What must be done now
Considering the TTP’s tactics leading to the NW operation, savage reprisal attacks were expected, especially in urban centres. Some attributed the lack of immediate blowback to a flurry of raids and arrests prior to the operation – as the talks lingered. Apparently military intelligence was able to ‘take out’ dozens of sleeper cells in large population centres, especially in Punjab. But, impressive as the alleged pre-operation intelligence sweep was, it is more likely that the initial success of the Zarb-e-Azb blitzkrieg paralysed militants. Their immediate concern was fleeing the theatre of active war. And the operation no doubt significantly degraded their command and control network – that had been causing problems from Pakistan to Afghanistan, China to Iran, in the years before the military finally took the bull by the horns.
Lately, though, insurgents have once again started wriggling. They have not only appeared on the information radar again – groups indulging in infighting, leaders joining IS, etc – but also upped the armed rebellion that froze over the last few months. Yet their ability to strike back was not taken seriously till the Wagah border incident last week. With more than sixty dead and over a hundred injured, it is one of the worst terrorist attacks in the country’s history. And as such, must mark the beginning of blowback proper as far as the military is concerned.
It is, however, extremely concerning that intelligence agencies had made the interior ministry and the Punjab government aware of a possible attack at Wagah well in advance, yet nothing was done to forestall the hit. Relevant institutions no doubt understood that as the operation, and its spillover, travelled down the mountains and southwards into the rest of the country, it would necessarily become more intel-intensive. That means, of course, that armoured carriers, tanks and helicopter gunships would give way to intelligence operations, surveillance and arrests. However, even if timely intelligence is unable to provide results, then some serious reorientation is in order. The interior minister cut a sorry figure recently when he blamed financial problems for the dilly-dally on NACTA. If there is money for bullet trains and metro busses, why not for a far more pressing national emergency? The sooner the intelligence machinery is coordinated with relevant state institutions, the better for the war against terrorism. Otherwise, what is won in the mountains may well be lost in the cities.
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