Working together, finally?
Fortunately, as the American departure from Afghanistan nears, the Afghan-Pakistani-American equation seems to have been streamlined, finally. Gen Sharif was clearly able to impress US officials during his recent visit, and Pak army’s commitment to Zarb-e-Azb has been accepted, despite Sartaj Aziz’s untimely and misleading remarks about the Haqqani network. The Americans have intensified their drone hunt for Mullah Fazlullah on the Afghan side of the border, and Latif Mehsud – right hand man of former TTP commander Hakeemullah – has been handed over to Pakistani authorities. The Coalition Support Fund (CSF), too, is back on the table, although with certain conditions. And Pakistan has responded in kind. The operation has badly degraded TTP and al Qaeda operations, and the army has taken out one of America’s prime AQ targets – the man who vowed to bomb the New York subway network
On the Afghan side, President Ghani has adopted the proper, progressive approach out of the stalemate that was marred by accusations and counter-accusations during the Karzai era. Gone are the days when Kabul accused Pakistan for all its troubles, and Gen Musharraf called President Karzai “an Ostrich with his head buried in the sand”. Ghani went out of his way to remove numerous misunderstandings during his visit to Pakistan. And after his visit to the GHQ, the mutual desire to flush out terrorists from the area is beginning to take the shape of a binding agreement. This is a welcome departure from the chaos that persisted till the Afghan election. The confusion over the BSF, Afghanistan’s NDS sheltering the TTP after Pakistan’s NW operation, Afghan leadership declaring ISI enemy-number-one, etc, will hopefully be things of the past permanently.
It is puzzling, though, that much if not all of the breakthrough on the Pakistani side has been engineered by Sharif the general instead of Sharif the premier. The civilian government has been in a state of self-induced paralysis since long before the dharnas grabbed its attention. The foreign ministry, especially, is hardly functioning – which is not surprising since it is still without a dedicated minister. The government must realise that monumental changes are sweeping the region, and it does itself no favour by deliberately placing itself behind the curve on the most important international issues. There is a need for it to assert itself to own not only the military operation, but also the delicate diplomacy that is already underway with Afghanistan. The three most important countries of the war on terror are making some of its most crucial decisions. It will be a shame if Islamabad isolates itself at this point.
