Unprepared for fallout

Is civ-mil imbalance harming the war against terrorism?

The TTP had no chance against a disciplined and well equipped army supported by jet fighters and helicopter gunships. The terrorist network has consequently suffered a humiliating defeat. Its control and command system stands disrupted; its factories producing IEDs and training facilities have been wiped out; hundreds of local and foreign fighters have been killed and the remaining thrown out of their safe haven.

The TTP’s top leadership, however, managed to escape. Despite the network having split into numerous factions that continue to wrangle among themselves, the terrorists are still determined to strike back. They have started regrouping and reactivating their sleeper cells in urban centres. The audacious attack at Wagah which killed 62 people indicates the chinks in the armour of the security apparatus. Will the country lose the battle won against the terrorists in North Waziristan in the cities of Pakistan?

The emergence of Daish in the Middle East and its victories has revived the sagging morale of Pakistani terrorists. A section of the TTP leadership has announced allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while almost all have congratulated him. Meanwhile Daish’s successes have led its rival, al-Qaeda led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, to announce the formation of al Qaeda’s India Chapter to win the race for the hearts and minds of those having militant tendencies in the Muslim world. The competition between the two would have repercussions for Pakistan also.

Pakistan offers a large recruiting ground to the terrorist networks. Successive military and civilian governments have promoted the extremist sentiment for narrow political gains. The text books taught in schools inculcate an intolerant mindset which looks at national and world events through the prism of conspiracy theories. Laws introduced by military rulers militate against minorities and promote hatred against them. Anyone accused of indulging in blasphemy is liable to be lynched by the mob, egged on by the clerics. Some have been killed inside jails.

Extremist thinking is also promoted by a large section of the media. There are many in Pakistan, therefore, who have a soft corner for the militant networks and consider themselves lesser Muslims for not fighting the jihad. These include young students, grown-ups in almost all professions as well as in political parties. The madaris under the Salafi influence are churning out thousands every year with an extremist outlook. The army’s motto of “Jihad fi Sabilillah”, introduced by Zia, continues to influence the thinking of those in uniform.

A major weakness in the intelligence system is lack of coordination. Agencies are reluctant to create a setup where intelligence collected by them is pooled, analysed and turned into actionable directives in real time

This makes it easy for militant networks to find sympathisers willing to contribute funds or help set up support networks. With the government unmindful of the phenomenon of extremism there will be no shortage of recruits for the militant networks in days to come. This is the first thing that helps the terrorists. The second are the grave weaknesses in the security system

A month after Ch Nisar took over as interior minister he received a tip from a top security agency about two terrorists entering Islamabad. This led him to issue a red-alert only to discover hours later that his directions had not changed anything in the administration’s response. Neither at the check-posts nor at the entry points was any special effort made to deal with the possible act of terrorism.

The interior ministry had been provided intelligence well before time about an impending suicide attack at Wagah. This was duly shared with the concerned civil and military authorities. Even then necessary measures were not taken which made it one of the most devastating attacks in the history of Lahore. The incident shows that little has changed on the security front over the last fifteen months

A major weakness in the intelligence system is lack of coordination. Agencies are reluctant to create a setup where intelligence collected by them is pooled, analysed and turned into actionable directives in real time. What is more there is still no mechanism to oversee that the required action is immediately taken. After sending the report to the authorities in Punjab, the interior ministry thought it had done its duty and need not take the trouble to ensure that necessary measures were being taken. That this should happen when mobile connections and the net have made interaction so easy is sheer irresponsibility.

The hesitation to pool the information is caused by the lack of trust prevailing between the civilian government and the military. With the passage of time the trust deficit has increased. The government and the army visualise relations with India and Afghanistan differently. The civilian government cannot thus be trusted with certain categories of ‘sensitive’ information. Agencies like the ISI have been used too frequently for political engineering which includes creating defections within parties, hammering together alliances and putting tails on the politicians. For months the army and the government were not on the same page about whether to use force against the terrorists or negotiate with them. This has over the decades given birth to rivalry between the military controlled and civilian controlled security agencies. One of the outcomes was a reluctance to enhance the capability of the civilian institutions.

Seventeen months in power and the prime minister has yet to appoint a professional national security adviser. He has given the task to an octogenarian party loyalist

Whatever attempts were made by the previous and the present government to organise NACTA, conceived as a set up where intelligence collected by all agencies was mutually shared, miserably failed. The idea was to have an intelligence network operating round the clock all the seven days passing on actionable information efficiently to relevant departments for swift action and with a determined follow-up.

At present, there is not a single institution that would allow all principal policymakers to sit around one table and take collective decisions on terrorism-related issues.

The attitude of the government is another factor standing in the way of the formation of an efficient security network. The civilian government remains unfocused on issues of internal security. The PML-N government likes to keep things personalised. It is allergic to creating and strengthening institutions and taking decisions through them.

Seventeen months in power and the prime minister has yet to appoint a professional national security adviser. He has given the task to an octogenarian party loyalist. What is more, Sartaj Aziz has been further burdened with foreign affairs. He has therefore little time to focus on security issues which require total attention from a man with quick responses.

A National Security Committee is in place. It holds meetings whenever the prime minister deems it fit. Nawaz Sharif however prefers to settle matters through tête-à-tête with the COAS. The NSC has all the relevant stake holders that could help devise a national security policy. The NSC should have been strengthened by providing the necessary appendages an institution like this requires like a proper secretariat and a staff of researchers and a mechanism to seek inputs from experts from among the academia, think tanks and NGOs.

The country faces a formidable challenge from the militants. This has to be dealt with through both long term and short term measures. Extremism prevailing in large sections of society requires long term treatment. This includes a thorough revision of the school textbooks to inculcate broad mindedness and tolerance. This also needs a well spelt out national policy that envisages seeking the support of media to restrain extremism. It also requires seeking the cooperation of the more enlightened ulema, madrassa reforms and regulating of the use of loudspeakers in mosques.

The short term measures require turning the NSC into a regular institution where all security related issues are taken up. The NSC should be used to create better understanding between the government and the army. It should subsequently lead to the formation of a powerful and active NACTA But has the PMLN any time to ponder over the important issue?