Divided on sectarian grounds
Ever since the demise of the communist threat in 1991, leading scholars have been proliferating their visions on as to how world politics would reshape. Amongst all, Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” has been ruling the academic debate for the past two decades. According to Huntington’s hallucination the conflicts of post cold war era would occur along the cultural fault lines – regions, ethnic groups, nationalities and religious groups – separating civilisations at two levels: firstly, micro level groups for control of territory; and secondly, macro level states for military and economic power to internationally promote their political and religious values.
The ongoing situation in the Middle East (ME) suggests that Huntington’s theory has already started showing its worst colours. Unfortunately, Islamic countries have gone a step ahead by indulging them into sectarianism while negating Huntington’s claim that the future theatre of war would constitute the west verses the rest. Furthermore, both micro and macro fault lines are today prominent on the ME landscape.
As regards the element of religion in international relations, there exist two opposite schools of thought. The first, while downplaying the religious factor, believes that international relations is a secular social science where religion is not a deciding factor in formulating a state’s policy. They argue that the breakup of Christendom after Peace of Westphalia-1648 and dissolution of Ottoman Empire-1924 gave birth to the modern state system in Europe and the Islamic world respectively. Since then, nation-states have always preferred their extreme national interests – survival, security, sovereignty, territorial and economic gains – in deciding their relations with other actors of the international community.
The second group integrates religion into the study of populist politics and claims that ever since the creation of Israel and the episode of 9/11, religion has increasingly been a central factor in relations within and especially among states.
The ongoing situation in the Middle East (ME) suggests that Huntington’s theory has already started showing its worst colours. Unfortunately, Islamic countries have gone a step ahead by indulging them into sectarianism while negating Huntington’s claim that the future theatre of war would constitute the west verses the rest
As Christianity is divided into catholic and protestant factions, the Muslim world is divided in Sunni and Shi’a Islamic states. There are overall 87-90 per cent Sunni and 10-13 per cent Shi’a Muslims spread all over the world. Saudi Arabia being a typical Sunni majority country has approximately 85-90 per cent of Sunni and 10-15 per cent Shi’a population. Similarly, Iran is a typical example of Shi’a state with around 90 per cent of Shi’a versus 10 per cent of Sunni populace.
Syria and Iraq are two variants where majority population has/had been governed by minorities. Syria holds t per cent Sunni, 16 per cent Shi’a (Alawites) and 10 per cent Christians population. The power, however, remained with minority Alawites since 1920s when Syria became French colony on the fall of Ottoman Empire. The power structure in Syria kept swinging between the two sects after its independence in 1946. In 1970 Air Force General Hafez al-Assad – an Alawite – assumed power on the podium of Ba’ath Party. Hafez maintained a good balance during his regime. The visibility of many Sunnis in top elite positions rarely assuaged the fears of some Syrians that the state’s machinery was completely dominated by a secretive, all-powerful, and monolithic Alawite community. The incumbent Bashr al-Asad, conversely, lost the strategic balance.
On the contrary, Shi’a Muslims are in majority in Iraq with 60-65 per cent against Sunni Muslims with 30-35 per cent of total population. Historically, Shi’a were denied their right to govern as they opposed the British occupation of Iraq during WW-I, and minority Sunni Arabs were delegated the reins of power by the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill. Any protest against the minority rule in Iraq had been brutally suppressed. Just to quote during Saddam’s era half a million Shi’a Muslims perished.
The present scenario in ME, though, emerged from the Arab-Spring – ignited from Tunisia in 2011 as a political movement to overthrow authoritarian regimes – its present picture is, rather, purely sectarian which emerged due to the strategic linkage of the Arab-Spring with Sunni resistance movements.
Since 2003 a number of strategic developments have contributed in shaping the regional political and security behaviour: firstly, different political actors were tried by the US in Iraq who all failed to ensure perpetual stability; secondly, the prevailing pseudo-democracy empowered the Shi’a majority after over nine decades of minority rule; thirdly, instead developing a national consensus Iraq transformed into a Shi’a state; fourthly, the two groups with complete trust deficit started competing in a zero-sum game for control over Iraqi political institutions, hence, plunging the country into civil war; lastly, the resisting Sunni Muslims including a large majority of trained Sunni soldiers deserted/expelled from Iraqi army, joined hands with resistance groups fighting against al-Assad in Syria.
Former Iraqi premier Maliki stands guilty on two accounts: initially, for not developing national consensus by taking all the sectarian and ethnic groups in the main national stream; and finally, failing in threat perception and timely mobilising forces against onslaught of ISIS deep inside Iraqi territory.
It may also be pertinent to critically examine Obama’s foreign policy towards ME in a realist paradigm. In one simple sentence, it is nothing short of total failure. Washington think-tanks and leadership have not only been fractured on formulating their state’s response towards Syrian crisis but have also completely misread the regional situation.
From the beginning of the revolt against President Assad in 2011, Syria has become a proxy battle ground for regional and international actors. In their long struggle for regional supremacy, Saudi Arabia and Iran are the core players in two battle groups: (1) the US led proxy includes Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and even Israel – all supporting the Syrian Sunni rebels to topple Assad; and, (2) the Sino-Russian led proxy constitutes Iran and states of Iraq and Syria – supporting Bashar al-Assad against the Sunni fighters. Where Sunni rebels were provided funds and weapons by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, the Shi’a-ruled neighbours, Iran and Iraq, dispatched Hezbollah fighters and Iraqi militiamen to rescue Assad’s army.
The present scenario in ME, though, emerged from the Arab-Spring – ignited from Tunisia in 2011 as a political movement to overthrow authoritarian regimes – its present picture is, rather, purely sectarian which emerged due to the strategic linkage of the Arab-Spring with Sunni resistance movements
Interestingly, the White House has been playing quite an opposing role in Iraq and Syria. While it’s been supporting the Sunni fighters against Syrian Shi’a regime, simultaneously it’s also been supporting the Iraqi Shi’a government in crushing the Sunni militants. One thing which the US analysts missed was the strategic linkage of opposition Sunni groups both in Syria and Iraq fighting against their regimes. This strategic linkage of all interest groups provided an opportunity to radical groups to carve out ISIS and make the region a cockpit for conflicts.
Political and defence analyst view it all as the US long term “anticipatory intelligence” and policy failure. According to James Clipper, the director of the US national intelligence, the analysts had reported the group’s emergence and its “prowess and capabilities” but failed to predict their will to fight. The US policy in ME can also be gauged with its outcome since 2003. Quoting Dr N Janardhan, the region has become a hub of crises rather than stability. Critics in the US, both from ruling Democrats and Republican opponents argue that Obama’s changed track policy is a decision taken in political desperation – in the aftermath of ISIS’s beheading of two Americans – and could lead to more strategic miscalculations.
Just to mention Pakistan, though a Sunni majority country (85-89 per cent) with the world’s second largest Shi’a minority (10-15 per cent), has always been considered as a moderate Islamic state. Fawaz A Gergis – the leading Lebanese-American philosopher – in his book “America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?” states that after disintegration of USSR, the US administration asked the newly emerged Central Asian Islamic states to follow the moderate Pakistani model of Islam. Though there have been numerous conspiracy theories to ignite Shi’a-Sunni conflicts in the country, Pakistani society stands united to foils all such attempts. The mere reason of it the equal share of all religious, sectarian and ethnic communities in politics, military and bureaucracy.
As a responsible international actor Pakistan has always played a positive role in balancing relations not only in the Muslim world but also in bridging the gap between the west and the east. Despite being the US frontline ally against communist USSR, Pakistan and China, on the other hand, have historically been best friend. Pakistan not only maintained a strategic balance in its relations with the US and China, but also played a significant role in easing tensions between the two – paving a way for President Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972.
Pakistan enjoys equally good relations with all Muslim states. It has commonality of interests with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The best role that Pakistan’s foreign office can play is to take advantage of its credible relations with Islamic world and the US. While standing within the international community and seeking support of other external actors, Pakistan can mediate and help bridge the sectarian gap among Islamic states.
