attention.

Nawaz and the army

These are, perhaps, Nawaz’s toughest times in office. The dharna pressure might have receded, but a far stiffer test of his leadership is already underway. He cannot hide behind political agitation anymore. And he must deliver on terrorism. He’s OK with the military for the time being, but there is always a sense of friction that built throughout the talks with the Taliban and Gen Musharraf’s treason trial.

And as Nawaz has grown weak the army has strengthened, both at home and abroad. The most crucial leaders, from Kabul to Washington, see their time better spent meeting with Sharif the COAS than Sharif the prime minister.

“The army’s stature has clearly improved over the last few months”, he says, agreeing with the analysis. “But it is important for the military to maintain its distance from mainstream politics, just like it is doing. It’s better to exercise whatever control it keeps from behind”.

And it’s too soon to call on the chances of the government working smoothly with the military as the war against the TTP takes a decisive turn.

“The way I read Nawaz Sharif, it seems he has his eye on the Senate elections due shortly”, he adds. “If he emerges with a majority, he’ll go for constitutional amendments”.

And once that gives him power to post and transfer generals, the army will be castrated, just like Nawaz wants it.

The most crucial leaders, from Kabul to Washington, see their time better spent meeting with Sharif the COAS than Sharif the prime minister

 

“Of course, whether or not such a situation develops, or causes friction with the military, remains to be seen”, he points out. But still, again as he reads it, this thought will be in minds on both sides of the divide, and therefore assumes greater importance. “Still, the military must be careful not to over-reach”.

And Peshawar?

This is where the old guard disagrees with the sentiment gaining force. After the Peshawar tragedy, especially, there are few buyers for the old proxy policy. The army, too, is done with it for all intents and purposes. Yet the old spymaster won’t let go.

This is a very long debate, he warns, and all angles must be calculated before advocating bold, even violent, policy turns. He still believes, contrary to overwhelming public opinion, especially since Peshawar, that not differentiating between different Taliban groups is not a good idea in the long term.

Sartaj Aziz’s recent slip-of-tongue regarding the Haqqanis was, according to him, actually the truth of the matter. “Really, why should we engage groups that pose no threat to us and invite unnecessary backlash?” he asks. “How is it our responsibility?”

Tactically, the operation might take precedence now, “but futuristically, there is no credible outcome other than talks and understanding”, he adds.

He also believes that pushing the anti-Taliban operation, and continuing to adhere to US policy, will “alienate Afghanistan”, and we can’t allow that.

“There is no choice, wars have ups and downs, and this is our most dangerous war yet. We must continue with the policy that has been in place for 40 years”.

Besides, he says, “all hues and colours” eventually plays into India’s hands. “There is not one registered case against JuD or LeT in Pakistan”, he points out for some reason. “And if some groups are active in Kashmir, they are only doing the military’s work”. Who would lose out, really, if Kashmir is secure and a large bulk of the Indian army is freed from there, seems to be the sentiment.

And for Peshawar never to happen again, he is convinced that there is a need to look slightly longer into the past; like Pakistani compliance in the terror war, especially the long years of drone bombs, prominent among them the Bajaur madrassah, where 80 people, mostly children, were killed.

“Pakistan suffered its first suicide attack after Oct ’06, when Musharraf falsely took responsibility for that attack”, he says. “I took the case to the Supreme Court, to ask for stopping our air space violation under Article 245, but it was dismissed since I was not an affected party”. Apparently he took the stand, disagreeing with the Court. But not much came of it.

In a nutshell, for him Peshawar marks a storm, but one where better senses should prevail with long term survival and interest taking priority over other things. That is the doctrine most Pakistanis now disagree with, especially after the murder of those innocent children.