Redefining the scope of CII

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Clueless about issues of statecraft

Evolving consensus and harmony among the Muslim sects is a useful task the Council of Islamic Ideology could have performed. As things stand the Council gives it the least importance. The CII proceedings strengthen the perception that the body is fixated on finding new ways to ensure the continuation of the subjugation of women. At times those sitting on the body take up issues related to statecraft for which they are poorly trained. What happened at the latest moot was no different.

Communal terrorists, particularly groups under the Salafi influence, have launched vicious attacks on Shi’a mosques and Imambargahs as well as on the shrines of saints and Sufi poets widely respected in the country. They have indulged in genocide of the Hazaras in Balochistan, where they conducted some of the bloodiest attacks. For the CII, however, the issue of ensuring harmony between the various sects remains confined only to a discussion on maintaining communal peace during Muharram. The CII has provisionally declared Pakistan Protection Ordinance un-Islamic. The law meant in the main to deal with the TTP terrorists was opposed by Chairman Shirani for, according to him, it had roots in the western concept of a ‘New World Order’. This amply indicates the limitations of the clerics in comprehending the issues related the running of the country.

The main item on the agenda related to the rights of women, the most favourite subject of the CII. The chairman called upon the government to repeal sections of the Muslim Marriage Act 1939 under which a Muslim woman can demand divorce if her husband marries a second, third or fourth time. He again supported child marriage and pronounced that a woman cannot be the judge in Hudood or Qisas cases. While the recommendations highlight the primitive thinking that prevails in the CII, this is the sort of material that the opponents of Islam use to malign Muslims. There is a dire need to redefine and limit the scope of the CII.